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SUMMARY 
 
 
 
This thesis is concerned with REACH, the EU Regulation on the Registration, 
Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals, and its regulator, the 
European Chemicals Agency (‘ECHA’). It has two overriding objectives. The first is 
to provide an exposition of REACH. The Regulation is vast and has been called, 
"possibly the most controversial and complex piece of legislation in European 
history", by one of the EU Commissioners who oversaw its genesis. Despite (or 
possibly because of) this, there is comparatively little substantive writing on REACH.  
 
The second aim of this thesis is to explore REACH using new governance literature 
and, in particular, writing which looks at post legislative norm elaboration via the use 
of guidance. The text of the Regulation stands at more than 130,000 words. The most 
recent consolidated version of REACH is 516 pages long. The Regulation is complex 
and dense and lengthy. Accompanying this complex legislation are more than one 
million words of official guidance produced by ECHA. To date, there have been a 
small handful of case studies which use particular legislative regimes to explore the 
challenges posed by post legislative norm elaboration via guidance. The yoking of 
post legislative soft norms to REACH has seen a complex transformation; one which 
was only partially foreseen in the Regulation (and likely also only partly foreseen in 
the minds of the legislature). As such, REACH is a good example of an evolving 
system of EU governance that is both associated with the Community Method and is 
also differentiated, new, complex and nuanced. However, REACH also acts as a 
challenge to a number of assumptions in the new governance literature, including: that 
new governance is non-hierarchical; that yoked soft norms are complementary and 
come only from the state; and that soft law elaborates solely on framework norms.  
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ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
The language of chemicals regulation is at times dense, complicated by a number of 
acronyms and terms which belie their ordinary meaning. These are not of my own 
creation, but are set out in statute or various guidance documents. The law under 
study requires one to know: how ‘IUCLID’ relates to a ‘SIEF’; to be able to identify a 
‘CMR’ from a ‘vPvB’; to understand that ‘CSR’ means something other than 
corporate social responsibility; and that an ‘OR’ is something wholly unrelated to 
hospitals (unless, of course, negotiations in a SIEF become overly heated). Academics 
will be glad to hear that ‘REF’ has something to with enforcement and nothing to do 
with star ratings. The following list of abbreviations provides an introduction to the 
main specialised terms and acronyms used in this thesis.  
 
 
A 
Agency The European Chemicals Agency 
Article An object which during production is given a special shape, surface or 
design which determines its function to a greater degree than does its 
chemical composition. While the exact meaning of this term is in dispute, 
articles are essentially ‘things’ (pens, books, computers) as opposed to 
chemical substances 
Authorisation
1
 Process by which harmful substances are identified and removed from the 
EU market, while progressively being replaced by suitable alternatives. 
Includes the possibility for applicants to seek a time limited authorisation 
to keep the harmful substances on the market 
C 
CA Competent Authority 
Candidate List Substances that may have serious and often irreversible effects on human 
health and the environment are called ‘substances of very high concern’ 
(SVHCs). If a substance is identified as an SVHC, it will be added to the 
Candidate List for eventual inclusion in the Authorisation List 
CAS Chemical Abstract Service. The CAS maintains the most comprehensive 
list of chemical substances. Each substance registered in the CAS Registry 
is assigned a CAS Registry Number. The CAS Registry Number 
(commonly referred to as the CAS number) is widely used as a unique 
identifier of chemical substances 
CBI Confidential Business Information 
CEFIC European Chemical Industry Council 
CLP Council Regulation (EC) 1272/2008 on the classification, labelling and 
packaging of substances and mixtures [2008] OJ L353/1 
CMR Carcinogenic, Mutagenic or Toxic to Reproduction 
CSA Chemical Safety Assessment 
                                                        
1
 It is probably worth noting here that REACH uses the s-pelling and not the z-spelling for 
‘Authorisation’. The same approach is taken in this thesis.  
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CSR Chemical Safety Report 
D 
DNEL Derived No Effect Limit. A DNEL is the level of exposure to the substance 
below which no adverse effects are expected to occur 
DU Downstream User. A DU means any natural or legal person established 
within the Community, other than the manufacturer or the importer, who 
uses a substance, either on its own or in a preparation, in the course of his 
industrial or professional activities. This does not include consumers or 
distributors 
E 
ECB European Chemicals Bureau 
ECHA European Chemicals Agency 
EINECS European Inventory of Existing Commercial Chemical Substances. 
EINECS lists and defines all chemical substances that were on the 
European Community market between 1 January 1971 and 18 September 
1981 
Evaluation Limited assessment of data submitted to ECHA as part of Registration 
Existing 
Chemicals 
Chemicals that were reported to be on the market in 1981, when the 
requirement to notify new chemicals entered into force. There are about 
100,000 existing chemicals 
G 
GHS Globally Harmonised System of Classification and Labelling of Chemicals. 
Developed by the United Nations 
GLP Good Laboratory Practice 
H 
HPV High Production Volume. HPV was used in pre-REACH EU chemicals 
legislation for substances manufactured annually in volumes of more than 
1,000 tonnes. The term is no longer relevant under REACH, but it is 
currently still use for the global risk assessment of chemicals e.g. by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
I 
Intermediate A substance that is manufactured for and consumed in or used for chemical 
processing in order to be transformed into another substance 
IUCLID 5 International Uniform ChemicaL Information Database 5. This software is 
used by registrants to prepare their registration dossiers under REACH  
 
 
M 
Manufacturer Any natural or legal person established within the Community who 
manufactures a substance within the Community 
Monomer A molecule that can combine with others to form a polymer 
MS Member State 
MSCA Member State Competent Authority 
  
ix 
 
N 
New Chemical Chemicals that have been placed on the market since 1981. These had to be 
notified to the Competent Authorities under pre-REACH chemicals 
legislation. There are around 3,400 'new' chemicals currently on the market 
No Longer 
Polymer 
A No Longer Polymer, or NLP, is a substance which was considered as 
notified under Article 8 (1) of the 6th amendment of Directive 67/54/EEC 
(and hence did not have to be notified under that Directive), but which does 
not meet the REACH definition of a polymer (which is the same as the 
polymer definition introduced by the 7th amendment of Directive 
67/548/EEC) 
Notified 
Substance 
A substance for which a notification has been submitted and which could 
be placed on the market in accordance with Directive 67/548/EEC. 
Notified substances also used to be termed 'new substances' 
O 
OEL Occupational Exposure Limit 
OR Only Representative 
P 
PBT Persistent Bio-accumulative and Toxic 
Phase In 
Substances 
REACH has a special transitional regime for substances which, under 
certain conditions, were already manufactured or placed on the market 
before REACH's entry into force. Such substances are called phase-in 
substances 
Polymer A substance consisting of molecules characterised by the sequence of one 
or more types of monomer units 
Preparation A mixture or solution composed of two or more substances 
Pre-
Registration 
Period, between 1 June and 1 December 2008, which allowed potential 
registrants of the same phase-in substance to get together and submit a 
registration dossier jointly. Pre-registration was a requisite to benefit from 
the extended registration deadlines foreseen for these substances 
Priority List Lists of priority substances which require immediate attention because of 
their potential effects to man or the environment 
PPORD Product and process orientated research and development. PPORD means 
any scientific development related to product development or the further 
development of a substance, on its own, in preparations or in articles in the 
course of which pilot plant or production trials are used to develop the 
production process and/or to test the fields of application of the substance 
Q 
QSAR Quantitative Structure Activity Relationship. It is the relationship between 
the physical and\or chemical properties of a substance and their ability to 
cause a particular effect 
R 
REACH Council Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 concerning the Registration, 
Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals  
REF ‘REACH En Force’. Projects of ECHA’s Forum on Enforcement 
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Registrant The manufacturer or the importer of a substance or the producer or 
importer of an article submitting a registration for a substance 
Registration  The submission to ECHA by a registrant of a registration dossier 
Registration 
Dossier 
A dossier containing technical data about the intrinsic properties of 
chemicals. May also contain a CSR 
Restriction REACH process under which limits or bans may be made on the 
manufacture, placing on the market or use of a substance 
RIP REACH Implementation Project 
S 
SAR A structure-activity relationship (SAR) is a (qualitative) association 
between a chemical substructure and the potential of a chemical containing 
the substructure to exhibit a certain biological effect 
SDS Safety Data Sheet 
SEA Socio Economic Analysis 
SIEF Substance Information Exchange Forum 
SME Small and Medium Enterprise 
SPORT Strategic Partnerships on REACH Testing 
Substance A chemical element and its compounds in the natural state or obtained by 
any manufacturing process 
SVHC Substances of Very High Concern 
Substitution Principle of REACH which seeks to replace harmful chemicals on the EU 
market with less harmful alternatives 
T 
Technical 
Dossier 
Used to refer either to the data required for registration under Article 10(a) 
of REACH or to one part of the dossier of data required under Annex XV 
Tonnage 
Threshold 
Volume based criteria for different requirements under REACH, 
formulated as "X tonnes/year per manufacturer/importer" 
 
U 
UVCB Unknown or Variable Composition 
V 
vPvB Very Persistent and Very Bioaccumulative 
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CHAPTER 1  
 
INTRODUCTION
1
  
 
 
We eat them. We breathe them. They seep into our skin without our knowledge or 
permission. Every day, we come into contact with hundreds of natural and synthetic 
chemicals and we know almost nothing about what they may be doing to us. Of the 
more than 100,000 chemicals on the EU market, it is estimated that around one third 
likely result in little exposure and another 20% or so only present minimal risks.
2
 This 
leaves over 40,000 chemicals to which we are exposed. By 2007, less than 1% of all 
chemicals on the market had been tested by the State as a result of regulatory 
requirements, with industry having voluntarily tested a mere 80 substances between 
1995 and 2005.
3
 Since then, some progress has been made, but we still live largely in 
a world of toxic ignorance.
4
  While it is difficult to quantify the myriad harms from 
chemicals, the World Health Organisation has estimated that 5% of the global burden 
of disease can be attributed to chemical exposures.
5
 This equates to around 3 million 
deaths per year.
6
 
 
In 1962, Rachel Carson published ‘Silent Spring’, a damning review of mankind’s 
attempts to dominate nature using synthetic chemicals.
7
 The nightmare in which 
widespread chemical spraying wipes out insects and birds has not happened, but 
Carson’s warnings are still highly relevant and, if anything, more urgent fifty years 
on. The aims of EU chemicals legislation have been to generate much needed 
                                                        
1
 Some of this Chapter appears in print as: Elen Stokes and Steven Vaughan, ‘Great Expectations: 
Reviewing Five Decades of EU Chemicals Control’ 25(3) Journal of Environmental Law 411. For the 
avoidance of doubt, the only materials taken from the article which appear in this Chapter are those 
which I authored myself.  
2
 Commission, ‘White Paper on the Strategy for a future Chemicals Policy’ COM (2001) 88 final 
3
 Liz Stanton, ‘European Chemicals Industry Faces Regulatory Upheaval’ (2005) 7 Environmental Law 
Review 231, 231 
4
 The use of ‘toxic ignorance’ comes from a 1997 report by the Environmental Defense Fund. See: 
<http://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/243_toxicignorance_0.pdf>, accessed 10 August 2014. For a 
more recent review of this ‘toxic ignorance’ see: Carl F Cranor, Legally Poisoned: How the Law Puts 
Us at Risk from Toxicants (Harvard University Press 2011) 
5
  World Health Organisation, ‘World Health Report’ (2002) – see: 
<http://www.who.int/whr/2002/en/whr02_en.pdf> accessed 10 August 2014 
6
  World Health Organisation, ‘Global Burden of Disease’ (2012) – see: 
<http://www.who.int/topics/global_burden_of_disease/en/> accessed 10 August 2014 
7
 Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (Fawcett Crest 1964) 
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information about impacts and to protect against potential harms. To these ends, the 
EU has adopted a host of legislative instruments, each with different features but all 
contributing to the control of chemicals across a range of commercial sectors.  This 
thesis is concerned with REACH, the EU Regulation on the Registration, Evaluation, 
Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals,
8
 and its regulator, the European 
Chemicals Agency (‘ECHA’). REACH is the flagship of the EU’s regulatory regimes 
for chemicals and was hoped to mark a stark departure from previous legislation. In 
many ways, however, this is just the beginning. The story of REACH has some way 
to go. 
 
This thesis has two key objectives. The first is to provide an exposition of REACH. 
The Regulation is vast and has been called, "possibly the most controversial and 
complex piece of legislation in European history", by one of the EU Commissioners 
who oversaw its genesis.
9
 Despite (or possibly because of) this, there is comparatively 
little academic writing on REACH. This thesis thus claims part of its originality in 
providing the first, rigorous and in-depth review of each of the elements of the 
Regulation. The second aim of this thesis is to explore REACH using literature on 
hard and soft law and, in particular, writing which looks at post legislative norm 
elaboration via the use of guidance. The text of the Regulation stands at more than 
130,000 words. The most recent consolidated version of REACH is 516 pages long. 
The Regulation is complex and dense and lengthy. Accompanying this complex 
legislation are more than one million words of official guidance produced by 
ECHA.
10
 To date, there have been a mere handful of case studies which use particular 
legislative regimes to explore the challenges posed by post legislative norm 
elaboration via guidance.
11
  
 
This thesis argues that while the text of REACH looks complex, much of the 
operation of the Regulation is framed and given form by the underlying guidance, 
which at times is more than and at times less than the requirements set out in the 
                                                        
8
 Council Regulation (EC) 1907/2006 on the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of 
Chemicals (REACH) [2006] OJ L33/1 
9
 Gunter Verheugen, EU Industry Commissioner 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/1503325/Most-controversial-European-law-
wins-parliamentary-approval.html#> accessed 10 August 2014  
10
 See: <guidance.echa.europa.eu/ guidance.echa.europa.eu/> accessed 10 August 2014 
11
 These are explored in Chapter 2 
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legislation. This thesis suggests that there are four ways in which ECHA’s post 
legislative guidance shapes the operation of the Regulation. I term these 
‘amplification’, ‘standardisation’, ‘translation’ and ‘extrapolation’. It is submitted that 
amplification occurs where guidance produced by ECHA goes beyond, but is not in 
direct contradiction with, the text of the Regulation. Standardisation is argued to be a 
subset of the amplification function. Here, the goal of ECHA is to channel registrants 
(and others) down given avenues of action (not set out specifically in the text of 
REACH) in order to make the tasks for which ECHA is responsible more 
manageable. With translation, I argue that while the text of REACH is clear, the 
Agency, in its guidance, implicitly contests the drafting of the Regulation and 
‘translates’ the relevant provisions into something else. Finally, extrapolation is said 
to occur where REACH is silent on something that is necessary for the effective 
working of the Regulation and ECHA, through its guidance, fills in the legislative 
gap. While the first two of these actions by ECHA can be seen to be legitimate 
endeavours of an EU agency, the third is more troublesome. The fourth certainly 
involves a level of invention on the part of ECHA but, as will be seen in this thesis, 
there have only been limited instances of extrapolation to date. This thesis also 
challenges a number of assumptions built into existing scholarship on new 
governance. It argues that soft law can be just as detailed and as thick as hard law, and 
that hierarchy and differentiation can be seen in soft norms just as they can in hard. 
This thesis challenges the assumption that yoked, hybrid (hard and soft) norms come 
only from public actors and the assumption that yoked soft norms are always 
complementary to their backstopped hard law. The careful documentary analysis 
offered up in this thesis is argued to be justification for greater granularity in new 
governance scholarship and a call to avoid bright line dichotomies. What is seen with 
REACH is more complex, more nuanced and messier than can be accounted for in 
simple dyads. Nuance and detail in this context are helpful because they help us to 
understand exactly what is going on with changes to EU norms, and the development 
of the EU legal order over time, and such an approach avoids reductive scholarship 
based on superficial observations of change. Each of these matters is explored in more 
depth in Chapter 9. 
 
This Chapter begins with a brief overview of modern EU chemicals regulatory 
regimes. It then sets out the challenges in chemicals risk assessment and management 
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before turning to the history of chemicals control and, in particular, the history of 
REACH. This Chapter ends by providing a summary of each of the Chapters which 
follow in this thesis. It is worth noting at this point that my field of study is the EU. 
Despite this, the global market (regulatory and industrial) in chemicals is huge. In his 
review of global trends in chemicals management, Bengtsson identifies upwards of 
100 international agreements and programmes on chemicals risk management and 
monitoring, with a number of mechanisms of international co-ordination.
12
  Further 
work could be usefully done on differentiation and globalisation in chemical norms.
13
  
 
 
Current EU Chemicals Regulation 
 
Europe, it has been said, is ‘carrying the flag of a chemicals regulatory revolution.’14 
Modern chemicals regulation within the EU is diffuse, the Commission having 
recently documented 156 separate pieces of existing EU legislation which concern, in 
some fashion, the control and use of chemicals.
15
 As a regulator, the EU is concerned 
with the intrinsic properties of chemicals (via REACH and via CLP, discussed 
below), specific sectoral applications of those chemicals (including pesticides
16
 and 
biocides)
17
 and with point sources and emissions of chemicals (through rules on 
waste,
18
 water quality,
19
 air quality,
20
 environmental permitting,
21
 etc). More widely, 
                                                        
12
 Gunnar Bengtsson, ‘Global Trends in Chemicals Management’ in Johan Eriksson, Michael Gilek and 
Christina Rudén (eds) Regulating Chemical Risks (Springer 2010) 
13
 Veerle Heyvaert, ‘Globalizing Regulation: Reaching Beyond the Borders of Chemical Safety’ (2009) 
36(1) Journal of Law and Society 110 
14
 Candido Garcia Molyneux, ‘Chemicals’ 5 Yearbook of European Environmental Law 327 
15
 Commission, ‘Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions in accordance with Article 117(4) 
of REACH and Article 46(2) of CLP, and a review of certain elements of REACH in line with Articles 
75(2), 138(2), 138(3) and 138(6) of REACH: Staff Working Document (SWD (2013) 25 final) 4 
(hereafter, the 2012 REACH Review) 
16
 Council Regulation (EC) 1107/2009 concerning the placing of plant protection products on the 
market and repealing Council Directives 79/117/EEC and 91/414/EEC [2009] OJ L309/1 
17
 Council Regulation (EU) 528/2012 concerning the making available on the market and use of 
biocidal products [2012] OJ L167/1 
18
 Council Directive (EU) 2011/65 on the restriction of the use of certain hazardous substances in 
electrical and electronic equipment [2011] OJ L2011/174 
19
 Council Directive (EC) 2000/60 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water 
policy [2000] OJ L 327/1 
20
 Council Directive (EC) 2001/81 on national emissions ceilings for certain atmospheric pollutants 
[2001] OJ L309/27 
21
 Council Directive (EC) 96/61 concerning integrated pollution prevention and control [1996] OJ L257 
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the EU also controls impacts from chemicals through import/export,
22
 product 
safety,
23
 worker protection,
24
 and food safety regulation.
25
 Generally (and excluding 
REACH and CLP), modern chemicals regulation is context-specific, relating, for 
example, to specific exposure settings (occupational, consumer, environmental) and 
environmental media (emissions into surface and groundwater, local atmosphere).
26
 
There are, as would be expected, degrees of overlap and ‘double regulation’ between 
these 156 instruments.
27
   
 
Since 2007, REACH has been the primary piece of control legislation for chemicals 
in the EU. At its most basic, REACH requires the generation of data on the intrinsic 
properties of certain chemical substances (around 45,000 of the 105,000 substances 
currently on the EU market) by the private sector (namely, the manufacturers, 
importers and, in limited circumstances, downstream users of those chemical 
substances) followed by the registration of those substances (accompanied by their 
testing data) with a new EU regulatory body, ECHA. Certain substances identified 
(either as a result of industry testing or via Member State nomination) as particularly 
harmful to human health or the environment will be banned (either in full or in certain 
applications); others may be granted a time limited authorisation by the Commission 
to remain on the market if it can be proved that the risks from those substances can be 
adequately managed, or where the use can be justified on socio-economic grounds 
and no suitable alternatives are available. Member States have individual 
responsibility for enforcement of the regime. It is worth noting that REACH excludes 
from its ambit substances directly regulated by other pieces of EU legislation and 
substances contained in products which are regulated by specific legislation. A study 
by Milieu has identified how these exclusions lead to gaps in risk assessment and 
                                                        
22
 Council Regulation (EC) 689/2008 concerning the export and import of dangerous chemicals [2008] 
OJ L204/1 
23
 Council Directive (EC) 2001/95 on general product safety [2001] OJ L11/1 
24
 The starting point here is: Council Directive 89/391/EC on the introduction of measures to encourage 
improvements in the safety and health of workers at work [1989] OJ L183/1 
25
 Primarily, Council Regulation (EC) No 1331/2008 establishing a common authorisation procedure 
for food additives, food enzymes and food flavourings (as amended) [2008] OJ L354/1. For other 
legislation in this area, see:  <http://ec.europa.eu/food/index_en.htm> accessed 10 August 2014  
26
 It is worth noting here that little has been done as regards EU harmonisation on chemical, and other 
impacts, to land.  
27
 These are set out in detail in: Milieu Ltd, ‘Technical assistance related to the scope of REACH and 
other relevant EU legislation to assess overlaps’ (Report to the European Commission, 2012)  
<http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/chemicals/files/reach/review2012/scope-final-report_en.pdf> 
accessed 10 August 2014  
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creates an uneven field in chemical testing and evaluation across the EU.
28
 Risk 
assessment is discussed in more depth below. 
 
REACH is complemented by the CLP, the 2008 Regulation for Classification, 
Labeling and Packaging of Substances and Mixtures.
29
 This Regulation incorporates 
the classification criteria and labeling rules agreed at UN level, namely the Globally 
Harmonised System of Classification and Labeling of Chemicals (GHS). GHS is 
based on the principle that the same hazards should be described and labeled in the 
same way all around the world. While REACH and CLP are complementary and, in 
some ways, interlinked, this thesis is concerned solely with REACH. 
 
Toxic Ignorance: Using and Assessing Chemicals 
 
There are a series of challenges in understanding the risks from chemicals. These 
challenges impact on and frame the regulatory structures for chemicals control. The 
overview which follows is thus useful for understanding some of the difficulties with 
REACH, and its predecessors, that are explored throughout this Chapter and those 
which follow. 
 
Every substance has the potential to harm us, be it natural or synthetic. Building on 
observations by Paracelsus in the 16
th
 century, Durodie comments that 
 
“As every toxicologist knows, all substances produce an effect – it is the dose 
that makes the poison. The fact that a substance contains a toxin does not make 
it poisonous: if this was true, all foods, which inevitably contain salt, a known 
toxin at high doses, would have to be banned.”30 
 
The fundamental difference, according to dominant conceptualisations of harm, is 
between hazard (the inherent potential harmfulness of the chemical) and risk (how 
and to what extent a receptor is exposed to the hazard). In terms of hazard, chemicals 
                                                        
28
 ibid 
29
 Council Regulation (EC) on classification, labelling and packaging of substances and mixtures 
[2008] OJ L353/1 
30
 Bill Durodie, ‘The True Cost of Precautionary Chemicals Regulation’ (2003) 23 Risk Analysis 389 
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may cause cancer, mutate our genes or be harmful to reproduction.
31
 They can 
accumulate and persist in the environment to such a degree that the same synthetic 
chemicals can be found in breast milk and polar bears.
32
 The extent to which 
chemicals actually cause harm (i.e. their risk) is more contingent and contested, and 
rests ultimately on the variability of exposure. In the last fifty years, worldwide 
production of chemicals has risen from 10 million tonnes p/a to over 400 million 
tonnes p/a.
33
 Cefic, the EU chemicals industry lobbying organisation, estimates that 
the same number of people work in the chemicals sector in the EU as make up the 
entire working population of Belgium.
34
  
 
Outside occupational contexts, interaction with chemical substances is commonplace 
in almost every aspect of our lives: the clothes we wear, the food we eat, the air we 
breathe, the products we buy. Despite this, and despite the massive increase in 
chemicals production over the last five decades, we know very little about their 
precise uses, circulation and implications, particularly those beyond the short term.  
Alongside our increasing dependence on chemicals, societal attitudes towards 
chemicals and the chemicals industry have also changed over time. Gunningham, for 
example, notes that,  
“Over the last 50 years the public image of the chemical industry has changed 
from that of the miracle provider of scientific products enhancing the wellbeing 
of the community to that of the demon, capable of destroying the world in the 
interest of private profit.”35   
 
In the 2013 Eurobarometer on Chemicals, 61% of respondents said they felt that 
chemicals on the EU market are safer today than they were 10 years ago (although the 
study does not drill down into why EU citizens feel this nor, indeed, do we know just 
how unsafe chemicals were perceived as being a decade ago).
36
  It is precisely these 
inconsistencies and contradictions, between reliance on the one hand and potential 
                                                        
31
 Randell C Baselt, Disposition of Toxic Drugs and Chemicals in Man (9
th
 edn, Atlas Books 2011) 
32
 Margot Wallstrom, ‘Beyond REACH’ (European Voice Conference, Brussels, 31 March 2003) 
33
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Substances, and the Case of Anti-fouling Paints’ in Johan Eriksson, Michael Gilek and Christina Rudén 
(eds) Regulating Chemical Risks (Springer 2010) 163 
34
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35
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Criminology Research Council, Australian Centre for Environmental Law, 1994) 3 
36
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detriment on the other, that make chemical regulation a particularly vexing problem 
and a particularly interesting field of study. 
 
An important part of the scientific enterprise is the development of assessments, 
investigations, standards of proof, and research methodologies “to produce 
comparatively objective knowledge that will stand the test of time.”37 Much has been 
written on risk regulation, science and decision-making and on the sociology of 
scientific knowledge.
38
 It is not my intention to replicate that work here. It suffices, 
however, to say that certainty and objectivity in the production of scientific 
knowledge are themselves contested. The standard tripos of risk management sees 
hazards identified, evaluated and ‘risk’ (the likelihood that the hazard will materialise 
in a given situation) minimised as far as possible.  In the context of chemicals, risk 
assessment is and has been imperfect. As Applegate and Campbell-Mohn put it, 
“Inferences, extrapolation and assumptions necessarily pervade the…risk assessment 
process.”39  With regard to chemicals, Hansson and Ruden highlight three key reasons 
for difficulties with the methods of risk assessment, leaving aside any broader issues 
of the phenomenon of producing objective data.
40
 First, it is not possible to assess the 
effects of a substance on all species under all conditions. Second, it is not possible to 
assess all combinations of exposure routes and endpoints even in a single species. 
Third, it may be impossible to distinguish even large harmful effects from random 
variations.
41
 Their argument, as opposed to that of Applegate and Campbell-Mohn, is 
that even if risk assessment was a value neutral deterministic, it would still not be 
possible to rely upon it for practical reasons in the context of chemicals. By way of 
example of the problems with risk assessment, Bengtsson comments on how 29 
separate working groups have been unable to give conclusive answers as to the 
                                                        
37
 Carl F Cranor, Toxic Torts: Science, Law and the Possibility of Justice (CUP 2006) 8 
38
 The following two pieces are useful starting points, with references to the major works in these 
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Faulkner, Bettina Lange and Christopher Lawless, ‘Material Worlds: Intersections of Law, Science, 
Technology, and Society’ (2012) 39(1) Journal of Law and Society 1 
39
 John S Applegate and Celia Campbell-Mohn, ‘Risk Assessment: Science, Law and Policy’ (2000) 14 
Natural Resources and Environment 219, 221 
40 Sven Ove Hansson and Christina Rudén, ‘REACH: What Has Been Achieved and What Needs to be 
Done’ in Johan Eriksson, Michael Gilek and Christina Rudén (eds) Regulating Chemical Risks 
(Springer 2010) 163 
41
 They give the example of how a 10% increase in cancer rates (which are generally 10% for a random 
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carcinogenicity of trichloroethylene, a single substance.
42
 These challenges become 
ever more acute where, instead of looking at single substances, we are trying to 
understand synergistic effects (the impact of Chemical A and Chemical B) or the 
impacts from complex polymers or mixtures.
43
  
 
The difficulties with testing noted in brief above mean that we have limited 
information on chemical hazards or on chemical risks. Here, the European 
Environment Agency argues that ‘‘no evidence’ does not necessarily mean ‘no 
effects.” 44  At the same time, because we know that some of the impacts from 
chemicals are significant, irreversible and have long gestation periods, waiting for 
‘hard’ correlative data may well be the wrong approach to regulating chemicals. 
There is, then, an inescapable temporal element to chemical harms. The premise 
behind much of modern chemicals control, including much of REACH, is that risks 
can be managed via hazard characterisation and then risk assessment. However, 
Majone observes that while uncertainty is accepted as being pervasive in risk 
regulation, what is less well understood is that in many cases scientific uncertainty 
cannot be reduced significantly. He gives an example from Weinberg:  
 
“…in order to determine by direct experimentation at the 95% confidence level 
whether a level of X ray radiation of 150 millirems would increase spontaneous 
mutation in mice by half of one percent, about 8 billion mice would be 
required.”45  
 
This is an area of law bound by practical limitations, but the issue is not solely one of 
‘8 billion mice’. The problem is more systemic and pathological, owing to the 
relatively short history of chemicals control in the EU and the nature and form of 
those controls. The following section discusses three general themes seen in the last 
five decades of chemicals regulation. The section which follows then looks at the 
particular history of REACH. 
 
                                                        
42
 Bengtsson (n 12) 206 
43
 European Environment Agency, ‘Chemicals in the European Environment: Low Doses, High Stakes’ 
(1998) 
44
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45
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Revolutionary it may be, but REACH is not a panacea for previous legislative ills.  
The idea that REACH provides an all-round solution is problematic, not least because 
it implies a clean break with the legislation before it.  REACH is not entirely separate 
or different from its legislative predecessors.  Rather, it is connected to and bears a 
contingent relationship with the past five decades of chemicals policies and practices.  
Looking to that past is useful because it explains why REACH is the way it is. As the 
European Commission has noted in a review of the former regulatory regimes, EU 
chemicals law has struggled with the “burden of the past.”46 
 
General Themes in Five decades of EU Chemicals Regulation 
 
In other work (with Elen Stokes), I have argued that three general themes can be seen 
in the last five decades of EU chemicals control.
47
 These are: (i) the centralisation of 
regulatory responsibility; (ii) EU colonisation and extended control, in the form of 
increasingly technical and specialised regulatory measures; and (iii) the 
standardisation of practice, particularly in areas of information provision.   
 
In the context of centralisation, early EU chemical law tells a familiar story about 
patterns of governance in the process of European integration.  In order to achieve its 
goal of market harmonisation, the EU undertook to reduce the differences among the 
national laws of Member States. Co-ordinating the economies of the (then six) 
Member States required (among other things) the assimilation of national laws.
 48
 In 
the chemicals sector, this was brought about by a series of ‘approximation of laws’ 
activities.  Given that national rules on chemicals were identified as having a “direct 
incidence” on the common market, chemical law and policy (to the extent that it had 
intra-Community trade implications) became a policy matter for EU institutions not 
Member States.
49
 Thus from 1967 onwards we saw responsibility for chemicals 
control flowing up from Member States to the EU. This then changed with REACH, 
which is said to shift the ‘burden of proof’ onto the private sector.  
 
                                                        
46
 Commission, ‘Report on the Operation of Directive 67/548/EEC, Directive 88/379/EEC, Regulation 
(EEC) 793/93, Directive 76/769/EC’ SEC (1998) final, 2 
47
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48
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Early on, the central organisation of legislative and bureaucratic tasks provided 
crucial momentum for the colonisation and control of chemical policy by the EU. 
This process was gradual, however.  Whereas the marketing and use of chemicals 
were targeted in the very early days of EU policymaking, the actual development and 
production of chemicals remained entirely free of EU regulation in the 1970s and 
80s.
50
  Initially, measures tended to focus on the impact of chemicals on a narrow 
section of society (industrial workers) but their application was limited to the post-
production stages of a chemical’s lifecycle.  Over time, the scope of chemical 
regulation broadened to encompass the protection of the environment and public 
health generally, and its gaze has since turned upstream to research and development 
activities in the laboratory and downstream to the end-of-lifecycle stage and disposal. 
However, notwithstanding the EU’s colonisation of environmental policy areas 
previously left to Member States, the simultaneous disaggregation of EU chemical 
law into sector and media-specific provisions has meant that it has tended to lack a 
coherent approach. The more sophisticated and widespread EU chemicals regulation 
became, the more it emerged as a highly compartmentalised collection of rules, 
having developed in an increasingly sectoral and specialised manner.  As Brickman et 
al comment, “Prior to the 1970s, government regulation of chemical substances was 
limited to food additives, pesticides and drugs, with some attention given to 
workplace exposures and to plant siting and construction.”51 With REACH, we see an 
attempt to regulate a much wider spread of chemicals. 
 
In conjunction with the gradually expanding remit and ambition of EU chemicals law, 
there has been a move towards increased standardisation.  This has manifested in 
several ways.  Substantively, it has been borne out by an increase in the number of 
legislative measures requiring information provision. Information is, of course, the 
great market leveler: it increases competition and reduces variety of practice across 
the Community.
52
  As discussed above, it has always been a basic tenet of chemical 
regulation that information on the nature, application and impact of chemical 
                                                        
50
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substances is limited, at best.  Early efforts to dispel the many uncertainties 
surrounding the link between exposure to chemicals and potential harm to health 
and/or environmental harm entailed the imposition of pre-market notification 
requirements. As is shown below, the lack of information of chemicals was one of the 
key reasons for the introduction of REACH.  
 
The Road to REACH 
 
Prior to REACH, the (then) Community’s general chemical regulatory framework 
consisted of: (i) Directive 67/548/EEC on classification, packaging and labeling 
(which was the first EU legislative measure on chemicals);
 53
 (ii) a 1976 Directive 
which sought to restrict the marketing and use of chemical substances;
54
 (iii) a 1993 
Regulation on the evaluation and control of ‘existing’ chemical substances (which 
required data to be transmitted to the State for evaluation);
55
 and (iv) a 1999 Directive 
on the classification, packaging and labeling of dangerous preparations.
56
 Under the 
pre-REACH regimes, how a substance was regulated depended on the date that it was 
placed on the market. If it was placed on the market before 1981, it was labeled, for 
the purposes of regulation, as an ‘existing’ chemical and legislation did not require 
any systematic testing of its intrinsic properties. If it was placed on the market in or 
after 1981, it was a ‘new’ chemical and testing was required. In 2001, of the 
c.106,000 chemicals on the EU market, less than 1% had been tested and assessed by 
the relevant EU Member States’ competent authorities. In large part, this was said to 
be the result of asymmetries between the State (as assessor of chemical risks) and the 
chemicals industry. The Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution said that the 
regulatory sphere for chemicals pre-REACH was “fragmented and differentiated.”57 
There was wide dissatisfaction with progress made under these regimes and a 
realisation that change was needed. 
                                                        
53
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Following an informal meeting of EU environmental ministers in Chester in April 
1998, the EU Commission was charged with a review of the then current chemicals 
legislation. Their report, some seven months later, highlighted,  
“the need to use the current [legal] instruments more efficiently and 
implement as well as enforce them more rigorously and consistently, the 
need to streamline the instruments and develop them in order to take 
account of new emerging problems”.  
 
Informed by a stakeholder meeting in February 1999, the Council requested that the 
European Commission develop a new strategy for more effective chemicals 
management and emphasised, “the need to work on the development of an integrated 
and coherent strategy for the future chemicals policy.”58   
 
In February 2001, the Commission published a White Paper (“Strategy for a Future 
Chemicals Policy”), which detailed a radical overhaul of existing policy, comprising 
of comprehensive risk assessment testing of all chemical substances produced or 
imported in quantities greater than one tonne per year and a new ‘burden of proof’ 
such that chemical manufacturers and importers (and not Member States, as had 
previously been the case) would the ones obliged to undertake and pay for the 
relevant testing and registrations.
59
 As for the basis of this new policy, the White 
Paper cited two main reasons: 
 
 (i) “The incidence of some diseases, e.g. testicular cancer in young men and 
allergies, has increased significantly over the last decades”; and 
 
 (ii) “There is a general lack of knowledge about the properties and uses of 
existing substances.”60 
 
It is interesting that the Commission cites the increased incidence of certain diseases 
when, as discussed earlier in this Chapter, there are real challenges in understanding 
the impacts from chemicals. This argument is also questionable as REACH is 
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concerned solely with understanding the intrinsic properties of single substances and 
does not consider synergistic effects or impacts from mixtures of chemicals (with the 
latter arguably more likely, in the real world, to impact on human health and the 
environment).  
 
The EU’s new policy on chemical risk management was set as of 13 February 2001 
when the White Paper was published. As Rogers (one of the policy advisors at the 
Commission responsible for the new chemicals strategy) comments, “White papers 
are statements of policy that are presented by the European Commission to the 
European Parliament, the European Council and other bodies and that may well be 
followed by legislative proposals.”61 Given this, presenting the new chemicals policy 
as a White Paper (and not, for example, as Green Paper) was significant. The policy 
aims had already been set by the Commission in the 35 months following the Council 
meeting in Chester; what was left was debate on their form and method of 
implementation (that is, the negotiation and drafting of REACH). 
 
From Policy to Legislation 
 
From the White Paper, the road to REACH was long and tortuous. For an in-depth 
analysis, the guide produced by Inger Schorling, MEP for the Greens/European Free 
Alliance, is particularly instructive.
62
 Over 4000 amendments to the initial draft of 
REACH were tabled, discussed and voted on during the first reading in the EU 
Parliament.
63
 41 separate regulatory impact assessments were prepared by lobbying 
groups, Member States, other countries and regions and NGOs.
64
 This may not be 
surprising as, as Heyvaert notes, “The European Parliament identified REACH as the 
single most important dossier ever to be discussed within its walls”.65 REACH was a 
radical overhaul of previous chemicals controls and would require much greater 
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involvement in risk assessment by the chemical industry and other users of chemicals. 
It was highly controversial. Between the publication of the White Paper in February 
2001 and December 2006, when the text of REACH was finally agreed, there were 
five separate stakeholder consultations or conferences, three pilot studies and eight 
official technical reports.
66
 A more detailed timetable of the road to REACH appears 
as Appendix 1 to this thesis. 
 
The two key pilot studies prior to the adoption of REACH were: ‘SPORT’, which 
looked at “strategic partnerships for chemical substance testing” (and simulated the 
element of REACH which requires the registration of chemical testing data); and 
‘PRODUCE’, which looked at the practical impacts of REACH on downstream users 
(for example, the car manufacturer who uses the specialty chemical made by a 
company subject to REACH).
67
 At the same time, there was also the SHERPER pilot, 
which looked into identifying the best strategies for establishing national REACH 
helpdesks on the basis of the needs of small and medium enterprises.
68
 As the text of 
REACH was being negotiated the Commission undertook a series of REACH 
implementation projects (or ‘RIPs’). The Commission details that these projects 
foresaw, “the development of guidance documents and IT-tools for the European 
Chemicals Agency, for industry and the authorities of the Member States”.69 This in-
tandem development of the Regulation (from the Commission via the Parliament and 
the Council) and its accompanying guidance (via other routes) is particularly 
interesting and is discussed further in Chapter 4. The following section sets out the 
methodological approach taken for this thesis.  
 
Thesis Methodology 
 
Background 
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After my law degree, I qualified as a solicitor and worked in the City, first for 
Freshfields Bruckhaus Derringer and then for Latham & Watkins. In both firms, I was 
an environmental lawyer. My clients at Latham were predominantly based in the US 
and in moving to that firm I found my role became more one of translating and 
applying EU environmental laws. At Freshfields, I had largely worked as a ‘corporate 
support lawyer’, providing advice on the analysis and transfer of environmental risks 
pertaining to corporate finance deals. At Latham, I was brought within the fold of the 
global Environmental, Land and Resources practice and introduced to partners, in the 
US, Belgium and Germany with particular expertise in EU and US chemicals 
regulation.  I also joined the American Chamber of Commerce in Brussels as a 
Latham representative and was a part of the Brussels chapter of TechAmerica, the 
industry organisation for the American electronics sector. It was in this latter role that 
I came to better understand REACH. By 2006, when I moved to Latham, REACH 
was very much on the horizon and our clients were beginning their preparations for 
the Regulation coming into force. We initially advised them on compliance strategies, 
on the setting of the mandatory manufacturer groupings (SIEFs) required under the 
legislation and on how best they should interact with ECHA.  
 
The complexity of REACH daunted me. It even daunted Latham’s partners in the US, 
some of whom had decades of experience on chemicals regulation, including as 
former employees of the US Environmental Protection Agency. I often felt that I 
never really had a good sense of both the big, overarching framework of the 
Regulation and the detail of what the individual elements required. Frequently we 
would be asked very specific questions about very small parts of the legislation. Our 
clients were equally confused by the vastness of REACH but, nevertheless, had to 
manage compliance. Two things struck me about this. The first was the way in which 
ECHA provided guidance. For the two to three years post the introduction of REACH 
(2007 onwards), the Agency seemed to be playing catch up and seemed unable to 
cope with the uncertainty and complexity that the operation of the Regulation created. 
In many instances, the Agency asked industry to draft guidance which ECHA would 
then offer to promulgate as good practice. Certainly, the current guidance is more 
sophisticated than the original versions, although this might not be immediately 
apparent, as ECHA does not make public the previous iterations of the guidance it 
issues. The second striking matter was the heavy reliance by clients (many of whom 
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were billion dollar multinationals with large in-house legal and toxicology teams) on 
industry associations for guidance and advice.  
 
When I left practice, I wanted to research something for my PhD that was large and 
relatively unexplored and dense.
70
 REACH seemed the obvious choice to me, though 
many (including many environmental law academics) find the legislation (and 
chemicals regulation more generally) both difficult and dull. REACH is certainly a 
behemoth and there have been many times when I have struggled to understand the 
complexity of the Regulation and also to understand why something had been done in 
a particular way. But I have also come to value the importance of exposition in legal 
scholarship, in being able to offer up a vision of the complexities of regulation in 
specific fields.  
 
A wealth of PhDs could be undertaken on REACH. Instead of depth on one aspect of 
REACH or one issue, I decided that I wanted to provide a rigorous and robust review 
of the entire Regulation. Certainly, this is something I would have valued while in 
practice and it is something that is missing in the existing writing on REACH (largely, 
I imagine, for reasons of time and space). I also found the interplay between ‘law’ and 
‘guidance’ fascinating. In practice, we had treated regulatory guidance as authoritative 
and spent a good deal of our time ‘lawyering’ ways around the specific wording of 
specific guidance documents (on REACH and other EU environmental laws). It was 
only on leaving practice that I had the time and space to reflect on the role of 
guidance and what its use and promulgation meant (and means) for matters like 
transparency, accountability, redress etc, which are explored in this thesis.  
 
Research Questions 
 
As set out earlier in this Chapter, this thesis has two overarching objectives. The first 
is to provide an exposition of REACH. The second aim of this thesis is to explore 
REACH using literature on hard and soft law and, in particular, writing which looks 
at post legislative norm elaboration via the use of guidance. To those ends, this thesis 
is underpinned by the following research questions: 
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1. What does REACH say and how does the Regulation work? 
 
2. What academic writing is there on REACH and what does this writing tell us 
about the Regulation and also about the scholarly interests of the authors? 
 
3. What guidance is there on REACH produced by ECHA and how does this 
guidance shape and channel the operation of the Regulation? 
 
4. What functions does the guidance serve? Are there instances where the 
guidance does more than simply explain the text of REACH? Are there 
instances where the guidance requires action that is not also set out in the text 
of the Regulation? 
  
5. What other guidance is there on REACH (for example, by trade associations) 
and how does this guidance shape and channel the operation of the 
Regulation? 
 
6. What writing is there on ‘hard law’ and ‘soft law’ and, in particular, on post 
legislative norm elaboration in the EU? 
 
7. What does the amount and nature of the guidance on REACH mean for 
current understandings of the ‘hard law’/’soft law’ divide generally and, more 
specifically, for post legislative norm elaboration in the EU? 
 
Research Design 
 
This thesis is legal doctrinal research inasmuch as it is, “research into the law and 
legal concepts” and does not draw upon empirical data.71 Referring to a ‘Statement on 
the Nature of Legal Research’ by the Council of Australian Law Deans, Hutchinson 
and Duncan suggest that,  
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“To a large extent, it is the doctrinal aspect of law that makes legal 
research distinctive and provides an often under-recognised parallel to 
‘discovery’ in the physical sciences. Doctrinal research, at its best, 
involves rigorous analysis and creative synthesis, the making of 
connections between seemingly disparate doctrinal strands, and the 
challenge of extracting general principles from an inchoate mass of 
primary materials.”72 
More specifically, this thesis uses content analysis to understand REACH and how the 
Regulation is framed and presented by ECHA (and others) via guidance. Krippendorff 
states that, “content analysis is a research technique used for making replicable and 
valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use.”73 
Bryman takes a narrower view and writes that, with content analysis, there is, “an 
emphasis on allowing categories to emerge out of data and on recognising the 
significance for understanding the meaning of the context in which an item being 
analysed (and the categories derived from it) appeared.” However, Krippendorff 
denies any absolute and necessary connection between content analysis and 
objectivity or quantification.
74
 
 
Doctrinal legal research is said to have two steps: location of the sources of law and 
then, “interpreting and analysing the text.”75 Both steps are present in this thesis and I 
would argue that second can amount to a form of content analysis. This, however, is 
not accepted by Hutchinson and Duncan.
76
 Instead, they argue that doctrinal analysis 
and content analysis differ in that the latter, “is the process of quantifying the use of 
words and then examining the language, and not simply what is being said or the 
meaning of the words in the first instance.”77 They argue that content analysis is a 
way of deconstructing text rather than reading and synthesising meaning from the 
text.
78
  It is suggested that this is based on a rather narrow understanding of content 
analysis (more in keeping with Bryman than Krippendorff) and that content analysis 
                                                        
72
 ibid, 105 
73
 Kristopher Krippendorff, Content Analysis: An Introduction to its Methodology (Sage Publications 
2013) 24 
74
 ibid, Chapter 2 
75
 Hutchinson and Duncan (n 71), 110 
76
 ibid  
77
 Hutchinson and Duncan (n 71), 118 
78
 ibid 
  
20 
 
can both read/synthesize text as well as deconstruct it. It is also submitted that much 
(but by no means all) doctrinal analysis is, in fact, a form of content analysis.  
 
As an approach, content analysis takes a variety of forms. Some content analysis (the 
school of thought on which Hutchinson and Duncan draw) seeks to take a qualitative 
approach (e.g. what words are used and what they mean) and turn that into a more 
quantitative process, through detailed coding and analysis.
79
 That is not the approach 
taken in this thesis. Instead, the text of REACH was first read in its entirety to a gain a 
sense of how the Regulation worked as a whole. The legislation was then read a 
second time, which led to the creation of Chapter 3, the general overview of REACH. 
The next step was to look at all of the available ECHA guidance. I say ‘look at’ 
because some of the guidance is wholly technical and I did not read every single word 
of every single guidance document. But I did read every section of every guidance 
document that was not purely technical. I then compared the guidance with the text of 
REACH and asked myself: what is the function of this guidance? does it add anything 
to REACH? if so, how? I also looked at the various guidance produced by the Health 
and Safety Executive (as the relevant REACH ‘competent authority’ for the UK) and 
by a number of trade associations. In terms of approach, this thesis has been part 
inductive and part deductive. My original hypothesis was that guidance produced by 
ECHA would do more than simply explain the text of REACH (simply because of its 
volume). However, my understanding of exactly what that guidance would do only 
became clear from having the read the guidance and compared it to the Regulation.  
 
The sheer amount of text has at times been overwhelming. However, the very 
complexity of REACH and the large supportive framework of accompanying 
guidance make this aspect of chemicals regulation a suitable subject for detailed, 
rigorous analysis. As McCrudden has observed, “if legal academic work shows 
anything, it shows that an applicable legal norm on anything but the most banal 
question is likely to be complex, nuanced and contested.”80 This has been seen as the 
overriding duty of the legal scholar. Indeed, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr notes that, 
“The business of the jurist is to make known the content of the law; that is, to work 
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upon it from within, or logically, arranging and distributing it, in order, from its 
stemmum genus to its infima species, so far as practicable”.81 My hope, therefore, 
with this thesis is to have made known the content of REACH and its guidance.  
 
Thesis Structure 
 
Chapter 2 of this thesis surveys the literature on new governance and on hard and soft 
law. It focuses in particular on the small subset of work which has looked at the role 
of post legislative norm elaboration via guidance. As noted above, REACH is 
complex and complicated. Because of this, Chapter 3 sets out REACH in sufficient 
detail for the reader to get a broad sense of how the Regulation works as a whole. 
This grounding in REACH sets the reader up for the more detailed reviews of 
individual aspects of REACH that take place in Chapters 4 to 8.  
 
The following five Chapters each then review a substantive element of REACH. 
Chapter 4 concerns ECHA and looks at the role and functioning of the Agency and 
how it produces guidance. It also provides an account of how guidance may be 
amenable to judicial review by the EU courts, and details how soft law is adjudicated, 
both in general as post legislative norms and in the particular jurisprudence on 
REACH. Chapter 5 unpicks how information is generated under REACH via the 
formation and operation of mandatory data sharing groupings (known as SIEFs). 
Chapter 6 then provides an account of Registration (data production and transmission 
to ECHA) and the wider role of information under REACH.  Substance bans and 
limitations are considered in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 looks at the enforcement of 
REACH, which is a matter for Member States. Chapters 5 through 8 each detail and 
critique the role of guidance in relation to the operation of REACH. Chapter 9 frames 
the contributions of this thesis within wider scholarship on new governance and 
explores, in detail, the differentiation within soft law that is seen with REACH.  
Chapter 10 brings together some overarching themes from this thesis in a short 
conclusion. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW – NEW GOVERNANCE, HARD LAW,  
SOFT LAW AND GUIDANCE 
 
 
Overview 
 
This thesis is concerned with post legislative norm elaboration via the use of 
guidance. Writing in this particular area is a subset of the literature on hard and soft 
law, which itself forms part of the much broader field of new governance. This 
literature review is primarily concerned with scholarship on hard and soft law in the 
EU, but begins by scene setting with a brief overview of new governance.   
 
Trubek and Trubek describe new governance as a, “wide range of processes which 
have developed and are designed to carry out public objectives using methods that 
differ in one way or another from classic forms of law.”1 We are concerned then with 
a plurality of non-hierarchical modes of political steering in which public 
policymakers seek to maintain social and economic order. They write that the co-
existence of new governance approaches and more classic methods of regulation (i.e. 
binding norms via legislation) is seen in, “numerous possible configurations and 
relationships”. 2 ‘New governance’ is not an homogenous approach. However, it is 
possible to set out some overarching themes. Here, De Burca and Scott argue that the 
common features of new governance approaches, “involve a shift in emphasis away 
from command and control in favour of ‘regulatory’ approaches which are less rigid, 
less prescriptive, less committed to uniform outcomes and less hierarchical in 
nature.”3 Armstrong writes that the EU is a “striking illustration” of a phenomenon 
which sees, “pluralisation and differentiation in the techniques, tools and methods 
                                                        
1
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deployed by public and private actors in the search for more legitimate and/or more 
effective means of securing economic and social governance.”4 
 
All of the authors referred to above argue that soft law falls within the realms of new 
governance. De Burca and Scott comment that, “A further characteristic often present 
in new governance processes is the voluntary or non-binding nature of the 
norms…which is sometimes described in terms of “soft law”.’5 While this broad 
reference point is useful, defining the nature and limits of soft law is more difficult. 
 
Soft Law Definitions 
 
As Shelton has observed, “Soft law comes in an almost infinite variety.”6 Starting in 
the 1970s much of the writing on hard law/soft law comes from literature in law and 
political science on international relations and public international law
7
. In this area, 
defining ‘law’ (and, as a corollary, its hard and soft forms) is difficult and soft law in 
this context is largely (but not exclusively) premised on informality and voluntarism.
8
 
While this body of literature is interesting, there is a good amount of writing on hard 
and soft law issues specific to the EU. It is this subset of the soft law literature on 
which this thesis primarily draws. As Borchardt and Wellens note in their leading 
1989 article on soft law in the (then) EC,  
 
“[A] number of aspects of the international legal problems involved will 
either not arise within Community law, or will present themselves in a 
different form or level of intensity, because of its own characteristics.” 9 
 
                                                        
4
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In the EU context, the classic understanding of ‘soft law’ comes from Snyder who 
described it as, “rules of conduct which in principle have no legally binding force but 
which may nevertheless have practical effects.” 10 Lee writes that soft law instruments 
are “likely to have” the endorsement of a community institution, but lack the 
formality required of the Treaty as regards law making.
11
 A decade later, and building 
on Snyder’s work, Senden offered up this amended definition of soft law, 
 
“rules of conduct that are laid down in instruments which have not been 
attributed legally binding force as such, but nevertheless may have certain 
(indirect) legal effects, and that are aimed at and may produce practical 
effects.” 12 
It is worth noting that these are but two of a large number of definitions.
13
 The field is 
further amorphous as some authors use different terms: ‘self-regulation’ (often in the 
context of private codes of conduct);
14
 ‘quasi legislation’; 15  or ‘informal 
instruments.’16  
 
Abbott and Snidal argue that soft law operates along one or more three dimensions: 
“obligation, precision and delegation”. 17  The notion of obligation (or legal 
bindingness) is seen time and time again in the literature.
18
  However, one should not 
be blinded by binding. Here, Jacobsson writes that one of the interesting sociological 
questions is how soft law instruments,  
 
“can gradually become politically, socially and morally binding for the 
actors involved. How can external expectations be perceived as valid 
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norms and/or gradually be internalised and perceived as the ‘reasonable’ 
way to act?”19  
 
In a similar vein, Borchardt and Wellens detail that “soft  law does create an 
expectation that conduct of states, international organisations and the individual will 
be in conformity with the non-binding rules of conduct.”20 Jacobsson comments that 
bindingness is the context of soft law is not absolute and that, “one can imagine 
courses of action where actors conform and adapt in some respects and pre- serve 
their interests and initial positions – refusing conformity – in others.” 21 As Senden 
observes, “the distinction binding/non-binding is too black-and-white, too simple to 
do justice to the phenomenon of soft law and its possible legal effect”. 22  Importantly, 
the European Court of Justice has recognised that lack of bindingness is not 
synonymous with lack of legal effect.
23
  
 
In his wide ranging review of new governance scholarship, Armstrong argues, in the 
context of soft law and the issue of bindingness, that “what seems to matter more to 
new governance scholars are the mechanisms and processed by which norms – 
binding or not – are elaborated and their performance reviewed in the context of their 
application.”24 Thus, context seems an important determinant for different authors of 
what does and does not count as soft law.
25
 As Borchardt and Wellens elaborate, 
 
“the way in which  soft  law is being defined in legal doctrine is directly 
determined by the function intentionally assigned to it, the way in which 
the concept is being or can be used and also by the phenomena which one 
can or wants to distinguish or identify as the forms in which  soft  law 
presents itself.” 26  
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The understandings of soft law in the literature also seem contingent on how authors 
view the underlying purpose of soft law. Surveying the hard law/soft law literature on 
the EU’s open method of co-ordination and on EU fiscal policies, Trubek et al 
highlight two different accounts: the rationalist account which sees soft law as a way 
for States to defer decision making and avoid hard choices; and the constructivist 
account which sees soft law as facilitating the hard decisions that the rationalists think 
are being deferred.
27
 They argue that, “since reality probably reflects a mix of these 
two motives and effects, it seems clear that we need a synthetic approach to soft law 
that would integrate elements of these two perspectives.”28 I would agree. 
 
Trubek and Trubek note that soft law may either be complementary to or have a 
rivalry with classic legal regulation.
29
 In many situations, hard law and soft law are 
not mutually exclusive. In this context, hybridity connotes the idea of hard and soft 
policy measures in the same field, either as a result of a conscious design effort or 
because two separate routes (one hard, one soft) pursue the same end goal.
30
 Trubek 
et al suggest that ambiguities at the frontiers of the concepts of soft law, self-
regulation and hard law point to, “hybrid constellations in which both hard and soft 
processes operate in the same domain and affect the same actors.”31 REACH is a 
classic case of a designed hybrid model in which the Regulation foresaw the need for 
detailed post legislative elaboration. This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4. 
De Burca and Scott, in a wider review of new governance, detail three possible forms 
of hybridity: (a) fundamental or baseline hybridity, which sees new governance as 
complementary to (rather than a replacement of) more traditional forms of law;
32
 (b) 
instrumental or developmental hybridity, which sees new governance as an 
instrumental means of developing traditional law;
33
 and (c) default hybridity, in which 
traditional law becomes a ‘default penalty’ applicable where there is failure to 
conform to the demands of new governance.
34
 They suggest that the clearest EU 
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example of developmental hybridity is seen with Directives that have new governance 
regimes for their implementation, with the example given of the Water Framework 
Directive.
35
 This Directive, and the associated governance work on it, is discussed in 
more depth below. 
 
What should be clear by now is that, as Senden writes, soft law is a “far from [an] 
homogenous phenomenon.” 36  The purpose in defining ‘soft law’ is often to 
differentiate it and draw a line between it and ‘hard law’. However, as Kirton et al 
observe, "Both terms [hard law and soft law] are used with a great variety of 
meanings in the existing literature."
37
 Given the varying and numerous attempts to 
ascertain the exact nature of ‘soft law’, there seems to be little point in setting out a 
“non-exhaustive miscellany of descriptions.”38 While Shaffer and Pollack counsel that 
confusion and disagreement about the basic characteristics of hard and soft law may 
mean that, “scholars in many instances speak past each other,”39 getting agreement on 
one definition and one understanding seems highly unlikely. Instead, what may be 
more productive is to explore and explain why ‘soft law’ has been used in the EU and 
the limits and challenges of the concept. Senden argues (and I would agree) that the 
notion of ‘soft law’, “provides a maybe not perfect, but at least reasonably satisfactory 
umbrella concept.” 40 For present purposes, ‘soft law’ is used to describe governance 
arrangements that operate in place of, alongside or blended with EU ‘hard law’ in the 
form of the treaties, regulations and directives and the Community Method.
41
 The 
following section discusses hierarchy and differentiation in EU norms before turning 
to the benefits and critique of ‘soft law’. 
 
Hierarchy and Differentiation in EU Norms 
 
For the first time since the establishment of the European Community, the Lisbon 
Treaty sets out specific areas of competence for the EU: those areas where the EU 
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alone has competence; those where competence is shared with Member States; and 
those areas the exclusive domain of the Member States.
42
 Where the EU has 
competence, there are a range of regulatory instruments that can be brought to bear.  
 
EU law comprises primary legislation (the Treaties), secondary legislation 
(Regulations, Directives and Decisions) and case law. Regulations are binding 
legislative acts that apply in their entirety across the EU, without the need for Member 
States to amend their bodies of national law.
43
 Directives are binding as to the result 
to be achieved, but leave the form and means of achievement open to Member 
States.
44
 Directives are implemented via Member States amending their bodies of 
national law. Decisions are directly binding on those to whom they are addressed (e.g. 
a particular Member State, body corporate or individual).
45
 The Treaties also refer to 
Recommendations and Opinions. Recommendations (which suggest a course of 
action) and Opinions (which are effectively statements by the EU institutions) have 
no binding force.
46
 In addition to these instruments which are set out in the Treaties, 
there are also a wealth of, “rules, manuals, directives [with a small ‘d’], codes, 
guidelines, memoranda, correspondence, circulars, protocols, bulletins, employee 
handbooks and training materials that clutter the desks (and computer files) of EU 
bureaucrats.”47 As Senden has observed, “the catalogue of sources and hierarchy of 
norms in Articles 288 to 291 of the TFEU are of misleading simplicity” and belie the 
many other instruments that emerged in the EU’ institutional practice over time.48 
 
Kirton and Trebilcock
49
 write that the EU is an institution grounded on hard law. 
Historically, the EU has worked on the basis of top down, hierarchical, binding norms 
(Regulations and Directives) as a means of harmonisation: the classic command and 
control model of regulation operationalised via the Community Method. Over time, 
however, and as seen in other national and supranational contexts, the variety of 
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regulatory modes (economic regulation, self-regulation, informational regulation etc.) 
and regulatory approaches has proliferated. In its 2001 White Paper on European 
Governance, the Commission was of the view that a combination of different policy 
instruments was key to effective decision-making and the meeting of Treaty 
objectives.
50
 They also suggested that, “legislation is only part of a broader solution 
combining formal rules with other non-binding tools such as recommendations, 
guidelines or even self-regulation within a commonly agreed framework.” 51  The 
following section discusses the benefits of these ‘non-binding tools’, before 
considering the limits and critique of soft law.  
 
The Benefits and Limits of Soft Law 
 
Kirton and Trebilcock summarise the benefits of soft law as follows: 
 
“timely action when governments are stalemated; bottom up initiatives that 
bring additional legitimacy, expertise and other resources for making and 
enforcing new norms and standards; and an effective means for direct civil 
society participation in global governance.” 52 
 
In the particular context of the EU, Harlow and Rawlings argue that the “exceptional 
complexity” of law making procedures might make soft law attractive in this area.53 
However, while the use of soft law may be attractive and the concept as a topic of 
study has received increasing attention, this has not always been positive. Indeed, 
there are a number of scholars who argue that the notion of ‘soft’ law is a 
contradiction: either law is binding (or hard) or it is not law.
 54
  For present purposes, 
this debate can be avoided. There are instruments out there which do not look like 
traditional legislative instruments that are designed to be binding on the parties to 
whom they are addressed, but which nevertheless may cause those parties to act in 
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certain ways and so have some kind of effect. Whether or not those instruments are 
law cannot be wholly ascertained through scholarly rhetoric, but would require (in 
each instance) review by the courts. Justiciability is discussed in more depth below. In 
a recent piece, Armstrong has argued that, “scholarship ought to make a more 
decisive break with the concept of ‘soft law’: a concept that is both over- and under-
inclusive in its capacity to capture changes in law and governance.”55  This is, it 
seems, not so much an attack on the phenomenon itself but on the pigeon holing by 
certain scholars of ‘soft law’ scholarship into a world of its own without reference to 
broader issues and debates in law and governance.  
 
On a more general (and perhaps important) level, objections to the use of soft law 
(specifically within the EU) include the lack of clarity, concerns about a race to the 
bottom in EU social policy, the possibility that soft law is a covert attempt by the EU 
to enlarge its legislative competence and/or the worry that soft law passes the usual 
systems of accountability.
56
 Kirton and Trebilcock note that soft law may “lack the 
legitimacy and strong surveillance and enforcement mechanisms offered by hard law” 
and may lead to uncertainty “as actors remain unclear about…when governments 
might intervene to impose a potentially different, mandatory regime”. 57 Klabbers has 
argued that soft law is undesirable as it has the potential to crowd out hard law in 
regulating behaviors through non-legally binding norms.
58
 These fundamental issues 
of power, legitimacy and democracy echo throughout the work on and the use of soft 
law. The challenges of and for soft law are further discussed at the end of this 
Chapter.  
 
As Trubek et al have observed
59
, the critiques of hard law and soft law tend to be 
centred on pragmatic issues: in essence, ‘which works best?’, with the critics taking 
the view that hard law is required to achieve whatever EU objectives are in question. 
They argue that, because the issue is a pragmatic one, the question is not necessarily 
one of “hard law versus soft law” as there is also the sphere in which the two 
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processes interact creating “hybrid” forms of governance.60 However, the examples 
that Trubek et al give (EU fiscal policy and EU employment policy) both concern 
spheres where the soft law (guidelines) co-exist and overlap with hard instruments 
(i.e. separate but together). My focus is primarily on the use of soft law to elaborate 
on hard law through post legislative guidance. This is discussed below.   
 
The European Parliament has cautioned against the dangers of relying too greatly on 
soft law, particularly when authority for the design of particular soft law instruments 
is delegated to bodies lacking democratic control.
61
 In its September 2007 Resolution 
on the use of soft law instruments, the Parliament details concerns that soft law does 
not “provide full judicial protection,” 62  brings “confusion and insecurity”, 63  and 
generates a “public perception of “superbureaucracy” with no democratic 
legitimacy.” 64  There is perhaps some irony in that, should the Resolution have 
practical effects, it too may be considered an instrument of soft law.  
 
Surveying the Field: Scholarship on EU Hard Law/Soft Law 
 
In 2004, Senden wrote that,  
 
“The use of soft law in EC law is both fashionable and problematic. 
Fashionable in view of the increasing flow of Community soft law acts, 
such as recommendations, communications, notices, guide- lines, codes of 
conduct, declarations. Problematic in that it is un droit au statut 
incertain… which raises the question to what extent one can consider these 
acts to form part of EC law at all.” 65 
 
Almost a decade later and the appetite of the EU for soft law measures (whether stand 
alone or in hybrid forms with harder instruments) has not decreased, nor have 
scholars disengaged from work on the concept, although it is fair to say that the 
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majority of the literature remains within scholarship on international law and 
international relations. 
 
As Senden observes, the notion of soft law has been applied to a number of settings in 
the EU since the 1980s.
66
 In the last decade alone, we have seen discussions of soft 
law in relation to EU instruments on state aid
67
, EU fiscal governance
68
, the open 
method of co-ordination
69
, EU employment policy
70
, EU integration and accession
71
, 
EU competition law
72
, EU governance of retailing
73
, control of new and emerging 
technologies within the EU
74
 and EU tax law.
75
 
Senden’s seminal work on soft law in the EC explored the differentiation of soft law 
from hard law and looked at how soft law instruments and their use fit in to the 
Community legal order. Her main focus was to explore the situations in which soft 
law could provide a satisfactory alternative to legislation in the EC. She identifies two 
streams of writing at EC level on soft law: that which looks at instruments that 
resemble those found in international law (conclusions, declarations, 
recommendations, resolutions and the like, adopted by notably the Council, 
Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting in Council or by 
the Member States themselves) and that which reviews soft law instruments generated 
by the Commission.
 76
 Her monograph divides EC soft law instruments into two 
types: the first category is designated as preparatory and informative instruments; the 
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second category comprises the interpretative and decisional instruments.
 77
 While this 
clear delineation may have been true in 2004, this thesis shows that the lines are more 
blurred with REACH. In her later work, with van den Brink, the distinction is made 
between, “soft regulatory rule-making” (involving para-law policy-steering 
instruments) and, “soft administrative rule-making” (involving post-legislative 
guidance instruments).
78
 In the context of post legislative guidance issued under 
REACH, this distinction appears rather blunt.  
 
Post-Legislative Guidance as Soft Law 
 
As noted in the introduction to this Chapter, this thesis is particularly concerned with 
the use of post legislative guidance and the challenges it poses.  However, save for 
detailed pieces by Scott and Senden (discussed below) little work has been 
undertaken in this area. Furthermore, many of the soft law examples used in the 
literature either act in the place of hard law or alongside hard law; few discussions 
concern where soft law is used to build on, and is often foreseen by, hard legislation. 
The existing literature is thus largely focused on researching and understanding soft 
law as something pre-legislative or extra-legislative, with little attention to the role 
and functioning of soft law as post-legislative. For present purposes, the following 
definition used by Senden sets the broad limits of what this thesis is concerned with, 
 
“Soft post legislative rule making concerns act that provide further general 
rules and guidance to national authorities and interested parties on the 
proper interpretation, transposition, application and enforcement of already 
existing EU law.”79 
 
In this regard, these instruments fulfill what Senden referred to in her earlier work as 
a “post law function”.80 In his review of EC competition policy, Hofmann notes that 
soft post legislative instruments can take a variety of forms/be called a number of 
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different things: guidelines, notices, letters, communications, codes etc.
81
 In this 
thesis, ‘guidance’ is used as a shorthand overarching term to encompass those soft 
post legislative instruments that are called ‘guidance’ and those (discussed, in the 
context of REACH, in more depth in Chapter 4) which are called something else but 
fulfill the same function. In many ways, it is the plurality of the forms of post 
legislative guidance that make the subject so interesting and which raise important 
questions about differentiation and hierarchy in post legislative soft norms. These are 
discussed in detail in Chapter 9. 
 
Despite the lack of academic focus, there has been an increase in the use of guidance 
in the EU, both generally and specifically in the context of EU environmental law. 
This, Scott observes, is a product of increasing legislative complexity and increasing 
reliance on broad and imprecisely defined framework norms.
82
 Senden comments that 
such increase is reflective of the EU as a maturing regulatory system and mirrors what 
has occurred in the legal regimes of the Member States.
83
 It may also be the case that 
this approach permits hard law to establish principles and objectives, leaving 
guidance to flesh out the necessary details. The attraction of guidance instruments is 
summarised by Scott as follows: 
 
“They may be used to elaborate upon the meaning of framework norms, to 
compensate for a lack of legal competence, to overcome legislative 
deadlock, to adjust the institutional balance between institutions to or to 
inject a higher degree of regulatory agility than formal legislation can 
provide.”84 
 
Similarly, Harlow and Rawlings talk of a legal hierarchy which may need to be 
“amplified, interpreted or expanded by soft law”. 85 However, Senden notes that, even 
post the Lisbon Treaty, the TFEU and the TEU are silent on the existence of post 
legislative instruments (save for the Recommendation and the Opinion, discussed 
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above).
86
 In his broad review of new governance in EU, Armstrong writes that what is 
seen over time in the EU is a, “relocation of norm production and norm elaboration to 
a range of institutional locations outside of, but not unconnected to, the inter-
institutional decision making processes associated with the Community Method.”87 
Here, he writes that, “alternative sites of norm production prevail in the post 
legislative ‘executive’ phase.” 88  Similarly, Hofmann talks of the Commission 
“regulating by information” through the use of post legislative guidance, shaping 
public and private activity.
89
 
 
Challenges of Post Legislative Guidance 
 
In terms of competencies, the main challenge with post legislative guidance is where 
the line is drawn between legislative mandate and the operationalisation or 
implementation of legislation, “particularly under conditions of novel risks and 
uncertainty.”90 Here, there are two risks: that the guidance goes beyond that which is 
mandated in the legislation (and so soft post legislative acts are used as a lawmaking 
device);
91
 and/or the guidance falls short of legal obligations laid down by the EU.
92
 
The use of ‘and/or’ here is important and seeks to signal that guidance is not a single 
or static concept and may take a variety of forms, some more binding and more 
expansive than others. At the same time, and as demonstrated in Chapter 4, the roles 
of various actors in the production of ‘ECHA’ guidance (the Agency, the 
Commission, Member States, industry, other experts etc) mean that the familiar 
problems of ensuring accountable and effective executive governance are 
compounded in a situation where, “authorship and responsibility may be blurred 
rather than clearly allocated or delegated.”93 This blurring is itself a product of the 
less than clear lines between legislative and executive action.
94
 These challenges are 
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discussed in more detail in Chapter 9, following the rigorous documentary analysis of 
REACH in Chapters 4-8.  
 
Senden writes of the real problem of lack of control of the Commission and notes 
instances in which the Commission has engaged in post legislative norm making to 
the detriment of the position of the Council and the European Parliament in the 
decision making process.
95
 Linked to this issue of accountability are concerns over 
transparency and whether the procedures which lead to the adoption of guidance are 
sufficiently open, particularly where the European Parliament is excluded from 
participation.
96
  There is also the concern that the European Commission might 
exercise its powers of enforcement as a result of guidance which is not legally 
binding.
97
 With REACH, there is the corollary concern that ECHA might exercise its 
regulatory functions (for example, acceptance or rejection of a Registration dossier) 
as a direct result of norms set out in its guidance documents which do not perhaps 
have the force of law.  
 
Two key pieces on post legislative norm elaboration concern the Water Framework 
Directive (hereafter, the ‘WFD’). 98  The WFD sets out a series of environmental 
objectives and the broad stages which should be followed in order to achieve those 
objectives. It is, as the name of the instrument suggests, based primarily on 
framework norms which require further elaboration. In their exploration of the new 
governance approach of the WFD, Scott and Holder write of the differences between 
the “surface appearance” of the legislation which “belies a complex reality which is 
characterised by multi-level, experimentalist governance.”99 Much of the reality of the 
implementation of the WFD, they argue, “rests upon informal structures and recourse 
to soft law.”100 As part of a Common Implementation Strategy (‘CIS’) for the WFD, 
various forms of guidance have been issued. Scott and Holder refer to comments by 
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the EEB that while these guidance documents can help to achieve the WFD 
objectives, “nevertheless, in a few cases, the guidance documents deviate from best 
practices and potentially undermine WFD requirements.”101 There is, in this sphere, 
the concern that the consensual nature of decision making underpinning the guidance, 
“generates a lowest common denominator approach.”102 Arguably, this has also been 
seen with REACH and the shift to a ‘majority rules’ as opposed to ‘consensus based’ 
form of decision making for ECHA’s guidance to get around this issue is notable.103 
Scott and Holder observe that one of the distinguishing features of the CIS is its 
provisionally and emphasis on change/learning from experience.
104
 This, it is worth 
emphasising, is also seen with guidance produced under REACH (and is discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 4). What is striking about the WFD, and what this thesis aims 
to draw out in relation to REACH, are the elaborate collective processes for post 
legislative norm elaboration which span sites and levels of governance.
105
 In his piece 
on the WFD, Howarth comments on the “strong technical character” of much of the 
Directive guidance and notes that it is written for a “regulatory audience” and not the 
general public.
106
  This is echoed in much of that which is produced under REACH.  
 
Conclusions 
 
Post legislative norm elaboration via guidance provides challenges to and for law: to 
law, because it is not birthed in the same way or subject to the same scrutiny; and for 
law, because (as discussed above) its status and effect are uncertain until ex post facto 
review and potential crystallisation by the Courts. In her review of the large hydro 
guidelines, Scott comments on the lack of transparency in the processes leading up to 
the adoption of the guidance, which is compounded by the informal nature of drafting 
processes and the lack of participation by the European Parliament and EU NGOs.
107
 
She argues that these guidelines (and other forms of guidance more widely), “give 
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rise to a form of complex normativity that combines European and national hard and 
soft law in a manner that presents a challenge for European administrative law.”108  
 
In other work (on the Water Framework Directive), Scott and Holder set out that the 
emergence of ‘experimentalist federalism’ in the EU, which is collaborative and 
multi-level with emphasis upon soft law (in opposition to the classic community 
method) “poses stark and difficult questions for law and for lawyers.”109 They argue 
that it is not enough to simply note the existence of a gap between law and the 
practice of governance. Rather, the challenge also lies in, “contemplating the role of, 
and implications for, law in the face of shifting patterns in the practice of 
governance.” 110  There are also fundamental concerns about how to square post 
legislative guidance with core principles of the EU. Here, Senden argues that the lack 
of explicit reference to soft post legislative instruments in the Treaty of Lisbon is,  
 
“at odds with the way in which the Treaty of Lisbon has positioned the 
principles of openness, transparency, consultation and participation in 
Articles 11 TEU and 15 TFEU as standards for assessing the behavior of 
the EU institutions from the perspective of good administration and 
governance.”111 
 
One might argue that such lack of explicit reference is unimportant if those same 
principles are found, as a matter of fact, in the practices and processes put in place by 
the post legislative norm making entity. Here, Scott and Holder have argued that the 
CIS under the WFD (which has no basis in any legal act of the EU) represents an 
example of “embedded constitutionalisation,” where the practice of governance has 
spawned a process of constitutionalism from within, in which expectations are settled 
and core values (transparency, accountability, participation etc.) are set out.
112
 
However, they accept that a fundamental question of accountability remains: is 
decision-making taking place in a normative vacuum?
113
 Much may depend on 
outlook and, as Armstrong notes, whether one views legislation as a “framework for 
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norm development” or as a vehicle for detailed substantive rules.114  The pace of EU 
legislation and the demands on EU legislators most likely means that EU law can only 
ever be a framework for norm development, even where, as seen with REACH, the 
legislation partly comprises highly detailed rules as well as open ended norms. At the 
same time, Armstrong counsels that those who would champion experimentalist 
governance in the EU (including the use of post legislative norm elaboration) would, 
“do well to remember the over inflated optimism with which comitology was 
embraced as an ideal legal and institutional framework for the exercise of executive 
power.”115 What seems clear is that, as Senden and van den Brink observe, “no clear-
cut answers exist with regard to the issue as to how to deal with soft rule-making, 
including by agencies.”116 
 
Post Legislative Guidance and this Thesis 
 
This thesis explores the challenges posed by post legislative norm elaboration via 
guidance issued under REACH. In the Chapters that follow, the various elements of 
REACH are explored (registration, evaluation, restriction etc). This is done on two 
fronts: (i) what the text of the Regulation says about each of those elements; (ii) and 
what the guidance that accompanies the Regulation says. This analysis shows that the 
wealth of guidance issued under REACH takes a variety of forms and performs a 
variety of functions. What is evident is that there is a hierarchy of norms within the 
broad umbrella of ‘guidance’ and that the same guidance document may amplify, 
interpret, expand, translate and/or contract the underlying legislation. To borrow a 
phrase from Scott referenced earlier in this Chapter, the “complex normativity” posed 
by REACH and its guidance creates a fascinating site of study.
117
  In order to fully 
understand the complexities and challenges posed by the use of guidance under the 
elements of REACH, however, it is first necessary to have a somewhat detailed sense 
of the entire Regulation. This necessary exposition follows in Chapter 3. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
REACH – AN OVERVIEW OF THE REGULATION 
 
 
Without fear of being accused of hyperbole, REACH is massive. Having been 
labelled (by the EU Commissioner who oversaw the five year progression from White 
Paper to agreed legislative instrument), as "possibly the most controversial and 
complex piece of legislation in European history"
1
, the most recent consolidated 
version of the Regulation stands at 516 pages (over 130,000 words).
2
 This is to say 
nothing of the more than 5,000 pages of official guidance on REACH produced by the 
European Chemicals Agency
3
 or the associated documents (too numerous to count) 
aiding at interpretation of the text produced by the Commission, EU political parties, 
the Member States, industry groups (such as those representing the chemicals sector 
at the EU and UK levels; CEFIC
4
 and the CIA
5
 respectively), NGOs and others 
(including, but not limited to, academics, lawyers in private practice and various 
forms of technical and scientific consultant).  
 
Given this abundance of information aiming simply at describing REACH, the ambit 
of this Chapter is necessarily limited: to present the thousands of pages on the text of 
REACH in a summary format. In particular, the seventeen annexes to REACH, which 
set out in detail matters such as the breadth and depth of information required as part 
of the Registration process, will not be discussed to any great length, nor will 
comment be made on the fees and charges associated with REACH.
6
 The reader is 
also referred to the wider caveats in relation to this thesis outlined in Chapter 1. It is 
not the intention in this Chapter to detail every nuanced aspect of every provision of 
the Regulation. Rather, a broad picture of REACH will be painted in sufficient detail 
for the reader to be able to better understand the governance issues in the REACH 
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context discussed in particular depth in Chapters 4-9. Despite these caveats, this 
Chapter is thick with detail, but unapologetically so and the reader is encouraged to 
reflect on the following by Scott in her own thorough review of the Regulation,  
 
“The discussion which follows is often technical and dense. This is unavoidable 
when examining a regulatory regime of this volume and complexity. This 
should not be allowed to disguise either the intrinsic importance of the subject 
under discussion for environment and human health protection, or the 
fascination of the governance forms which this regulation embodies. It is in the 
minutiae of law’s construction of decision-making procedures and conditions 
for action that the politics of risk regulation are played out.”7  
 
In terms of structure, this Chapter begins with a few words on REACH terminology 
before setting out the entire Regulation in two paragraphs by way of overview. The 
key ‘players’ in relation to REACH are introduced (with primary focus on the newly 
created regulator, ECHA) and the ambit of the Regulation discussed (here, with 
emphasis on those chemical substances that are excluded or exempted). Each 
substantive element of REACH (Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and 
Restriction) is then set out in some detail. For the avoidance of doubt, references in 
this thesis (including in footnotes) to “articles” and “recitals” are, save where 
expressly stated otherwise, references to articles and recitals in REACH. In addition, 
references to “the Regulation” are, save where the context otherwise permits, 
references to REACH.  
 
A Word On Terminology 
 
REACH is a linguistically complicated legislative instrument, full of difficult terms 
and less than obvious acronyms. The Regulation requires one to know how ‘IUCLID’ 
relates to a ‘SIEF’; to be able to identify a ‘CMR’ from a ‘vPvB’; to understand that 
‘CSR’ means something other than corporate social responsibility; and that an ‘OR’ is 
something wholly unrelated to hospitals (unless, of course, negotiations in a SIEF 
become overly heated). Even simple terms, like “manufacturer”, have meanings 
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within REACH that may betray their common origins.
8
 It is impossible to fully 
understand REACH without also understanding (at least some of) its linguistic 
complexities. Given this, a glossary of acronyms and terms is included at the front of 
this thesis and the reader encouraged to re-review this list before proceeding. The 
following section provides a summary of REACH in two paragraphs. It is hoped that 
this will sit in the reader’s mind while they wade through the more substantive 
summary of REACH that the remainder of this Chapter constitutes.  
 
An Introductory Overview of REACH 
 
At its most basic, REACH requires the generation of data on the intrinsic properties of 
certain chemical substances (around 45,000 of the 105,000 substances currently on 
the market)
9
 by the private sector (namely, the manufacturers, importers and, in 
limited circumstances, downstream users of those chemical substances) followed by 
the registration of such substances (accompanied by their testing data) with a new EU 
regulatory body, the European Chemicals Agency (“ECHA”). As set out in Chapter 1, 
unlike previous EU chemicals legislation, which saw Member States as the primary 
assessors of chemical safety, REACH is, 
“based on the principle that industry should manufacture, import or use 
substances or place them on the market with such responsibility and care as 
may be required to ensure that, under reasonably foreseeable conditions, 
human health and the environment are not adversely affected.”10  
It is thus for the private sector to ensure that such substances are, effectively, “safe”.11 
What data on a given chemical substance is required to be submitted to ECHA, and 
by when, depends on two main factors: (i) the volume of substance manufacture or 
import (the REACH registration obligation only applies to those substances 
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 On which, see Article 3(9). Let us say, for example, that a company purchases chemicals and then 
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purpose of REACH, but rather a downstream user.  
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more on these ‘practical jokes’ can be found here: <http://apps.echa.europa.eu/preregistered/pre-
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manufactured or imported in quantities greater than one tonner per annum
12
); and (ii) 
the intrinsic harmfulness of the substance. If no data is submitted for a substance 
subject to REACH, it can no longer be sold within the Union (a core REACH 
principle of “no data, no market”).  
 
ECHA is tasked with providing guidance on the implementation and understanding of 
REACH, evaluating a limited amount of the data it receives and otherwise acting as a 
facilitator or intermediary between the private sector and the EU Commission (and 
Member States). Certain substances identified (either as a result of industry testing or 
via Member State nomination) as particularly harmful to human health or the 
environment will be banned (either in full or in certain applications); others may be 
granted a time limited authorisation by the Commission to remain on the market if it 
can be proved that the risks from those substances can be adequately managed, or 
where the use can be justified on socio-economic grounds and no suitable alternatives 
are available. Member States have individual responsibility for enforcement of the 
regime.  
 
Cast List 
 
There are various actors relevant to the implementation and operation of REACH.
13
 
Many of these (Member States (and their competent authorities), NGOs, importers, 
manufacturers, consumers, the Commission) will be entities with which the reader is 
already familiar (albeit possibly in non-REACH contexts)
14
. Others (such as ECHA 
and Only Representatives) represent new entities created by REACH. The remainder 
of this section discusses ECHA only (and from a limited, institutional point of 
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view
15). The reason for this is that to understand an Only Representative (or “OR”), it 
is first necessary to understand which entities have which obligations under REACH 
(a matter discussed in the body of this Chapter below). ORs are thus discussed in the 
section below on Registration. A more detailed review of what ECHA does 
(particularly as regards the creation, issue and amendment of guidance) appears in 
Chapter 4.  
 
As has already been highlighted, with REACH came a new EU regulatory institution, 
the European Chemicals Agency or ECHA.
16
 Established given the “…need to ensure 
effective management of the technical, scientific and administrative aspects of 
[REACH] at Community level,”17 the Agency is intended to act, in many ways, as a 
conduit between the private sector, Member States, the Commission and other 
stakeholders (such as consumers and NGOs) relevant to the functioning of REACH. 
At the same time, ECHA is also a pro-active regulator and takes regulatory decisions 
(for example, on whether or not to accept a registration dossier). Recital 95 to the 
Regulation states that confidence in ECHA will only be secured if it is independent, 
transparent and efficient, with high scientific, technical and regulatory capacities. 
Various commentators have called into question whether in fact ECHA has the 
necessary competencies in order to carry out its mandates under REACH.
18
  
 
On a structural level, REACH envisages three committees working as part of ECHA: 
a Member State Committee (which has the task of attempting to achieve agreement 
among Member States where a harmonised approach under REACH is required); a 
Committee for Risk Assessment; and a Committee for Socio-economic Analysis (both 
of which issue scientific opinions in certain contexts.)
19
 In addition, there is a 
Secretariat,
20
 a Board of Appeal and a Forum for Exchange of Information on 
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Enforcement (the “Forum”)21. The Forum is discussed in more depth in Chapter 8 
(which summarises the enforcement of REACH in the UK from a structural level). 
The Agency is managed by a Management Board (the “Board”), led by an Executive 
Director.
22
 The Board comprises 28 Member State representatives, (one from each 
State), up to six representatives appointed by the Commission and two independent 
persons appointed by the Parliament.
23
 The UK representative on the Board is John 
Roberts, head of Chemicals and Nanotechnologies at the Department for 
Environment, Farming and Rural Affairs. The tasks of the Board include the adoption 
of the work programme, an annual report and other strategic documents as well as the 
adoption of ECHA’s budget and the delivery of an opinion on the final accounts. The 
Board also appoints the Executive Director, the Board of Appeal and the members of 
the Committee for Risk Assessment and the Committee for Socio–economic Analysis, 
and may invite stakeholders to Committee meetings. The current Executive Director 
of ECHA is Geert Dancet, a Commission employee from 1986 – 2007 (who headed 
the REACH unit of DG Enterprise).  
 
The ECHA Board of Appeal comprises three members, a Chairman and two others,
24
 
each appointed by the Management Board.
25
 The three members (and their 
“alternates”, who represent the members of the Board of Appeal in their absence26) 
must have appropriate technical and/or legal qualifications.
27
 The matters for which 
an appeal may be brought before the Board are somewhat limited.
28
 Article 91 details 
that an appeal may be brought against decisions of the Agency taken pursuant to 
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Chairman, the legally qualified member of the Appeal Board and the technically qualified member of 
the Appeal Board.  
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Article 9, Article 20, Article 27(6), Article 30(2) and (3) and Article 51 of REACH.
29
 
Those with standing to appeal comprise the usual suspects with standing elsewhere in 
EU law:
30
 any natural or legal persons to whom a decision is addressed; and those 
persons to whom a decision is or direct and individual concern (even though not 
addressed to them.)
31
 Appeals must be brought within three months
32
 and decisions of 
the Board are subject to challenge before the General Court (formerly known as the 
Court of First Instance.)
33
  
 
ECHA is financed partly by fees paid by natural or legal persons under REACH (i.e. 
the fees paid for registration) and partly by the general budget of the European 
Communities.
34
 It is also open to Member States to make “voluntary contributions” to 
the Agency.
35
 ECHA was subject to a review by the Commission by 1 June 2012 and 
then every five years thereafter.
36
 The conclusions of the 2012 REACH Review are 
discussed, where appropriate, in Chapters 5-9.  
 
The Aims of the Regulation 
 
REACH has three given (if not necessarily complementary) aims:
37
  
 
1. a high level of environmental and human health protection (with the broad, 
and ill defined, goal of “achieving sustainable development”);38  
 
2. furthering the free movement of substances; and  
                                                        
29
 Broadly, what this means is that the Board of Appeal may hear appeals in relation to the following 
matters: Exemptions from the general obligation to register for product and process orientated research 
and development; Rejections of registrations; Sharing of existing data in the case of registered 
substances; Sharing of data involving tests; Examination of testing proposals; Compliance check of 
registrations; and Substance evaluation. Each of these matters is set out in more detail in the body of 
this Chapter.  
30
 On the area of the jurisdiction of the European Courts and the question of standing more generally, 
see Part IV of: Alan Dashwood, Michael Dougan, Barry Rodger, Eleanor Spaventa and Derrick Wyatt, 
Wyatt & Dashwood's European Union Law (6
th
 edn, Hart 2011) 
31
 Article 92(1) 
32
 Article 92(2) 
33
 Article 94(1) 
34
 Recital 107, Article 96(1)(a) and (b) 
35
 Article 96(1)(c) 
36
 Article 75(2) 
37
 Recital 1, Article 1(1) 
38
 Recital 3 
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3. enhancing competitiveness and innovation.  
 
These are stated as forming part of obligations on the EU under the Johannesburg 
World Summit
39
 and the Strategic Approach to International Chemical 
Management.
40
 At the same time, Article 2(4)(a) details that REACH is intended to 
apply without prejudice to EU workplace and environmental legislation,
41
 or to 
competition legislation (this latter element is discussed in more depth below in the 
section on SIEFs).
 42
 It is envisaged that the data generated by REACH will have a 
direct impact on other areas of EU competence, such as product safety or eco-
labelling.
43
 
 
The Ambit of REACH: Exclusions  
 
The above introductory overview of REACH set out that the Regulation will likely 
capture around 45,000 of the over 100,000 substances currently on the EU market. 
However, certain substances are excluded from the ambit of REACH. Certain of these 
exclusions apply in full; others only exclude the class of substance from certain of the 
provisions of REACH.
44
 This is perhaps one of the key deficits with the Regulation, 
in that it does not actually create a level playing field for chemicals risk assessment. 
Table 3.1 below sets out those substances which are excluded and the corollary 
reasons for such given by the Regulation.  
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 Pursuant to an implementation plan adopted on 4 September 2002. Recital 4. 
40
 Adopted on 6 February 2006 in Dubai. Recital 6 
41
 Recital 5. Such legislation includes (but is not limited to): Council Directive (EC) 2004/37 on the 
protection of workers from the risks related to exposure to carcinogens or mutagens at work [2004] OJ 
L 229/23; and Council Directive (EC) 98/24 on the protection of the health and safety of workers from 
the risks related to chemical agents at work [1998] OJ L 131/11 
42
 Recital 48 
43
 Recital 14. On the issue of the interaction of REACH with product liability law, see: Paul Boden and 
Andrew, ‘REACH and the Consumer Products Sector - Regulatory and Product Liability Implications 
of the EU's Chemicals Regime’ in Ian Dodds-Smith and Michael Spencer QC (eds) The International 
Comparative Legal Guide to Product Liability 2009 (Global Legal Group 2009) 
44
 The Regulation uses both “excluded” and “exempted”, but the difference between these two is not 
clear.  
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Table 3.1. Substances Excluded From REACH 
Substance Type of Exclusion Justification and Commentary 
Wastes Full Exclusion should “ensure 
workability and… maintain the 
incentives for waste recycling and 
recovery.”45  
Substances under customs 
supervision which are in 
temporary storage, in free zones 
or free warehouses with a view 
to re-exportation or in transit. 
Full Such substances are not “used” as 
this term is understood within 
REACH.
46
 
Dangerous substances and 
dangerous preparations carried 
by rail, road, inland waterways, 
sea or air. 
Full Specific legislation already applies 
to such carriage.
47
 
Substances manufactured in the 
Community or imported for the 
purposes of product and process 
orientated research and 
development. 
Articles 5, 6, 7, 17, 
18 and 21 do not 
apply for a period of 
five years. This is, in 
short, an exemption 
from registration.  
This exemption is granted to 
“encourage innovation.”48 Where 
seeking to take the benefit of this 
exemption, the relevant 
manufacturer or importer or 
producer needs to notify ECHA of 
certain information and pay the 
relevant fee.
49
  
Substances used in medicinal 
products for human or vetinary 
use,
50
 or substances used in food 
or feedingstuffs in accordance 
with Regulation (EC) No 
178/2002.
51
 
Provisions of Titles 
II, V, VI and VII do 
not apply. This 
means that such 
substances are 
excluded from the 
provisions on 
registration, 
evaluation and 
authorisation.  
Such exclusion is necessary to 
“avoid confusion” between the 
mission of ECHA and the missions 
of the European Medicines Agency 
and the European Foodstuffs 
Agency.
52
  
                                                        
45
 Recital 11, Article 2(2) 
46
 Recital 10, Article 2(1)(b) 
47
 Recital 10, Article 2(1)(d) 
48
 Recital 28, Article 9(1) 
49
 Article 9(2) 
50
 Article 2(5)(a), providing that such products are within the scope of Council Regulation (EC)  
726/2004 on the Community code relating to veterinary medicinal products [2004] OJ L 136/1; and 
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[2001] OJ L 311  
51
 Article 2(5)(b) 
52
 Recital 111 
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Substances which are necessary 
in the interests of defence. 
Case-by-case 
specific 
Member States may nominate 
certain substances for exemptions.
53
 
Non-isolated intermediates.
54
 
 
Full An intermediate means a substance 
that is manufactured for and 
consumed in or used for chemical 
processing in order to be 
transformed into another 
substance.
55
 A non-isolated 
intermediate means an intermediate 
that during synthesis is not 
intentionally removed (except for 
sampling) from the equipment in 
which the synthesis takes place.
56
 
Polymers Exclusion from 
Titles II and VI. This 
means that polymers 
are excluded from 
the requirements of 
registration and 
evaluation.  
Exclusion lasts “until those that 
need to be registered due to the 
risks posed to human health or the 
environment can be selected in a 
practicable and cost-efficient way 
on the basis of sound technical and 
valid scientific criteria.”57 What this 
means, in layman’s terms, is that 
including polymers within REACH 
is thought to be too complicated for 
the present time. This topic was the 
subject of the first case on REACH 
before the UK and EU courts.
58
 
Radioactive substances within 
the scope of Council Directive 
96/29/Euratom of 13 May 
1996.
59
 
Full There is no given reason for this 
exclusion in the text of REACH.  
Substances included in Annex 
IV.  
Exempted from 
Titles II, V and VI 
(i.e. from registration 
and evaluation).  
It is though that sufficient 
information is known about these 
substances that they are to be 
considered minimum risk because 
of their intrinsic properties.
60
 The 
list in Annex IV includes 
substances such as argon and 
sunflower oil.  
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 Article 3(15) 
56
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 See: R (SPCM SA and Others) v Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [2007] 
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Substances covered by Annex 
V.  
Exempted from 
Titles II, V and VI 
(i.e. from registration 
and evaluation).  
Registration is deemed 
“inappropriate or unnecessary” for 
these substances and their 
exemption is not thought to 
prejudice the objectives of 
REACH.
61
 Included in Annex V are 
substances which occur in nature 
(including natural gas, crude oil and 
minerals).  
Substances on their own or in 
preparations, registered in 
accordance with Title II, 
exported from the Community 
by an actor in the supply chain 
and re-imported into the 
Community by the same or 
another actor in the same supply 
chain. 
Exempted from 
Titles II, V and VI 
(i.e. from registration 
and evaluation). 
There is no stated reason for this 
exemption in REACH (although it 
makes sense on a practical level.)
62
 
Note, however, that this ‘substances 
in the same supply chain’ 
exemption operates only in respect 
of registration (and not additionally 
pre-registration). 
Substances, on their own, in 
preparations or in articles, 
which have been registered in 
accordance with Title II and 
which are recovered in the 
Community.
63
  
Excluded from Titles 
II, V and VI (i.e. 
from registration and 
evaluation). 
This “recovery” exemption is 
linked to the wastes exemption 
detailed above. Note, however, that 
this is a complex area and one in 
which the European Commission 
has published draft guidance.
64
 
On-site isolated intermediates 
and transported isolated 
intermediates.  
Excluded from: (a) 
Chapter 1 of Title II, 
with the exception of 
Articles 8 and 9; and 
(b) Title VII
65
 (i.e. 
exemption from 
certain aspects of 
registration and from 
the authorisation 
process).  
An on-site isolated intermediate 
means an intermediate not meeting 
the criteria of a non-isolated 
intermediate (set out above) and 
where the manufacture of the 
intermediate and the synthesis of 
(an)other substance(s) from that 
intermediate take place on the same 
site, operated by one or more legal 
entities.
66
 A transported isolated 
intermediate: means an 
intermediate not meeting the 
criteria of a non-isolated 
intermediate and transported 
between or supplied to other sites.
67
 
Note, however, that any 
manufacturer of an on-site isolated 
intermediate or transported isolated 
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63
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64
 See : <http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/chemicals/files/reach/waste_paper_ca_090403_en.pdf> 
accessed 10 August 2014  
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67
 Article 3(15)(c)  
  
51 
 
intermediate in quantities of 1 tonne 
or more per year is required to 
submit a limited registration to 
ECHA.
68
 This registration 
requirement is less burdensome 
than the more general requirements 
in Chapter 1 of Title II of REACH.  
 
In addition to the substances set out above, which are excluded from REACH, two 
other classes of substances are “to be regarded as registered” (and thus are effectively 
exempt from a large part of the active obligations on manufacturers and importers 
under the Regulation.)
69
 The first class is certain substances manufactured or 
imported for use in “plant protection products” (namely, insecticides, herbicides, 
fungicides and other products);
70
 the second class are those substances manufactured 
or imported for use in “biocidal products” (broadly, disinfectants, pesticides, 
preservatives and other products.)
71
  
 
Where substances are to be “regarded as registered”, the Commission is obliged to 
send to ECHA the equivalent body of information as would be required were that 
substance subject to the registration provisions of REACH.
72
 The requirements and 
mechanics of registration (and optional pre-registration) under REACH are discussed 
in the following paragraphs.  
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69
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70
 Article 15(1) provides as follows: “Active substances and co-formulants manufactured or imported 
for use in plant protection products only and included either in Annex I to Directive 91/414/EEC or in 
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72
 Article 16(1) 
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Pre-Registration 
 
The cornerstone of REACH is registration, the process by which (certain) 
manufacturers and importers of (certain) substances send (certain) information to 
ECHA. This is a massive undertaking: potentially millions of companies across the 
EU sending highly technical data to a regulator based in Helsinki with well-known 
staffing and budgetary issues (as noted above). The obligation to register chemicals 
under REACH with ECHA operated as from 1 June 2008. However, in order to 
“avoid overloading authorities and natural or legal persons with the work arising from 
[such] registration”, 73  REACH provided for a series of staggered registration 
compliance deadlines for what it terms “phase-in substances”. 74  Such staggered 
compliance deadlines were also intended to smooth the full entry into force of 
REACH and to allow relevant parties to “focus resources in the preparation for new 
duties at the right times.”75 To take advantage of these deadlines, manufacturers and 
importers were required to pre-register their substances between 1 June 2008 and 1 
December 2008.
76
  
 
The staggered compliance deadlines for registration, and the “phase-in substances” to 
which they relate, are set out below in Table 3.2. They are based on two principles: 
(a) chemicals manufactured in high volumes are likely to present greater risks to 
human health and the environment and so should be registered (and thus assessed) 
first; and (b) a degree of priority for chemicals of higher concern.  
 
Table 3.2 – REACH Compliance Deadlines 
Substances Registration Deadline 
Phase-in substances classified as carcinogenic, mutagenic or toxic to 
reproduction, category 1 or 2, in accordance with Directive 
67/548/EEC
77
 and manufactured in the Community or imported, in 
quantities reaching 1 tonne or more per year per manufacturer or per 
importer, at least once after 1 June 2007. 
1 December 2010 
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74
 Detailed in Article 23 
75
 Recital 127 
76
 Article 28(2) 
77
 The reader will recall that these terms and the ambit of Directive 67/548/EEC are discussed in depth 
in Chapter 1. 
  
53 
 
Phase-in substances classified as very toxic to aquatic organisms 
which may cause long-term adverse effects in the aquatic 
environment (R50/53) in accordance with Directive 67/548/EEC, and 
manufactured in the Community or imported in quantities reaching 
100 tonnes or more per year per manufacturer or per importer, at 
least once after 1 June 2007. 
1 December 2010 
Phase-in substances manufactured in the Community or imported, in 
quantities reaching 1 000 tonnes or more per year per manufacturer 
or per importer, at least once after 1 June 2007. 
1 December 2010 
Phase-in substances manufactured in the Community or imported, in 
quantities reaching 100 tonnes or more per year per manufacturer or 
per importer, at least once after 1 June 2007. 
1 June 2013 
Phase-in substances manufactured in the Community or imported, in 
quantities reaching 1 tonne or more per year per manufacturer or per 
importer, at least once after 1 June 2007. 
1 June 2018 
 
Chapter 1 detailed that the chemicals regime prior to REACH divided substances into 
those “existing” and those “new”, with rigorous testing regimes in place solely for 
“new” substances. While REACH does not have such a divide, it does split substances 
between those which are “phase-in” (and which may benefit from the staggered 
registration compliance deadlines set out above if pre-registered) and “non-phase-in” 
substances (which were required to be registered before 1 June 2008 in order to stay 
on the market). Article 3(20) details that a “phase-in” substance is one which meets at 
least one of the following criteria: 
 
1. It is listed in the European Inventory of Existing Commercial Chemical 
Substances (EINECS). In theory, EINECS details all substances on the 
Community market on 18 September 1981; or 
 
2. It was manufactured in the Community, or in the countries acceding to the 
European Union on 1 January 1995 or on 1 May 2004, but not placed on the 
market by the manufacturer or importer, at least once in the 15 years before the 
entry into force of REACH, provided the manufacturer or importer has 
documentary evidence of this; or 
 
3. It was placed on the market in the Community, or in the countries acceding to 
the European Union on 1 January 1995 or on 1 May 2004, before entry into 
force of REACH by the manufacturer or importer and was considered as 
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having been notified in accordance with the first indent of Article 8(1) of 
Directive 67/548/EEC but does not meet the definition of a polymer as set out 
in REACH, provided the manufacturer or importer has documentary evidence 
of this. These substances are commonly referred to as “no longer polymers”.  
 
The mechanics of pre-registration under REACH were relatively straightforward (and 
the process itself was free of charge). Article 28(1) details that in order to benefit 
from the transitional regime, each potential registrant of a “phase-in substance” 
manufactured or imported in quantities of 1 tonne or more per year was required to 
submit all the following information to the Agency by way of pre-registration: 
 
(a) the name of the substance; 
 
(b) his/her name and address and the name of a contact person at the 
manufacturer or importer; and 
 
(c) the envisaged deadline for registration of the substance (and the associated 
tonnage band in which the substance is manufactured or imported).  
 
It is worth noting that the staggered registration deadlines for phase-in substances 
having undergone pre-registration are deadlines and not goals: it is perfectly possible 
for a manufacturer or importer to submit a registration at any time before the 
associated deadline.
78
 
 
Registration 
 
One of the most fundamental tenets of the Regulation, the principle of ‘no data, no 
market”, details that substances on their own, in preparations or in articles may not be 
manufactured in the Community or placed on the market unless they have been 
registered with ECHA in accordance with Title II of REACH.
79
 “Substances” are 
defined as “chemical elements and their compounds”, either manufactured or in a 
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 Article 23(4) 
79
 Article 5  
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natural state;
80
 “preparations” are a mixture of two or more substances; 81  and 
“articles” are objects which have been given specific shapes, surfaces or designs 
during their production which determine their function to a greater degree than does 
their chemical composition (so, for example, the hard copy bound version of this 
thesis would be an article.)
82
 The potential breadth of REACH is thus staggering, 
capturing not only chemical manufacturers, but a wealth of chemical importers and a 
variety of chemical users as well as the producers of certain products (or articles, to 
give them their REACH moniker). Indeed, it is hard to think of many EU entities not 
impacted in some way by the Regulation (as, even if such has no direct obligations 
under REACH, its supply chain will, at some point, depend on chemicals 
manufactured in or imported into the EU).  
 
For the avoidance of doubt, it is the substance (and not the preparation or the article) 
which requires registration under REACH. Registration is seen as acting as proof of 
compliance, with the obligations on manufacturers and importers to generate data on 
chemicals, assess risks arising from such data and then develop appropriate risk 
management techniques.
83
 What is less clear is whether registration automatically 
discharges the duty of care that REACH imposes on manufacturers and importers to 
see that chemicals which they place on the market do not adversely affect human 
health or the environment.
84
 There is little writing on this aspect of REACH, with 
commentators suggesting that the ‘duty of care’ in the Regulation “may” mean that 
manufacturers need to warn of inherent dangers in the chemicals they produce.
85
 
 
Registration obligations are volume triggered. With substances, the registration 
obligation rests on any manufacturer or importer of a substance, either on its own or 
in one or more preparation(s), who manufactures or imports in quantities of 1 tonne or 
more per year.
86
 Thus, those who manufacture or import in quantities less than 1 
tonne per year will not be obliged to register; although they may still be subject to the 
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authorisation and/or restriction procedures, detailed below. With articles, any 
producer,
87
 or importer, is required to submit a registration to the Agency for any 
substance contained in those articles, if both of the following conditions are met: 
 
(a) the substance is present in those articles in quantities totalling over 
1 tonne per producer or importer per year; and 
 
(b) “the substance is intended to be released under normal or 
reasonably foreseeable conditions of use.”88 
 
The obligation to register operates in respect of each legal entity within the 
Community manufacturing or importing a substance or article captured by REACH. 
So, for example, if a US chemicals manufacturer has three subsidiaries (one in the 
UK, one in France and one in Germany), each of which imports the same chemical 
from the US parent in amounts greater than one tonne per year, each subsidiary will 
be responsible to register that substance with ECHA. This example is also illustrative 
of the potential for the use of “Only Representatives” or “ORs” referenced earlier on 
in this Chapter. Say our US chemicals manufacturer also sells certain of its chemicals 
to a non-group company based in Spain. Under REACH, this Spanish company (as 
importer) would have the obligation to register the US company’s chemicals that it 
imports. However, where a manufacturer of substances or producer of articles is 
based outside of the EU, it may choose to appoint an “Only Representative” or “OR” 
to fulfill the obligations of its EU based importer.
89
 If an OR is appointed, the OR 
(and not the importer) is the entity responsible for registration of the substance 
imported. On a practical level, a non-EU based exporter may choose to appoint an OR 
to prevent the exchange of certain confidential information with its EU based 
importer, or to retain control over the registration process. Any OR appointed must 
have a sufficient background in the practical handling of substances and the 
                                                        
87
 Defined in Article 3(4) as any natural or legal person who makes or assembles an article within the 
Community.  
88
 Article 7(1). These words have proven difficult for ECHA and the Commission, who have declined 
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information related to them,
90
 and when an OR has been appointed, importers “within 
the same supply chain” need to be informed.91 What seemed to be a fairly simple 
procedure was muddied during the pre-registration phase of REACH by a lack of 
clear guidance from ECHA on: (a) the mechanics of OR appointment;
92
 (b) the levels 
of necessary qualification of the OR; and (c) what “within the same supply chain” 
means.
93
 These issues have now been clarified somewhat through the publication of 
limited guidance in the ECHA Guidance on Registration document, but the example 
is an interesting one of the Agency’s guidance lagging behind.94  
 
On a substantive level, those obliged to register are required to submit a registration 
dossier, containing: (a) a technical dossier; and (b) for all substances manufactured or 
imported in quantities greater than ten tonnes per year per registrant, a chemical 
safety report (“CSR”). 95 Articles 10 and 12 and Annexes VI to XI of REACH detail 
the specific content of the technical dossier. Exactly what information is required to 
be submitted to ECHA depends on the ‘tonnage band’ (i.e. the number of tonnes per 
year of substance manufactured or imported per manufacturer or importer), with the 
higher the tonnage, the more information required. The tonnage bands relevant to 
REACH are as follows: one tonne or more per year; ten tonnes or more per year; one 
hundred tonnes per year or more; and one thousand tonners per year or more.
96
 Article 
14 and Annex I detail the substantive content of the CSR. Essentially, the CSR 
documents the chemical safety assessment of the substance to be registered in the 
context of various environmental hazards, including (where required) a focus on 
exposure and related risks.  
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 For example, although REACH applies at the level of individual legal entity, would it be possible for 
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It is worth noting here that the provision of information to ECHA is not a once and for 
all time obligation (and such is discussed in more depth in Chapters 5 and 6). Rather, 
following registration, a registrant shall be responsible “on his own initiative” for 
updating his registration without undue delay with relevant new information and 
submitting it to the Agency in various (and fairly broad) cases: some linked to 
mechanical changes (e.g. an importer becomes a manufacturer or vice versa or a 
change in the tonnage of substance manufacture or import); others linked to the 
intrinsic properties of the substance (e.g. new knowledge of the risks of the substance 
or new, previously unidentified, uses of the substance.)
97
  
 
Joint Submission of Registration Data: SIEFs and Data Sharing
98
 
 
Let us take a simple example, which will be used in other contexts throughout this 
thesis. Say we have ten manufacturers in the EU of (the hypothetical chemical) 
legalene, a highly catalytic substance used in the production of inks for the printing of 
law textbooks. Each manufactures in quantities greater than one tonner per year and 
legalene is not excluded from the ambit of REACH. Each manufacturer has pre-
registered legalene as a phase-in substance with ECHA. The ten manufacturers now 
come to the task of registration. REACH operates on the principle of “one substance, 
one registration.” On a practical level, and with the aims of reducing chemical 
assessment testing (in particular, testing on animals),
99
 and the associated cost to 
industry
100
 REACH mandates the sharing of certain data between those manufacturers 
and importers intending to register the “same” substance. “Same” is in quotation 
marks here, as there may be complicated questions over whether Substance A and 
Substance B are the same, even where they share a common name or classification or 
EINECS entry. This issue is explored in more depth in Chapter 5 of this thesis. Data 
sharing is facilitated by a SIEF (or Substance Information Exchange Forum), 
membership of which is compulsory for all potential registrants of the “same” 
substance (manufacturers, importers and Only Representatives) and optional for 
downstream users of the substance and other third parties who have submitted 
                                                        
97
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98
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99
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information to ECHA on that substance.
101
 Thus, in our example, all ten legalene 
manufacturers will be members of the legalene SIEF. The ultimate aim here, under 
the “one substance, one registration” principle, is that one member of the SIEF 
(commonly referred to as the “lead registrant”) will make a submission to ECHA of 
the data on the intrinsic properties of legalene for and on behalf of all the other 
members of the SIEF (thus obviating the need for, here, ten separate submissions of a 
registration dossier for legalene.)
102
  
 
REACH does not mandate the legal form of the SIEF nor how the SIEF members are 
to organise themselves.
103
 Across the EU, different SIEFs have taken on different 
forms: some remain as unincorporated associations operating as a consortium and 
linked by various layers of contractual agreement; others have incorporated as limited 
liability companies; others partnerships; and a very small number as European 
Economic Interest Groupings. SIEFs are discussed in much more depth in Chapter 5. 
Whatever the format of the SIEF, the obligations of the SIEF participants are 
fourfold: (a) to provide other participants with existing studies on the intrinsic 
properties of the SIEF substance; (b) to react to requests by other participants for 
information; (c) to collectively identify needs for further studies; and (d) to arrange 
for those studies to be carried out.
 104
  Each SIEF is required to be operational until 1 
June 2018 (i.e. until the final deadline for registration of substances under 
REACH.)
105
 In terms of the approach to chemical testing that must be taken within a 
SIEF, REACH attempts to promote the use of “alternative test methods” not involving 
the use of vertebrate animals where data on the intrinsic properties of a substance is 
not already available.
 106
 Such methods should be used “whenever possible,”107 with 
tests on vertebrate animals undertaken “only as a last resort.”108            
 
                                                        
101
 Article 29(1). Third parties with information on a substance may include (for example) NGOs who 
desire to participate in the registration process for a given substance and/or manufacturers or importers 
of a substance who manufacture below the registration volume trigger (i.e. one tonne per year).  
102
 Article 11(1) 
103
 Indeed, a SIEF itself has no legal status. It is merely a forum for data exchange.  
104
 Article 29(3) 
105
 Article 29(3) 
106
 Recitals 40 and 47 
107
 Article 13(1) 
108
 Article 25(1). This is primarily a response to concerns from animal welfare groups (among others) 
that arose during the negotiations of the Regulation in response to a claim that almost 4 million animals 
could be used to generate the necessary testing information under REACH. See, for example: 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4437304.stm> accessed 10 August 2014  
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In certain instances, the failure by a registrant to share data held by it (e.g. testing data 
on vertebrate animals) within the SIEF will lead to that registrant being unable to 
register its substance under REACH until he provides the information to the other 
participants.
109
 Such data owner may be penalised according to national laws on 
REACH enforcement.
110
 Once data is submitted as part of registration, another 
manufacturer or importer may use that data for the purpose of their own registration 
for up to 12 years from submission.
111
 
 
Although it is stated that the operation of REACH, “... should be without prejudice to 
the full and complete application of the Community competition rules,” 112  the 
gathering together of, as in the earlier example, all ten of the EU’s legalene 
manufacturers in one place over a sustained period of time, with a legal mandate to 
share information, is of obvious potential concern. Article 25(2) states,  
“The sharing and joint submission of information in accordance with this 
Regulation shall concern technical data and in particular information related to 
the intrinsic properties of substances. Registrants shall refrain from exchanging 
information concerning their market behaviour, in particular as regards 
production capacities, production or sales volumes, import volumes or market 
shares.”  
 
The practicalities of policing the exchanges of data within a SIEF are, however, 
another matter. These concerns, and others in the context of SIEFs, are discussed in 
much more depth in Chapter 5.  
 
Evaluation 
 
Let us say that it is 2015 and our ten legalene manufacturers have pooled their 
information on the intrinsic properties of legalene, arranged for the necessary 
additional chemical assessment studies to be undertaken and sent the registration 
dossier to ECHA. The Agency will then assign a number to the registration,
113
 such 
that it can be easily identified, and undertake a completeness check in order to 
ascertain that all the elements required by REACH have been provided.
114
 The 
                                                        
109
 Article 30(3) 
110
 Article 30(6), Article 126 
111
 Article 25(3) 
112
 Recital 48 
113
 Article 20(1) 
114
 Completeness checks are undertaken for every registration sent to ECHA.  
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completeness check is not in any way substantive and amounts, in essence, to a “Are 
there electronic files that look as though they should be the right files under REACH 
in the dossier?” check. It should be stressed that the completeness check does not 
include an assessment of the quality or the adequacy of any data submitted to 
ECHA.
115
 Instead, it is (quite simply) a box checking exercise. The completeness 
check is required to be undertaken within three weeks of submission of registration 
and, where the check highlights incomplete or missing data from a registration, the 
registrant will be informed of this by the Agency and given a “reasonable deadline” to 
submit an amended, hopefully complete, registration.
116
  
 
After registration (and a successful completeness check), ECHA will then evaluate (or 
assess) a certain number of registration dossiers and registered substances. Evaluation 
is said to be required in order to, 
“…instil confidence in the general quality of registrations and to ensure 
that the public at large as well as all stakeholders in the chemicals industry 
have confidence that natural or legal persons are meeting the obligations 
placed upon them.”117 
 
The Evaluation processes are split into two parts: (a) dossier evaluation; and (b) 
substance evaluation. Dossier evaluation is itself then split into two sub-categories: (i) 
a compliance check (not to be confused with the completeness check detailed above); 
and (ii) an examination of testing proposals. Compliance checks are intended to take 
place for no fewer than 5% of all registration dossiers received for each tonnage 
band.
118
 Without wishing to state the overly obvious, this means that up to 95% of all 
registration dossiers sent to ECHA will never undergo any form of evaluation (other 
than the completeness check box ticking exercise). This is discussed in more depth in 
Chapter 6.  
 
ECHA comments that, “Substance evaluation aims to clarify any grounds for 
considering that a substance constitutes a risk to human health or the environment.”119 
                                                        
115
 Article 20(2) 
116
 Article 20(2) 
117
 Recital 65 
118
 Article 41(5), although the Commission has the power to vary this percentage in accordance with 
Article 41(7) 
119
 This quotation was taken from ECHA’s ‘Guidance on Dossier and Substance Evaluation’ which is 
now said to be “obsolete”. See: < http://echa.europa.eu/guidance-documents/guidance-on-reach> 
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As a first task, ECHA (in co-ordination with the Member States), is obliged to 
develop criteria for prioritising substances, on a “risk based” approach, with a view to 
further evaluation.
120
These criteria (based on hazard information, exposure 
information and substance tonnage) will lead into a three year Community rolling 
action plan (the first submitted by ECHA to the Member States before 1 December 
2010) detailing the substances to undergo substance evaluation each year and which 
Member State has responsibility for evaluating which substance.
121
 With substance 
evaluation, the role of ECHA is one of co-ordination, with the active evaluation 
undertaken by competent authorities in the Member States (or third parties appointed 
on their behalf)
122
. This form of evaluation is also explored in more depth in Chapter 
6. 
 
Authorisation 
 
As outlined in Chapter 1, one of the reasons for the introduction of REACH was the 
lack of substantive data on the intrinsic properties of more than 99% of all chemicals 
on the EU market. One of the (albeit implicit) aims of the Regulation is to identify 
chemicals of concern and either remove them from the market or have their presence 
on the market subject to certain limitations, with the greatest focus on the substances 
of the highest concern.
123
 For substances of “very high concern”, or “SVHCs” as 
REACH terms them, a time limited authorisation may be required from the 
Commission to allow them to remain on the EU market.
124
 Certain SVHCs will be 
banned in full, under the Restriction procedure of REACH discussed below. 
Applicants seeking an authorisation for a SVHC will have to demonstrate that risks 
associated with uses of the substance are adequately controlled or that the socio-
economic benefits of their use outweigh the risks. Applicants must also analyse 
whether there are safer suitable alternatives or technologies. If there are, then the 
applicant must prepare substitution plans and, if not, then they should provide 
                                                                                                                                                              
accessed 10 August 2014. Chapters 5 and 10 discuss ECHA’s updates to and removal of its own 
guidance documents in more depth.  
120
 Article 44(1) 
121
 Article 44(2). It is worth noting that a Member State can put itself forward as the competent 
authority for evaluating a particular substance in accordance with procedures detailed in Article 44(2) 
and (3).  
122
 Article 45(1) 
123
 Recital 115 
124
 Article 56(1) 
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information on research and development activities to create alternatives to the 
SVHC, where appropriate.
125
 The aim with authorisation is to ensure that SVHCs “are 
progressively replaced by suitable alternative substances or technologies where these 
are economically and technically viable.” 126  It is commonly thought that the 
authorisation process will apply to around 3,000 substances.
127
 
 
Not every SVHC will require authorisation. Those which do are detailed later on in 
this section. Article 57 lays down broad guidelines for the substances which may be 
considered as SVHCs (and thus potentially needing authorisation). These guidelines 
include the following three wide categories of substance: 
 
1. Those meeting the criteria for classification as carcinogenic category 1A or 
1B, mutagenic 1A or 1B, or toxic for reproduction category 1A or 1B in 
accordance with Annex I to the CLP Regulation;  or 
 
 
2. Substances which are persistent, bioaccumulative and toxic (or very persistent 
and very bioaccumulative) in accordance with the criteria set out in Annex 
XIII of REACH; or 
 
3. Substances (such as those having endocrine disrupting properties or those 
having persistent, bioaccumulative and toxic properties or very persistent and 
very bioaccumulative properties) which do not fulfil the criteria of the first 
two broad categories, but for which there is “scientific evidence of probable 
serious effects to human health or the environment which give rise to an 
equivalent level of concern”128. Such “other” substances will be identified on a 
case-by-case basis in accordance with a procedure set out in Article 59. 
 
                                                        
125
 Article 55 
126
 Article 55 
127
 See, for example, the reference to this number made here by the European Parliament: 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?language=EN&type=IM-
PRESS&reference=20061213IPR01493> accessed 10 August 2014  
128
 Article 57(f) 
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The mechanics of how a substance becomes labeled a SVHC worthy of authorisation 
are somewhat laborious.
129
 The two first steps are the identification and inclusion in a 
"Candidate List" of Substances of Very High Concern, and the prioritisation of 
substances to be included in Annex XIV of REACH (the "Authorisation List "). With 
the first step, Member States Competent Authorities (or ECHA, on a request by the 
Commission) have the ability to prepare dossiers for the identification of substances 
of very high concern (i.e. dossiers which contain chemical assessment data supporting 
the view of that Member State that the substance is of very high concern). These 
dossiers are then reviewed by ECHA, with the outcome of this identification 
procedure a list of substances (the above referenced Candidate List) which are 
candidates for eventual inclusion in the Authorisation List. This first step is not a once 
and for all time occurrence. Rather, it is intended that Member States will (on a 
regular, as yet undisclosed, basis) send dossiers detailing substances they consider to 
be SVHCs to ECHA. From the Candidate List, a number of substances will be 
prioritised for authorisation.
130
 Priority is expected to be given to substances with: (a) 
PBT or vPvB properties; or (b) wide dispersive use; or (c) those manufactured or 
imported in high volumes.
131
 What prioritisation means, as a matter of practice, is that 
ECHA chooses which chemicals appear to be of the most concern to it (from the list 
of SVHCs generated by Member States) and sends the dossiers for those chemicals to 
the Commission who will make a decision on: (a) whether or not the substance will be 
subject to authorisation; (b) which uses of the included substances will not need 
authorisation (e.g. because sufficient controls established by other legislation are 
already in place); (c) and the “sunset date” by when a substance can no more be used 
without authorisation. 
 
For certain SVHCs, an authorisation will be granted by the Commission if the 
applicant can demonstrate that the risk from the use of the substance is adequately 
controlled.
132
 For certain other substances,
133
 an authorisation may only be granted if 
it is shown that socio-economic benefits outweigh the risk to human health or the 
                                                        
129
 And are set out in Article 59 
130
 The First Candidate List prioritised 7 substances for authorisation from a candidate list of 15. See: 
<http://echa.europa.eu/doc/authorisation/annex_xiv_rec/annex_xiv_subst_inclusion.pdf> accessed 10 
August 2014  
131
 Article 58(3) 
132
 Article 60(2) 
133
 Listed in Article 60(3) 
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environment arising from the use of the substance and if there are no suitable 
alternative substances or technologies.
134
 Article 60(5) details that when assessing 
whether suitable alternative substances or technologies are available, all relevant 
aspects shall be taken into account by the Commission, including: 
 
(a) whether the transfer to alternatives would result in reduced overall risks 
to human health and the environment, taking into account the 
appropriateness and effectiveness of risk management measures; and 
 
(b) the technical and economic feasibility of alternatives for the applicant. 
 
Once granted, authorisations may be reviewed at any time if: (a) the circumstances of 
the original authorisation have changed so as to affect the risk to human health or the 
environment, or the socio-economic impact; or (b) new information on possible 
substitutes becomes available.
135
 
 
While the Commission is the body with the power to grant an authorisation, the 
application for authorisation is made to ECHA,
136
 and can be by one or more persons 
(including by the manufacturer(s), importer(s) and/or downstream user(s) of the 
substance.)
137
 Similarly, applications can relate to one or more than substances (where 
such meet the definition of a group of substances in section 1.5 of Annex XI of 
REACH) and be for the applicant’s own use(s) or the use(s) for which he intends to 
place the substance on the market.
138
 The contents of the authorisation application are 
set out in Article 62(4) and include, in particular, an analysis of suitable alternatives 
to the substance (and, where such exist, a plan for substituting the substance with the 
alternative and an indicative timeline in which this will happen). Where there are 
subsequent applications for authorisation which could draw on data contained within 
a previous application, a subsequent applicant may refer to the appropriate parts of the 
previous application provided he has permission from the previous applicant.
139
 
 
                                                        
134
 Article 60(4) 
135
 Article 61(2) 
136
 Article 62(1) 
137
 Article 62(2) 
138
 Article 62(3) 
139
 Article 63(1) 
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Following submission of the application, ECHA will acknowledge receipt and its 
Committees for Risk Assessment and Socio-economic Analysis then have ten months 
(from the date of application) within which to give their draft opinions
140
 (with the 
option to request additional information from the applicant, as may be necessary.)
141
 
The draft opinions are sent to the applicant, with the option to comment, and then, 
once finalised, to the Commission, Member States and the applicant. The mechanics 
of this process and associated timeline are set out in Article 64(5). Within three 
months of receipt by the Commission of the opinions from ECHA, it will prepare a 
draft authorisation decision.
142
 A final decision granting or refusing the authorisation 
shall be taken in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 133(2). 
Summaries of the Commission decisions, including the authorisation number and the 
reasons for the decision, in particular where suitable alternatives exist, are to be 
published in the Official Journal of the European Union and will be made publicly 
available in a database established and kept up to date by ECHA.
143
 
 
Where an authorisation has been made, the holder must include the authorisation 
number on the label before they place the substance or a preparation containing the 
substance on the market for an authorised use.
144
 
 
Restriction 
 
In certain instances, the Authorisation procedures will not be enough to protect the 
environment or living organisms from the risks posed by certain substances. This may 
because of the length of time which Authorisation can take and/or because of the level 
of potential threat to human health or the wider environment. Given this, REACH 
contains a Restriction process to regulate the manufacture, placing on the market or 
use of certain substances within the EU territory if they pose an unacceptable risk to 
health or the environment.
145
 Such activities may be limited or even banned, if 
                                                        
140
 Article 64(1) 
141
 Article 64(3) 
142
 Article 64(6) 
143
 Article 64(9) 
144
 Article 65 
145
 Article 68 
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necessary. ECHA comments that, “The restriction is designed as a “safety net” to 
manage risks that are not addressed by the other REACH processes.”146  
 
Any substance on its own, in a preparation or in an article may be subject to 
restrictions if it is demonstrated that risks need to be addressed on a Community-wide 
basis. Restrictions of a substance can apply to all uses or to specific uses.  All uses of 
a restricted substance which are not specifically restricted are allowed under REACH 
unless they are subject to authorisation, or other Community or national legislation 
regulating their use. Unlike the Registration of substances under REACH (as set out 
above), there is no tonnage threshold for a substance to be subject to restriction.  
 
Proposals for restrictions will be prepared by Member States or by ECHA (on request 
of the Commission) in the form of an Annex XV dossier.
147
 The Annex XV dossier 
should demonstrate that there is a risk to human health or the environment that needs 
to be addressed at Community level and should identify the most appropriate set of 
risk reduction measures.  Interested parties will have an opportunity to comment and 
the Agency will provide opinions on any proposed restriction.  
 
Where a substance is subject to Restriction, it will be listed in Annex XVII of 
REACH. Substances which were already banned (in full or in certain applications) 
under pre-REACH EU law,
148
 such as asbestos fibres, mercury, arsenic etc, have been 
grandfathered into Annex XVII.
149
  
 
 Conclusions 
 
This Chapter has sought to provide the reader with a sufficiently detailed overview of 
REACH to be able to engage fully with the commentary on the Regulation and the 
guidance produced on it by ECHA, as detailed in Chapters 4-8. Across the EU we do 
not have enough information on the intrinsic properties of the vast majority of 
                                                        
146
 See: <http://guidance.echa.europa.eu/restriction_en.htm> accessed 10 August 2014  
147
 Article 69 
148
 As contained in Council Directive (EEC) 76/769 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions of the Member States relating to restrictions on the marketing and use of 
certain dangerous substances and preparations [1976] OJ L 262 (commonly known as the ‘Limitations 
Directive’). The Limitations Directive was discussed in more depth in Chapter 1.  
149
 Recital 84. Article 139 repeals the Limitations Directive as from 1 June 2009.  
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substances on the market to be able to judge whether or not they may adversely affect 
human health or the environment. REACH aims to address this data gap by 
transferring the regulatory burden for substance testing to the private sector and 
making compulsory the registration of such testing data with a central EU body, 
ECHA. This shift, from public sector to private sector, of the responsibility for 
evaluating the intrinsic nature of substances is important and reflects an (implicitly 
acknowledged) asymmetry of resources (both financial and in terms of human 
capital), expertise and information. With this shift comes an elaborate and complex 
piece of legislation accompanied by thousands of pages of equally elaborate and 
complex guidance.  
 
REACH is complex and complicated, on a variety of levels legal and technical. It 
operates using various structural tiers (Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation, 
Restriction) with a blend or hybrid of regulatory approaches. The Regulation also 
creates a complex of structures within which a web of entities (private, public and 
not-for-profit; EU, non-EU and national) operate, with certain relationships obligatory 
and others optional. Some of these relationships (such as those created by the 
mandatory SIEF groupings) highlight extra-legal considerations and expose tensions 
between the regulatory burdens imposed by REACH (here, primarily in relation to 
data sharing) and market burdens imposed by competition between the manufacturers 
or importers of the same substance in the same geographic area.  
 
In terms of ambit, the regulatory compass under REACH has asymmetrical capture: in 
certain instances (for example, with the Restriction and Authorisation processes) any 
chemical substance anywhere on the EU market may be subject to the provisions of 
the Regulation; in others (primarily with Registration) only one part of the spectrum 
of substances on the market is captured (due to tonnage criteria). Even with those 
substances subject to Registration, the regulatory burden widens or narrows (in terms 
of the breadth of the registration data required) as a function of tonnage bands and the 
intrinsic properties of the substance being registered. At the same time, there are a 
large number of exclusions. Such widening and narrowing of ambit under REACH 
highlights the potential overlapping nature of the Regulation with other forms of EU 
substance control, the complexity of legislating in this area, a lack of limitless 
resources and a desire not to stifle or inhibit innovation or the EU chemicals market 
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more than is strictly necessary to protect human health or the environment.  Having 
considered the various elements of REACH, the following Chapter looks in depth at 
ECHA and the Agency’s role in relation to the Regulation. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE EUROPEAN CHEMICALS AGENCY 
 
 
With REACH comes a new EU regulator, the European Chemicals Agency, or 
ECHA.  Established given the “…need to ensure effective management of the 
technical, scientific and administrative aspects of [REACH] at Community level”,1 
the influence of ECHA and what it does on a day-to-day basis puts it at the very heart 
of modern chemicals regulation. Aside from REACH, the Agency is now also the 
responsible regulator under the Biocides Regulation,
2
 the CLP Regulation
3
 and the 
Prior Informed Consent Regulation.
4
 This Chapter, however, is concerned solely with 
ECHA’s role in relation to REACH. It begins with a review of ECHA’s mission 
before turning to exploration of the Agency’s structure and financing. The Chapter 
then considers how guidance is developed and disseminated via ECHA. Guidance 
produced in relation to REACH is expansive. The later Chapters of this thesis show 
how that guidance amplifies, standardises, translates and extrapolates the text of the 
Regulation. This Chapter sets out how that guidance comes into being. It also 
considers judicial and non-judicial accountability mechanisms, both for ECHA in 
general and its guidance in particular. In so doing, it explores some of the 
implications for law of changes in governance. 
 
In their 2012 review of REACH, the Commission described the Agency as follows: 
 
“ECHA is a decentralised agency: it draws up opinions so that the 
Commission can enact legislative proposals (e.g. in the restrictions area) 
or take specific decisions (e.g. granting or refusing authorisations). It has, 
in addition, own decision-making powers allowing it to adopt individual 
decisions needing a defined technical expertise, under clearly and 
precisely defined conditions and without discretionary power (e.g. in the 
                                                        
1
 Recital 15 
2
 Council Regulation (EU) 528/2012 concerning the making available on the market and use of biocidal 
products [2012] OJ L 167/1 
3
 Council Regulation (EC) 1272/2008 on classification, labelling and packaging of substances and 
mixtures [2008] OJ L 353/1 
4
 Council Regulation (EU) 649/2012 concerning the export and import of hazardous chemicals [2012] 
OJ L 201/60 
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area of evaluation); however, it is not allowed to adopt legislative 
measures of general application.”5 
 
It is probably worth noting that ECHA is not the only EU regulatory agency with 
oversight of chemicals. Others (such as the European Environment Agency and the 
European Food Standards Agency) also play a role. In the rise of EU regulatory 
agencies with competencies for chemicals, we see devolution of State power 
outwards.
6
 Interestingly, different agencies have been granted different competencies: 
some, like the European Environment Agency, have merely advisory functions; 
others, like the European Food Standards Agency, can issue non-binding directions; 
and there are those, like ECHA, that can create orders with binding effect.
7
 There are 
then, in addition, a whole host of regulators with responsibility for chemicals control 
in the 28 Member States. At the EU level, this creates a regulatory landscape with 
varying topology. Since 2001, there has been a proliferation of EU agencies as part of 
an effort to free the Commission from certain regulatory and/or executive tasks that 
are predominantly of a technical or scientific nature. Interestingly, ECHA is one of 
only four EU agencies with the ability to take decisions that are binding on third 
parties.
8
 
 
ECHA’s Mission 
 
Titling itself as the “driving force” among regulators working on REACH, the 
Agency puts its mission as follows, 
 
“ECHA helps companies to comply with the legislation, advances the safe 
use of chemicals, provides information on chemicals and addresses 
chemicals of concern.”9 
                                                        
5
 Commission, ‘Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions in accordance with Article 117(4) 
of REACH and Article 46(2) of CLP, and a review of certain elements of REACH in line with Articles 
75(2), 138(2), 138(3) and 138(6) of REACH: Staff Working Document ‘(SWD (2013) 25 final), 79 
(hereafter, the ‘2012 REACH Review Report’) 
6
 On this, see: Veerle Heyvaert, 'Regulating Chemical Risk: REACH in a Global Governance 
Perspective' in Johan Eriksson, Michael Gilek and Christina Rudén (eds) Regulating Chemical Risks 
(Springer 2010) 223 
7
 Barbara Stibernitz, ‘A Brief Comment on Science Based Risk Regulation Within the European 
Union’ (2012) 1 European Journal of Risk Regulation 86 
8
 Sami Andoura and Timmerman, ‘Governance of the EU: The Reform Debate on European Agencies 
Reignited’ (European Policy Institutes Network Working Paper, 2008), 12 
9
 See: <http://echa.europa.eu/web/guest/about-us/who-we-are/mission> accessed 10 August 2014 
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What is noteworthy here is the explicit reference to ‘companies’ and the lack of 
explicit reference to other, non-private sector, stakeholders. That being said, the 
Agency’s five values do reference the public and state that ECHA will be: 
transparent; independent; trustworthy; efficient; and “committed to well being”. 10 
These map somewhat imperfectly with Recital 95 to the Regulation which states that 
confidence in ECHA will only be secured if it is independent, transparent and 
efficient, with high scientific, technical and regulatory capacities. The difficulties in 
sourcing the right scientific, technical and regulatory expertise for ECHA are well 
known. Much of this, it seems, comes down to location. Here, the Commission 
comments that: 
 
“The location of ECHA in Helsinki is reported to pose a particular 
challenge for staffing.  In spite of considerable, and highly appreciated, 
efforts of Finland and the City of Helsinki to create a welcoming 
environment for staff members and their families, promising candidates 
have been reported to turn down offers of employment for reasons linked 
to the climatic conditions, the remoteness of the location compared to the 
rest of the EU, and difficulties for spouses and partners to find attractive 
employment.”11 
 
ECHA plans its activities through three-year multi-annual work programmes 
(MAWPs) and annual work programmes (WPs)
12. ECHA's ‘general reports’13 provide 
accounts of the Agency's progress in a given year and every five years ECHA is 
obliged to produce a report on the operation of REACH. The first of these was 
published in 2012.
14
 Its findings are discussed throughout this Chapter and elsewhere 
in this thesis. 
 
ECHA’s Structure 
 
On a structural level, REACH envisages three committees working as part of ECHA: 
a Member State Committee (which has the task of attempting to achieve agreement 
                                                        
10
 See: <http://echa.europa.eu/about-us/who-we-are/values> accessed 10 August 2014 
11
 2012 REACH Review Report (n 5), 82 
12
 See: <http://echa.europa.eu/web/guest/about-us/the-way-we-work/plans-and-reports> accessed 10 
August 2014 
13
 ibid 
14
 European Chemicals Agency, ‘The Operation of REACH and CLP’ (Helsinki, 2011) (hereafter, the 
‘ECHA 2011 Report’) 
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among Member States where a harmonised approach under REACH is required); a 
Committee for Risk Assessment; and a Committee for Socio-economic Analysis (both 
of which issue scientific opinions in certain contexts)
15
. In addition, there is a 
Management Board, a Secretariat
16
, a Board of Appeal and a Forum for Exchange of 
Information on Enforcement (the “Forum”).17  
 
In the start-up phase of REACH (mid 2007), the initial team at ECHA consisted of 38 
seconded staff from the Commission. The Agency’s Secretariat currently comprises 
more than 500 staff members, divided over seven Directorates and into twenty three 
‘units’.18 This diffusion of personnel has led to an acknowledged lack of coherency 
within the Agency and is something ECHA has identified as an area for 
improvement.
19
 The range of work undertaken by the Secretariat is vast and is, as the 
Commission has noted, “not purely administrative but goes deeply into technical-
scientific issues; in that sense the name “Secretariat” may be a little limitative”. 20 
Looking to the future, the work of the Secretariat will broaden, as it is granted 
additional responsibilities under the new Biocidal Products Regulation,
21
 and under 
the Prior Informed Consent Regulation (which conerns the import and export of 
dangerous chemicals).
22
  One of the key units within the Secretariat is the Helpdesk 
which, as the name would suggest, exists to provide advice on compliance with the 
Regulation. By March 2011, the Helpdesk had recevied and responsed to more than 
30,000 queries.
23
 The annual reports produced by ECHA do not detail from whom the 
queries originated and such may be important to understanding the interpetative role 
played by the Agency.  
 
 
 
                                                        
15
 Recitals 102 and 103; Articles 76(1)(c), (d) and (e).  
16
 As will be recalled from Chapter 3, the Secretariat has responsibility for supporting the Management 
Board in administrative and certain technical matters. Recital 98 details that “In the interests of 
efficiency, the staff of the Agency Secretariat should perform essentially technical-administrative and 
scientific tasks without calling on the scientific and technical resources of the Member States.”  
17
 Articles 76(1)(f), (g) and (h) 
18
 <http://echa.europa.eu/web/guest/about-us/who-we-are/organisation> accessed 10 August 2014 
19
 ECHA 2011 Report (n 14) 80-81 
20
 2012 REACH Review Report (n 5) 82 
21
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22
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23
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Management of ECHA 
 
All EU agencies have a main governing body with a supervisory role, general 
responsibility for budgetary and planning matters as well as for reporting the agency’s 
activities to the EU institutions.  In ECHA, the Management Board (the “Board”) is 
led by an Executive Director
24
 and comprises 28 Member State representatives (one 
from each State),
 25
 up to 6 representatives appointed by the Commission and 2 
independent persons appointed by the Parliament.
26
 The tasks of the Board include the 
adoption of the work programme, an annual report and other strategic documents as 
well as the adoption of ECHA’s budget and the delivery of an opinion on the final 
accounts. The Board also appoints the Executive Director, the Board of Appeal and 
the members of the Committee for Risk Assessment and the Committee for Socio–
economic Analysis, and may invite stakeholders to Committee meetings.  
 
The current Executive Director of ECHA is Geert Dancet, a Commission employee 
from 1986 – 2007 (who headed the REACH unit of DG Enterprise). He is now in his 
second, and final, term of office at the Agency.
27
 During the initial selection process 
for the Executive Director of REACH, the Commission put forward only two 
candidates for the Board to consider (including Mr Dancet). This led to an official 
complaint being made to the Ombudsman, which was upheld.
28
 The Ombudsman 
found that it was, “impossible to verify that the Commission did not unduly and 
arbitrarily restrict the range of candidates for the post of ECHA Executive Director 
and did not abuse its discretion in the matter”. 29  This course of action by the 
Commission is interesting in that it suggests that the Commission saw ECHA as 
crucial in completing the chemicals regime that the Commission had first put forward 
(and, as a consequence, that the appointment of its Executive Director was also 
crucial).  
                                                        
24
 Articles 76(1)(a) and (b) 
25
 From the signing of the Accession Treaty with Croatia, the Management Board decided to grant 
Croatia observer status and to invite a representative of Croatia to attend the meetings of the 
Management Board and the Committees. 
26
 The list of current (October 2013) Board members can be found here: 
<http://echa.europa.eu/about/organisation/management_board/management_board_members_en.asp> 
accessed 10 August 2014 
27
 Article 84(2) 
28
 2012 REACH Review Report (n 5) 81 
29
 ibid 
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As part of the 2012 review of REACH, PricewaterhouseCoopers (‘PwC’) had been 
asked by the Commission to produce a report on ECHA.
30
One of their 
recommendations was that ECHA’s Board would be more efficient with fewer 
members (in particular, via a reduction in the number of Member State 
representatives).
31
 This echoes other work which has criticised full Member State 
representation in EU agency boards as unnecessary, costly and ineffective.
32
 Despite 
these criticisms, the Commission concluded in the 2012 review of REACH that it, 
“sees no need to change the composition of the Management Board.” 33 The following 
two sections consider ECHA’s Forum on Enforcement and the ECHA Board of 
Appeal. Both have considerable input into the soft law framework that underpins 
REACH.  
 
The Forum on Enforcement 
 
ECHA’s Forum on Enforcement, which coordinates a network of Member State 
authorities responsible for enforcement, is unique among EU agencies. The 
Commission has supported the need for its existence in the following terms, 
 
“The increased responsibility of operators for the safe use of chemicals, 
a shift in mindset, that is at the very core of REACH, meant that 
enforcement of the legislation needed to be strengthened at EU level.  
In this light it was considered appropriate to provide a more formal 
framework for the co-operation among enforcement authorities which 
had emerged under the previous chemicals legislation.”34 
 
Article 77(4) of REACH sets out that the tasks for which the Forum is responsible. 
These are: 
 
“(a) spreading good practice and highlighting problems at Community 
level; 
                                                        
30
 PwC, ‘Review of the European Chemicals Agency’ (Report to the European Commission, March 
2012) – see: < http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/dg/files/evaluation/201203-final-report-echa_en.pdf> 
accessed 10 August 2014 
31
 ibid, 45 
32
 Ramboll Management, ‘Evaluation of the EU decentralised agencies in 2009’(Report for the 
European Commission, December 2009) 
33
 2012 REACH Review Report (n 5) 81 
34
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(b) proposing, coordinating and evaluating harmonised enforcement 
projects and joint inspections; 
(c) coordinating exchange of inspectors; 
(d) identifying enforcement strategies, as well as best practice in 
enforcement; 
(e) developing working methods and tools of use to local inspectors; 
(f) developing an electronic information exchange procedure; 
(g) liaising with industry, taking particular account of the specific needs of 
SMEs, and other stakeholders, including relevant international 
organisations, as necessary; and 
(h) examining proposals for restrictions with a view to advising on 
enforceability.” 
In terms of composition, the Forum has a representative from each Member State plus 
three members appointed by Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway.
35
 These 
representatives are in turn supported by the REACH competent authorities in their 
respective Member/EEA/EFTA States. The Forum can also co-op experts to assit it, 
but has not chosen to do so thus far. To date, the Forum has created one ‘REF’ 
(REACH-EN-FORCE) project,
36
which looked to assess the compliance of 
manufacturers and importers of substances with the REACH obligations on the pre-
registration and Safety Data Sheets. In total, 1,589 inspections were carried out during 
2010 in the then 27 Member States.
37
  
 
The Forum has also published guidance for Member State competent authorities, 
which sets out, “guidelines, in the form of minimum criteria, to be applied as a 
common basis for the performance of REACH and CLP inspection activities within 
the Member States and EEA-EFTA States.”38 ECHA says that this is, “consistent with 
some of the principle tasks of the Forum under Articles 76(1)(f) and 77(4) of 
REACH”.39 However, and as detailed above, REACH says nothing about harmonised, 
minimum criteria for enforcement (even though such an approach is not new in the 
wider field of environmental law).
40
 While issuing such criteria might be “consistent” 
                                                        
35
 For the full list of members, see: <http://echa.europa.eu/web/guest/about-us/who-we-
are/enforcement-forum/members-of-the-forum> accessed 10 August 2014 
36
 <http://echa.europa.eu/about-us/who-we-are/enforcement-forum> accessed 10 August 2014  
37
 <http://echa.europa.eu/documents/10162/13585/ref-1_project_report_conclusions_en.pdf> accessed 
10 August 2014  
38
 See: 
<http://echa.europa.eu/documents/10162/13577/mcri_minimum_criteria_reach_inspections_2011_en.p
df> accessed 10 August 2014 
39
 ibid, 2 
40
 Minimum criteria have already been set for environmental inspections under ‘Council 
Recommendation no. 2001/331/EC of 4 April 2001 providing for minimum criteria for environmental 
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with the tasks with which the Forum is furnished, there is arguably a lack of explicit 
grant of authority. This, it is suggested, is an example of the Forum translating 
Articles 76(1)(f) and 77(4) of REACH to make the Regulation work better in practice. 
Later Chapters show similar translation by ECHA, and the significance of this 
guidance function is discussed in Chapter 9. 
 
One of the few matters to be given ‘very high’ priority in the Forum’s 2011-2013 
Work Progamme is the, “clarification of the interlinks between ECHA, Competent 
Authorities and MS enforcing authorities”. This lack of clarity in and further matters 
relating to enforcement under REACH are discussed in Chapter 8. 
 
The Board of Appeal 
 
The Board of Appeal is responsible for deciding on appeals lodged against decisions 
of the Agency listed in Article 91 of REACH. The Commission argues that the Board 
of Appeal, “provides a possibility of legal redress which is quicker, less formal and 
less expensive than an action to the Court of Justice of the European Union.”41   
 
The ECHA Board of Appeal comprises three members: a Chairman and two others
42
, 
each appointed by the Management Board
43
. The three members (and their 
“alternates”, who represent the members of the Board of Appeal in their absence) 
must have appropriate technical and/or legal qualifications.
44
 The matters for which 
an appeal may be brought before the Board are somewhat limited.
45
 Article 91 details 
that an appeal may be brought against decisions of the Agency taken pursuant to 
Article 9, Article 20, Article 27(6), Article 30(2) and (3) and Article 51 of REACH. 
Broadly, what this means is that the Board of Appeal may hear appeals in relation to 
                                                                                                                                                              
inspections’, as elaborated by the European Union Network for the Implementation and Enforcement 
of Environmental Law (IMPEL) 
41
 2012 REACH Review Report (n 5) 84 
42
 Article 89(1) 
43
 Article 89(3) 
44
 Article 1 of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1238/2007 of 23 October 2007 on laying down rules 
on the qualifications of the members of the Board of Appeal of the European Chemicals Agency. For a 
list of current members of the Board of Appeal, see: <http://echa.europa.eu/about-us/who-we-
are/board-of-appeal/the-board-of-appeal/the-list-of-the-members-of-the-board-of-appeal-and-the-
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45
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the following decisions taken by ECHA: Exemptions from the general obligation to 
register for product and process orientated research and development; Rejections of 
registrations; Sharing of existing data in the case of registered substances; Sharing of 
data involving tests; Examination of testing proposals; Compliance check of 
registrations; and Substance evaluation.  
 
Those with standing to appeal comprise the usual suspects of EU law:
46
 any natural or 
legal persons to whom a decision is addressed; and those persons to whom a decision 
is or direct and individual concern (even though not addressed to them).
47
 Appeals 
must be brought within three months
48
 and decisions of the Board of Appeal are 
subject to challenge before the General Court (formerly, the Court of First Instance).
49
 
The Board has published guidance in the form of Practice Directions to assist 
applicants with their appeals.
50
 
 
The Board of Appeal sits within ECHA’s organisational structure, is located inside 
the Agency’s offices in Helsinki and yet deals with appeals against ECHA’s 
decisions. As the Commission has noted, this “poses specific challenges”. 51 Despite 
this, stakeholders interviewed as part of PwC’s review of REACH were confident that 
the Board of Appeal is independent.
52
 The real proof of the pudding will likely come 
as the workload of the Board increases. As of 10 August 2014, only 39 appeals had 
been lodged since the creation of the Agency in 2007.
53
 While the number of appeals 
is small, it should be remembered that ECHA has made relatively few appealable 
decisions to date (see Chapter 6 for a review of Evaluation under REACH) and that 
the Board of Appeal should find its workload increasing over time.  
 
 
                                                        
46
 On the area of the jurisdiction of the European Courts and the question of standing more generally, 
see Part IV of: Alan Dashwood, Michael Dougan, Barry Rodger, Eleanor Spaventa and Derrick Wyatt, 
Wyatt & Dashwood's European Union Law (6
th
 edn, Hart 2011) 
47
 Article 92(1) 
48
 Article 92(2) 
49
 Article 94(1) 
50
 <http://echa.europa.eu/documents/10162/13573/appeals_practice_directions_en.pdf> accessed 10 
August 2014  
51
 2012 REACH Review Report (n 5) 84 
52
 PwC (n 24) 31 
53
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ECHA Committees 
 
As noted above, REACH envisages three committees working as part of ECHA: a 
Member State Committee (‘MSC’); a Committee for Risk Assessment (‘RAC’); and a 
Committee for Socio-economic Analysis (‘SEAC’). 54  In terms of composition, 
members of the RAC and SEAC are appointed by the Management Board, upon 
nomination of candidates with relevant experience by Member States.  At least one, 
and no more than two members nominated by each Member State can be appointed in 
this way: the RAC currently has 41 members
55
; and the SEAC 30 members
56
.  
Members of the MSC are appointed directly by the Member States, each appointing 
one member.
57
 
 
Committees for Risk Assessment and Socio-Economic Analysis 
 
The main obligations of the RAC include opinions on authorisation applications and 
on proposals for restrictions.
58
 The RAC also has obligations under the Classification, 
Labelling and Packaging Regulation (commonly known as ‘CLP’). 59  What this 
means, on a practical level, is that the Committee is under a quickly increasing 
workload and has been chastised by the Commission for not working efficiently
60
. 
The RAC has also come under criticism for failing to be transparent on how 
stakeholders can become involved in its work.
61
  
 
Like the RAC, the main responsibilities of the SEAC also include opinions on 
authorisation applications and on proposals for restrictions. It too has been 
encouraged to become more efficient as its workload increases.
62
 The roles and work 
of the RAC and SEA are considered in more depth in Chapter 7 on Authorisation and 
Restriction.  
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55
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60
 2012 REACH Review Report (n 5) 87 
61
 2012 REACH Review Report (n 5) 88 
62
 ibid 
  
80 
 
Member State Committee 
 
The MSC is different. As the Commission has observed, it, “falls nearly completely 
outside the classic committee paradigm.” 63  In terms of its work, the MSC is 
responsible for resolving divergences of opinions among Member States on proposals 
for the identification of Substances of Very High Concern. The Committee also 
provides opinions on ECHA's draft recommendations for the authorisation list (the so-
called ‘Candidate List’)64 and draft Community Rolling Action Plan for the substance 
evaluation process. If an agreement is not reached within the MSC, the matter is then 
referred to the Commission for decision-making.
65
 In this context, the Commission 
has commented that, 
 
“This referral to the Commission for decision is an illustration of the 
extraordinary role and nature of the MSC which leads MSC members to 
some, perhaps too large, extent to engage in policy discussions rather than 
scientific-technical discussions.”66 
 
The functioning of the MSC to date thus suggests that the parameters of REACH may 
open to negotiation. While the MSC exists to faciltate consensus building, there have 
also been reports of difficulty in getting agreement among the committee members as 
to the inlcusions of SVHCs onto the Candidate List.
67
 The tone of the Commission’s 
2012 review of REACH is very much that the MSC is an oddity and lacks 
efficiency.
68
 Despite this, and despite the lack of clarity on the accountability of MSC 
reprsentatives, the Commission did not suggest amending REACH to alter the 
composition or role of the MSC.  
 
Directors’ Contact Group 
 
Established in 2010, the Directors' Contact Group (DCG) provides a platform for the 
exchange of views between the European Commission, ECHA and nine industry 
                                                        
63
 2012 REACH Review Report (n 5) 86 
64
 On which, see Chapter 7 on Authorisation and Restriction  
65
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associations.
69
 In essence, the DCG is a problem solving goup which seeks to 
capitalise on industry expertise to find solutions to issues which arise during the 
operation of REACH. This body was not envisaged, and is not referred to, in the 
Regulation. This is telling. ECHA comments that,  
 
“Under its initial mandate, the DCG found solutions to 28 issues of 
concern for industry relating to the first REACH Registration deadline of 
30 November 2010. These solutions were shared with the Member State 
Competent Authorities through the CARACAL advisory body and with the 
EU/EEA Enforcement Authorities through the Forum for Exchange of 
Information on Enforcement.”70 
 
The issues that the DCG has dealt with to date have been technical or practical – for 
example, what should be done where a company splits in two and one of new entities 
has not undergone pre-registration
 
.
71
 While the mandate of the group says that it is 
“informal” and that its role is to “monitor” the operation of REACH and “promote 
best practice”, it is clear that ECHA expects the guidance produced by the DCG to be 
followed.
72
 Interestingly, the DCG refers to its solutions as “recommendations” rather 
than guidance. Given the practical effect is the same, the distinction does not seem to 
make much, if any, difference.   
 
Stakeholder Engagement 
 
ECHA comments that, “All organisations and individuals interested in or affected by 
the chemicals regulations are considered as ECHA's stakeholders and are welcome to 
participate in the Agency's work.”73 While the sincerity of this statement is not in 
                                                        
69 The nine are: Cefic, Eurométaux, REACH Alliance, CONCAWE, FECC,  UEAPME; Orgalime, 
DUCC and CheMI Platform. 
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 <http://echa.europa.eu/documents/10162/13559/rrd-56-10_mandate_dcg10_final_en.pdf> accessed 
10 August 2014  
73
 <http://echa.europa.eu/about-us/partners-and-networks/stakeholders> accessed 10 August 2014  
  
82 
 
doubt, and ECHA organises various public engagement events,
74
 the reality is that a 
very small number (of largely industry based organisations) are actively targeted by 
ECHA and engage with the operation of the Regulation. ECHA works particularly 
closely with what it terms “Accredited Stakeholder Organisations” (‘ASOs’), who 
represent differing fields of competence at the EU level. Looking at the list of 
ASOs,
75
 the vast majority are industry representative bodies: only 7 out of the 69 
accrediated ASOs represent civil society. In their 2012 review of REACH, the 
Commission noted the lack of paucity of engagement with REACH aside from those 
directly within the Regulation’s purview (i.e. industry). 76  This is also seen (and 
discussed below) in the context of stakeholder engagement in the generation of 
REACH guidance.  
 
The Financing of ECHA 
 
ECHA is financed partly by fees paid by natural or legal persons under REACH (i.e. 
the fees paid for registration) and partly by the general budget of the European 
Communities.
77
 It is also open to Member States to make “voluntary contributions” to 
the Agency.
78
 None have done this so far. The original EU subsidy was a balancing 
subsidy designed to cover the start-up of ECHA (when no or insufficient fees were 
coming in) as well as any income gaps caused by fee income fluctuations between 
registration peaks. Since 2010, ECHA has been fully financed by the fees paid for 
registration.
79
 In 2012, while the Agency continued to be fully self-financed for its 
activities under the REACH, it received its first EU subsidies for performing its tasks 
under the Biocidal Products and PIC Regulations.
80
 ECHA’s expenditure has risen 
from EUR 13m in 2007,
81
 to EUR 95m in 2012.
82
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Guidance produced by ECHA 
 
REACH is vast and the norms in the Regulation take a variety of forms: some are 
prescriptive and detailed; others are bare framework commands without any 
underlying substance in the Regulation (e.g. create a SIEF). Article 77(2) details that 
one of the tasks of ECHA’s Secretariat is to, 
 
“… (g) provide technical and scientific guidance and tools where 
appropriate for the operation of this Regulation…; 
 
h) provide technical and scientific guidance on the operation of this 
Regulation for Member State competent authorities and providing support 
to the helpdesks established by Member States…; [and] 
 
(i) provide guidance to stakeholders including Member State competent 
authorities on communication to the public of information on the risks and 
safe use of substances…” 
 
This mandate is wide and non-specific. However, the Regulation then also details a 
small number specific instances where the Agency is obliged to produce guidance: for 
example, cost sharing guidance for SIEFs;
83
 and applications for authorisation which 
require socio economic analysis.
84
 Since 2003, more than one million words of 
official guidance have been produced on REACH. ECHA’s Document Library (the 
central repository for publicly available ECHA documents)
85
 contains 482 separate 
‘support’ documents. This is made up of: (a) 138 guidance documents; (b) 34 
Helpdesk documents; (c) 185 documents relating to IT Tools; and (d) 67 Manuals.  
 
The guidance produced and disseminated by ECHA takes a variety of forms. The 
table below details the title of the guidance format, their nature, how many of them 
have been produced and the length of the documents. 
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Table 5.1 – ECHA Guidance Documents 
 
Name Nature of documents Length 
Guidance
86
 With the core guidance documents, ECHA says 
that, “These documents have been developed 
with the participation of many stakeholders: 
Industry, Member States and NGOs. The 
objective of these documents is to facilitate the 
implementation of the legislation in ECHA's 
remit by describing good practice on how to 
fulfil obligations in the Regulation.”87 
 
It is interesting to note the lack of reference 
above by ECHA to: (a) the public; and (b) other 
branches of the EU (e.g. Commission and 
Parliament). 
 
These 21 documents 
contain more than 
one million words of 
guidance. One of the 
core guidance 
documents is almost 
three times the 
length of this thesis. 
The specifics of each 
of the core guidance 
are set out in 
Appendix 2 to this 
thesis.  
‘Guidance 
in a 
Nutshell’ 
ECHA comments that they have produced, “a 
series of shortened versions of the REACH 
Guidance Documents in order to make the 
corresponding Guidance Documents published 
by the Agency more accessible for industry.”88 
 
The 5 Nutshell 
documents vary 
from 2,500 words in 
length to over 9,000 
words; between 10 
and 20 pages long. 
For the longer of 
these documents, 
“nutshell” is perhaps 
a misnomer. 
 
‘Guidance 
Factsheets’ 
These provide a “structured overview” of the 
guidance documents and include a summary of 
the key aspects, bibliographic information and 
other references. The core guidance documents 
are so complex that they require their own 
guidance/explanatory maps.  
 
 
Each of the 10 
Guidance Factsheets 
is 4-5 pages long. 
‘Practical 
Guides’ 
These provide “practical information” on 
REACH and are essentially ‘how to’ guides (e.g. 
how to avoid unnecessary animal testing; how to 
report in vitro data). These are highly procedural 
15 Practical Guides; 
each 20-30 pages 
each. 
                                                        
86
 ECHA simply calls these documents ‘guidance’. To distinguish them from the various other forms of 
guidance, I refer to them as ‘core guidance’ documents. 
87
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(and, for example, show screen shots of various 
forms to be completed as part of Registration). 
 
‘Formats’  These are templates of certain of the reports to be 
submitted to ECHA (e.g. Chemical Safety Report 
or Annex XV dossier on Restriction). Linked 
with these, and in addition to the Practical 
Guides, ECHA also publishes Practical 
Examples, which give illustrative examples of 
how completed chemical safety assessments and 
exposure scenarios should look.
89
 
 
7 Formats. Varying 
length. These are, in 
effect, shells to be 
completed by 
registrants and 
Member State 
Competent 
Authorities.  
 
In addition to the guidance documents detailed above there are, as of 10 August 2014, 
answers to 889 separate FAQs set out on the ECHA website.
90
 The Agency accepts 
that some of its guidance is dense and complex and is working on making the 
documents more accessible and, where possible, more simple.
91
 ECHA labels 
everything save for the core guidance documents as “quasi guidance”, with the intent 
that these are “in simple terms” and particularly intended for SMEs.92 There is then an 
implicit hierarchy of norms in the guidance ECHA produces. The Agency sees its 
guidance as living documents and comments that, “Guidance reflects the ‘state-of-the-
art’ in the practical implementation of the legislation.”93 
 
Guidance History 
 
The history of ECHA’s guidance documents is rooted in the REACH Implementation 
Projects (‘RIPs’). Orchestrated by the Commission and beginning in 2003, the RIPs 
were designed, “to ensure that all stakeholders, especially industry and public 
authorities, are adequately prepared for the practical application of the new system.”94 
The day-to-day management of the RIPs was conducted by the European Chemicals 
Bureau (‘ECB’) which, prior to REACH, was the focal point for the data and 
assessment procedure on dangerous chemicals within the European Union.  
                                                        
89
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In 2008 the ECB completed its mandate and ceased to exist. Some of its activities 
were taken over by ECHA; others remained within the Joint Research Centre's 
Institute for Health & Consumer Protection. The ECB website no longer exists. What 
this means, on a practical level, is that the information related to RIPs 3 and 4 (which 
produced the 15 initial REACH guidance documents for industry and Member State 
regulators) is no longer accessible.
95
 Nor is the website cached somewhere else for 
easy access.
96
 The guidance itself remains (housed on ECHA’s website) but there is 
no public information on the development of the RIPs, the stakeholders engaged, the 
challenges encountered etc. This lack of publicly available data has been confirmed 
by the Health & Safety Executive (the main regulator for REACH in England & 
Wales).
97
 A presentation by an ECB official in 2006 details that the initial guidance 
documents produced under the RIPs were created via an open call for tenders, with 
working drafts discussed by Stakeholder Expert Groups and input from Member 
States, NGOs, the Commission and industry.
98
 All of the guidance documents 
produced under RIPs 3 and 4 were designed to be completed by the end of 2007.   
 
Guidance Development and Stakeholder Engagement 
 
A Guidance Consultation Procedure was first adopted by ECHA’s Management 
Board in 2008, with full implementation of the procedures and workflows for 
developing and updating guidance occurring in 2009.
99
 ECHA’s aim with the 
development and review of guidance is to build consensus between various actors. 
This, however, is not always possible. The 2008 Guidance Consultation Procedure 
was said to have led to, “protracted discussions on scientific, technical or policy 
issues which caused delays.”100 As a result, ECHA implemented a new Consultation 
Procedure on Guidance in 2011, which allows the Agency to, “finalise guidance on 
the basis of majority views if full consensus cannot be achieved.” 101  This new 
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approach, and ECHA’s guidance more generally, raise interesting questions about 
legislative mandate, agency power, transparency and accountability. These are 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 9. 
 
ECHA’s Secretariat collects data on difficulties with the guidance that the Agency has 
produced. This data comes in via helpdesks (ECHA’s own and those of the Member 
States), from ECHA’s committees (the RAC, SEAC and MSC), the Commission and 
Member State competent authorities.
102
 Once issues with guidance are identified, 
there are four possible actions: (a) a corrigendum (which is a simple editorial change 
or correction); (b) an amendment (which changes the substance of one part of the 
guidance); (c) a revision (a more whole scale review of the guidance); or (d) the 
issuing of a wholly new guidance document.
103
 Where the Secretariat realise that 
“comprehensive work is required”, a formal consultation process begins. This starts 
with the Commission (which sees a first draft of any changes) and then broadens to 
include a Partner Expert Group (‘PEG’), experts from ECHA’s committees and a final 
(re)consultation of the Commission and Member State competent authorities.
104
 The 
2011 Consultation Procedure on Guidance details that the Secretariat decides whom 
to consult and on the time frames given for consultation.
105
 Much of the consultation 
is ‘closed’ in that it involves experts “whose nominations have been received by a 
specified deadline”106 and who are then formed into PEGs.107 The ECHA website 
does not detail lists of experts within PEGs formed as part of previous consultations 
on guidance. Only in limited situations (for example, entirely new guidance) will 
ECHA engage in full public consultation. This goes to the legitimacy of ECHA’s 
guidance, is potentially of concern and is discussed in more depth in Chapter 9.  
 
On occasion, updated guidance has been intentionally delayed to allow for stability in 
the run up to registration deadlines.
108
 At present, updated guidance is published at 
three specific times during the year, “to enable industry to better plan for changes.”109 
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The Agency comments that stakeholder engagement in the guidance updating process 
is important: (a) to reduce possibility of errors; and (b) to get, as ECHA terms it, “buy 
in” from the various actors.110 ECHA’s 2011 review of REACH details that, between 
2006 and 2011, the Agency published 71 guidance documents, undertook 30 
consultations on guidance with Member State competent authorities and consulted 
254 experts as part of the PEG.
111
  
 
ECHA Guidance and Accountability 
 
With the expansion in new forms of governance (discussed in Chapter 2) come 
concerns about the extent to which they are legitimate and/or fit within existing 
notions of accountability. This section begins by looking at the formal, institutional 
accountability of ECHA. It then turns to a more in depth discussion of the role of the 
courts as an accountability mechanism, both generally in the context of soft law and 
more specifically in the context of the post legislative shaping of REACH via 
ECHA’s guidance. 
 
ECHA Accountability 
 
As was set out in Chapter 2 and earlier in this Chapter, the European Chemicals 
Agency sits at the heart of REACH. It has the power to take decisions that are binding 
on third parties without consulting the Commission or Member States and is one of a 
handful of EU agencies with such independence.112 By way of contrast, although the 
European Food Safety Authority is a scientific body charged with risk assessment in 
relation to foodstuffs, it is made clear that questions of risk management fall to the 
European Commission.113 The discretion granted to ECHA as regards the day-to-day 
operation of REACH is wide. Despite this, there are a number of mechanisms which 
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have the potential to act as a check and/or balance on the exercise of the Agency’s 
functions (including, but not limited to, the creation of guidance).  
 
Formal accountability of ECHA is structured in a variety of ways, many of which are 
common to other EU agencies.114 The first of these is Member State, Commission and 
Parliament participation in ECHA’s Management Board; the second is the influence 
of the Member State Committee during Evaluation and Authorisation (discussed in 
brief in Chapter 3, and in more depth in Chapters 6 and 7); and the third is via the 
Article 117 reporting obligations on the Agency (annual reports and a quiquennial 
review of REACH; also discussed in Chapter 3). As noted earlier in this Chapter, 
redress against decisions of ECHA may be found in the ECHA Board of Appeal, 
though the matters for which an appeal may be brought before the Board are 
somewhat limited.115 In the initial years of REACH, when ECHA was funded in part 
by EU subsidies, the European Parliament also had input to the Agency’s budget.116 
Finally, ECHA is one of only five agencies where the European Parliament has the 
possibility to invite the Executive Director for a hearing before his appointment.117 
EU agencies more generally have been considered to be problematic because of their 
perceived lack of accountability.118 Here, there are broad tensions between, on the 
one hand, agency independence and the functional benefits of grouping together 
experts, and, on the other hand, anxiety about agencies exercising arbitrary power.119 
The extent to which the above formal accountability mechanisms have impacted on 
the creation, amendment and promulgation of guidance by ECHA is uncertain. There 
is nothing in the public domain on this matter. Similarly, how the guidance produced 
by ECHA to underpin REACH is regarded by the Commission (or other EU bodies) is 
also not known. Despite the wealth of guidance relating to REACH, the Commission 
said little about ECHA’s approach in its 2012 review of REACH. Aside from 
comments that ECHA’s guidance should remain stable in the months preceding any 
registration deadline and a suggestion to target guidance for SMEs and in more EU 
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languages, the 2012 review is silent on the underlying rationale for the guidance and 
the methodology by which it is created and updated. 120  The Commission did, 
however, note that ECHA “is not allowed to adopt legislative measures of general 
application.”121 While this is true, the Agency does adopt other normative measures 
of general application in the form of guidance. Given the wealth of guidance 
produced by ECHA and the importance of this guidance in the shaping of the day-to-
day operation of REACH, the Commission’s silence on this matter in the 2012 review 
is striking. Robust and informed monitoring is said to be one of the hallmarks of 
effective experimentalist governance systems.122 REACH contains the right sorts of 
monitoring obligations (ECHA annual reports, quinquennial Commission review etc), 
but, at least in the context of guidance making and promulgation, one might question 
whether the outputs (i.e. the reports themselves) are effective.  
 
As was discussed in Chapter 2, soft post-legislative instruments are not a formally 
recognised branch of EU law. As such they lack legally binding force. However, these 
instruments are ‘soft law’ in that they established rules of conduct that have both, or 
may have both, practical and indirect legal effects.123 The remainder of this Chapter 
considers the nature of these indirect legal effects and how soft law may be held to 
account by the judiciary. It unfolds in three parts: the first sets out the challenges in 
getting soft law, in general, and post legislative guidance, in particular, before the EU 
courts; part two looks at what the EU courts have said about soft law and how it may 
be used; and the final part then considers what the EU courts have said about the 
guidance produced under REACH.  
 
However, before turning to the detail, it is worth briefly reviewing why it may be 
important to consider the role of the courts. As Scott and Sturm have observed, the 
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courts offer up a “concrete site” where the tensions between law and new governance 
must be reconciled.124 They argue that,  
 
“in areas of normative uncertainty and complexity, courts prompt and 
create occasions for normatively motived and accountable inquiry and 
remediation by actors involved in new governance processes.”125  
 
As such, they see courts “as catalysts”. In his review of soft instruments and the EU 
courts, Smismans similarly suggests that the “ideational repertoire” of soft law 
instruments may have an impact on EU jurisprudence.126 The notions of catalysts and 
influence are appealing. However, there is an important empirical question, 
unanswered by Scott and Sturm, or by Smismans, as to the real world impact of the 
“signalling” that the courts do. As is seen below, and discussed by Scott in her later 
work on post legislative guidance, 127  while the number of cases concerning new 
governance (in any form) is sizeable, the number of cases on hybrid forms of 
governance, on soft law yoked with hard law, is small.   
 
The Challenges in Adjudicating on Soft Law Instruments 
 
Scott and Trubek have suggested that the EU courts have responded to shifts towards 
newer forms of governance in a variety of ways: thwarting experiments in new 
governance; ignoring those experiments; distorting new governance; or seriously 
engaging with it.128 In later work, Hervey argues that the relationship between the EU 
courts and new governance operates along a spectrum ranging from, “mutual 
ignorance; through separation, either with hierarchy or in parallel; to hybrid forms of 
mutual transformation.”129 It is at this furthest end of the spectrum that courts are, 
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“open to being persuaded as to the normative worth of diverse processes born of the 
diverse experiences of governance.”130 Judicial review of soft law may occur either in 
direct action before the EU courts, under Article 263 TFEU, or via preliminary 
references made to the EU courts by Member State courts, under Article 267 TFEU. 
Article 263 TFEU details that the legislative and executive acts of EU institutions 
which create legal effects for third parties are amenable to judicial review, as are the 
acts of EU bodies and agencies that have the same effect. Article 263(4) TFEU sets 
out that natural and legal persons may, “institute proceedings against an act addressed 
to [them] or which is of direct and individual concern to them, and against a 
regulatory act which is of direct concern to them and does not entail implementing 
measures.”131 
 
Article 267 allows the ECJ to give preliminary rulings on: (a) the interpretation of the 
Treaties; and (b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, 
offices or agencies of the EU. A national court may refer such questions to the ECJ if 
it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment. 
Where such questions are raised in cases before the final courts in any Member State, 
those courts are obliged to bring the matter to the attention of the ECJ. However, 
preliminary references happen infrequently for a variety of reasons. 132  In the 
particular context of environment law preliminary references, “only a handful of 
questions are referred to the ECJ by the domestic judiciary.”133 Despite this, of the 12 
cases referred by the UK to the ECJ between 2007 and 2013, a third concerned 
REACH.134 This is unsurprising, given that REACH entered into force in 2007 and 
was, as this thesis has shown, both new in many ways and highly contested.  
 
In contrast to traditional hard law, soft law is less likely to be justiciable (for the 
reasons set out below) and thus there is a concern that a gap may open between 
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instruments created by bodies public which are and which are not amenable to judicial 
review. In this context, Scott argues that, “although the European Courts privilege 
substance over form in deciding which measures may be challenged, post legislative 
guidance will frequently escape the scrutiny of these courts.”135 In 2002, Scott and 
Trubek argued that EU courts “have tended to ignore, or distort, new governance in 
order that new governance can be accommodated by the premises of a traditional, 
positivist concept of law.”136 While there has been some progress (discussed below) 
this is largely still true today.  
 
One issue is whether the soft law instrument is an act adopted by an institution of the 
EU.137 If it is, then the act may be amenable to judicial review by the EU courts, but 
not otherwise. Importantly, and as a result of EU case law (now enshrined in the 
TFEU), acts adopted by EU agencies can be said to acts of an institution of the EU.138 
Thus, for present purposes, the core guidance produced by ECHA should, in theory, 
be justiciable. This is in contrast to other post legislative guidance issued, for 
example, in the area of emissions trading or water quality where either the authorship 
of the guidance is explicitly multiple (i.e. from members of a working group), or 
where the guidance (while seeking to elaborate on EU hard norms) is said to come 
from the joint action of the Member States.139 What is of more concern in the context 
of REACH is whether the guidance produced by the Directors Contact Group 
(discussed earlier in this Chapter) would be amenable to review. While the DCG is 
not a part of ECHA, and is called “an informal platform”, its work is referred to by 
ECHA and the DCG’s outputs (communiques and Terms of Work) are housed on the 
ECHA website.140 Given this, and the privileging of substance over form,141 it is 
suggested that the DCG’s guidance should also be amenable to review.  
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The question of authorship, for the majority of guidance produced under REACH, is 
not a significant bar to judicial review.142 Whether all of ECHA’s guidance formats 
are “acts…intended to produce legal effects” for the purposes of Article 263 TFEU is, 
however, another matter. As was set out earlier in this Chapter, ECHA labels 
everything bar its core guidance documents as “quasi guidance”, and each of the core 
guidance documents comes with a ‘Legal Notice’ that the content “does not constitute 
legal advice.” In France v Commission, the ECJ noted that,  
 
“The Court has consistently held that an action for annulment is available 
in the case of all measures adopted by the institutions, whatever their 
nature or form, which are intended to have legal effects.”143  
 
In her review of case law in this area, Scott observes that Commission 
Communications, Commission Internal Instructions and a Commission Code of 
Conduct have all formed the subject matter of admissible actions for judicial 
review.144 The extent to which this case law applies to ECHA’s guidance is discussed 
in more depth below (see the section headed, ‘EU Jurisprudence on Notices, 
Guidelines and Guidance’).  
 
The Use of Soft Law by the EU Courts 
The EU courts do refer to and, in more limited situations use, soft instruments, though 
they appear reluctant to employ certain terminology: the term ‘soft law’ only appears 
in 25 cases; “new governance” does not appear at all.145 In Germany v Council, a 
recent case on the EU becoming a member of the Organisation of Vine and Wine, 
Advocate General Cruz Villalon accepted that there, 
 
“acts known as ‘soft law’…[which] although not legally binding, 
nonetheless exhibit a degree of relevance through references made to 
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them, the reliance placed on them for the purposes of interpreting binding 
law or their practical effectiveness.”146  
 
However, he suggested that the catch-all of ‘soft law’ was “neither a legally relevant 
category of acts nor one that can be clearly circumscribed.”147 While the latter is 
certainly true, and the limits of soft law may be porous, the former observation is 
disappointing. Given the widespread uses of soft law within the EU, they are relevant 
and are worthy of further exploration, in particular by the courts. This was arguably a 
missed opportunity. Earlier case law, while not referring explicitly to ‘soft law’, had 
already recognised that, “such rules of conduct, which are of general application, may 
produce legal effects.”148 AG Sharpston, in a case concerning the EU Charter of 
Rights, had observed that,  
 
“the Charter acquired the status of ‘soft’ law; that is to say, although its 
provisions were not directly applicable as part of EU law, they none the 
less were capable of producing legal effects – in many cases, far-reaching 
effects – within the Union.”149 
 
Stefan’s study of competition and state aid case law has shown over 600 judgments, 
orders and opinions which have acknowledged (some) legal effects of soft law 
instruments.150 She draws out three overarching themes from this case law. 151 First, 
she argues that soft law increasingly features in judgments of the European courts 
(even though, as noted above, the term ‘soft law’ is infrequently used). Second, she 
sets out that that the EU courts recognise that such instruments can have legal effects 
even if they are not binding. Third, the Court  
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“recognises legal effects to non-binding documents such as the notices and 
guidelines of the Commission, only when this serves the enforcement of 
certain superior principles of law, common to the European legal order and 
the national legal orders.”152  
 
This observation is partly confirmed and partly challenged by the jurisprudence on 
REACH, discussed below. In her more recent work, Stefan suggests that the European 
Courts have “kept pace only to a limited extent with the changes at the regulatory 
level” and that they are ready to acknowledge limited legal effects of soft law in some 
areas, but not in others.153 The following section considers what the EU courts have 
said about post legislative notices, guidelines and guidance, which is of particular 
relevance for this thesis. The section after that offers an account of case law on 
REACH and ECHA’s guidance. What the work in this thesis means for EU 
jurisprudence in this area is set out in Chapter 10.  
 
EU Jurisprudence on Notices, Guidelines and Guidance 
 
Two interesting matters arise: the first is whether post legislative soft norms (notices, 
guidelines, guidance documents etc) have legal effects (and under what conditions) 
for the purposes of Article 263 TFEU; and the second is how those guidance 
documents are used by the EU courts to shape their own decisions.154 As to the first 
question, following a detailed review of associated case law, Scott argues that there 
are three situations in which post legislative guidance may have legal effects (and thus 
be amenable to review by the EU courts).155 The first is where guidance is construed 
as introducing new obligations and adding to the relevant EU legislation (this maps 
well with the instances of ‘translation’ and ‘extrapolation’ by ECHA of the provisions 
in REACH highlighted in this thesis); the second situation is where guidance sets out 
how an EU institution will exercise its discretionary and supervisory powers; and the 
third is where certain measures, through express statement in legislation or via 
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implication, may be binding on Member States. While many guidance documents are 
at pains to clearly state that they are simply guidance and are not legally binding, 
“non-binding should not be equated with an absence of (legal) effects and careful, 
contextual analysis is required to assess and evaluate their nature and extent.”156 As 
noted above, ECHA’s core guidance documents clearly state that they do not 
constitute “legal advice.” However, these guidance documents do not say (and would 
be inaccurate were they to say) that they do not create legal effects. The challenge, 
however, for the majority of ECHA’s guidance being amenable to judicial review is 
in whether the EU courts would consider that the advice given was simply “fleshing 
out” or making more explicit existing legislative obligations (which has previously 
been said not to be reviewable),157 or whether that guidance added to the underlying 
hard law (which would open the guidance up to review). This thesis shows how the 
“fleshing out” of REACH by ECHA’s guidance (the amplification and standardisation 
functions) is several orders of magnitude greater than the underlying Regulation. If 
the EU courts refused to consider this guidance, they would (wrongly) be excluding 
the majority of norms that shape the operationalization of the EU’s flagship chemicals 
regime. This thesis therefore suggests that the EU courts need to revisit this question 
of “fleshing out”.  
 
As to the second question, on the use of post legislative soft norms by the EU courts, 
there are, as has been observed by other academics, only a small number of cases on 
which to draw.158 Despite this, Scott suggests there is a strong argument for enabling 
judicial review of post-legislative guidance documents, because “guidance of this 
kind is intended to interpret a binding legal obligation and to shape the manner in 
which this binding legal obligation is interpreted, enforced and applied.”159 I would 
agree. In Expedia, a preliminary reference from the French Cour de Cassation, the 
ECJ was asked to consider whether a Commission notice in the area of competition 
law was binding. The decision of the Court is quite clear, and quite brief: the notice is 
not binding on Member States, but imposes a limit on the exercise of the 
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Commission’s discretion.160 This follows on from a number of earlier cases which 
were clear that administrative guidelines created by the Commission, while not “rules 
of law…form rules of practice from which the administration may not depart in an 
individual case without giving reasons.”161 
 
However, the Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Expedia is worth exploring in 
some depth (not least because her observations arguably could influence whether and 
how ECHA’s guidance is justiciable).162 AG Kokott argued that the Commission 
notice did not have binding legal effect because of, “the wording of the notice, …its 
purpose and the context in which it was adopted.”163 As for the wording of the notice, 
the fact that it clearly stated that it was only the Commission’s view, and was ‘without 
prejudice’ to any interpretation of Article 81 EC, meant that it could not be 
binding.164 The same could be said for each of ECHA’s core guidance documents, 
which come with the clear statement that they do not constitute legal advice. 
However, to allow public bodies to avoid judicial scrutiny through the blanket use of 
boilerplate provisions is too broad brush an approach and clearly wrong.  
 
As for purpose, AG Kokott commented that the Commission’s purpose in issuing the 
notices, “was to make transparent its administrative practice…and to provide 
guidance with useful information on interpretation.”165 These purposes, she argued, 
suggested that the notices were not binding (although the logic of this argument is 
hard to follow and is not well made out in the Opinion). Indeed, and in line with 
Scott, the opposite is true - the fact that these norms help to interpret underlying hard 
norms make them wholly fitting candidates for judicial review. Finally, the context of 
the Commission’s notice also meant that it was not intended to be binding. Here, AG 
Kokott suggested that one relevant consideration was that: “The Commission issued 
the notice, not by virtue of its legislative powers, but in its capacity as the competition 
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authority of the European Union.”166 However, when ECHA issues guidance, it does 
so both as the EU’s central authority for chemicals regulation and because of its 
legislative mandate to create guidance. Despite the wording, purpose and context of 
the Commission’s notice suggesting that it was not legally binding, AG Kokott did 
suggest: (i) that, as an instrument of soft law, the notice could bind the 
Commission;167 (ii) the notices, as soft law, contributed to the “fundamental aim” of 
the uniform and effective application of EU law;168 and (iii) national authorities and 
courts “must take due account” of the Commission’s notices.169 It is interesting that 
AG Kokott developed this line of reasoning as she had already noted in her Opinion 
that the ECJ had previously decided that Commission notices in the area of EU 
competition law do not have binding legal effect.170 Certainly, as noted above, the 
ECJ, in its ruling in Expedia, did not go into any depth, at all, on how/why soft law, 
such as Commission notices, are or could be justiciable. 
 
AG Kokott’s observations, as to the fundamental importance of soft norms, have been 
seen in other cases. In a matter concerning compliance by the UK with an EU 
Directive on urban waste water treatment, Advocate General Mengozzi commented 
that it would have been, “highly desirable for at least the Commission, if not the 
legislature, to provide clarification [on the Directive] by drawing up and publishing 
appropriate guidance on interpretation.”171 In the ECJ ruling on this case, the Court 
commented that, “[S]ince the concept of ‘unusually heavy rainfall’ is not defined by 
Directive 91/271, it is legitimate for the Commission, in carrying out its supervision 
of compliance with European Union law, to adopt guidelines.”172 What is interesting 
about the language used by the ECJ is that it could be argued that it is inappropriate 
for guidance to be issued where matters are set out, in sufficient depth, in the 
underlying legislation. This is not the case with REACH – the guidance, in instances, 
provides further corpulence to matters already quite well fleshed out in the Regulation 
(for example, as regards the content of an applicant’s registration dossier).  
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In Lodato, an interesting case concerning alternative methods for calculating the 
‘growth in employment’ in two different sets of Commission guidelines, Advocate 
General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer commented on how post legislative norms are able to 
shape the underlying hard law: “Articles 87 EC and 88 EC represent the hard law 
applicable in that area, and the guidelines the soft law for its interpretation.”173 He 
argued that, in the 1989 case Grimaldi, 174  the ECJ confirmed its jurisdiction in 
preliminary rulings to interpret soft law provisions adopted on the basis of the Treaty, 
stating that such measures are not lacking in legal effects.175 This is, with respect, 
somewhat of  a leap: first, the Court in Grimaldi never used the term ‘soft law’; and 
second, in Grimaldi, the Court was concerned with a Commission Recommendation 
which contained no reference to any other relevant legislation (which is arguably 
different to Commission guidelines that link to, and build on, EU legislation). On the 
latter point, the Advocate General acknowledges (in a footnote) this as a potential 
issue, notes academic concerns over using Grimaldi for other soft norms, but 
ultimately concludes that, “there is no serious impediment to extending this case-law 
to other forms of soft law such as guidelines.”176 Using Grimaldi, AG Ruiz-Jarabo 
Colomer argues that national courts must “take into consideration” soft law provisions 
when deciding cases before them, in particular where such provisions clarify the 
national rules enacted in order to implement them, or where they “supplement legally 
binding Community rules.”177 The use of ‘supplement’ here is interesting as regards 
ECHA’s guidance (and particularly its translation and extrapolation functions) and 
what this means for how the EU courts should think afresh about soft law. This is 
discussed further in Chapter 10. In BP Chemicals Ltd v Commission, the then CFI 
ruled that a soft law Commission framework was, “one of the factors on which the 
Community judicature may rely in determining the scope to be attributed to a term 
used in a Community legislative measure.”178 
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The use by AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer of previous case law on non-yoked soft law in a 
hybrid context had also been seen in the earlier case of Italy v Commission, 
concerning state aid.179 Here, the ECJ noted that while guidelines setting out the 
approach that the Commission intended to take “certainly help to ensure that it acts in 
a manner which is transparent, foreseeable and consistent with legal certainty, they 
cannot bind the Court.”180 Despite this lack of bindingness, “they may form a useful 
point of reference.”181 The Court based its decision on earlier case law which had 
held the same points but, (as with Lodato) in the previous cases the guidance was not 
yoked to hard law, but operated in place of it.182 It may simply be that the EU courts 
consider the distinctions between different types of soft norm to be irrelevant.  
 
The preceding review of EU jurisprudence has shown some acknowledgements that 
post legislative soft norms can bind the issuer, that these norms can both help in the 
interpretation of, and as a supplement to, legally binding EU rules; and that they can 
assist with the uniform and effective application of EU law. However, it is also fair to 
say that the cases on post legislative norms (compared to other, non-yoked forms of 
soft law) are few in number, and that most of the substantial commentaries are seen in 
the opinions of the Advocates General and not in the rulings of the EU courts. The 
following section looks specifically at case law on REACH, and at commentary on 
ECHA guidance.  
 
What The Courts Have Said About REACH, ECHA and Post Legislative Guidance 
 
As of 31 July 2014, there have been 23 cases on REACH in the EU courts;183 15 
before the General Court; and eight before the Court of Justice.184 In only four of 
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these cases is there any reference at all to ECHA’s guidance: (i) in SPCM SA v SoS 
for the Environment Food and Rural Affairs,185 the Court referenced Article 27(3) of 
REACH, which itself references cost-sharing guidance to be produced by ECHA;186 
(ii) in Bilbaina, the ECJ set out that the claimant had referred to ECHA guidance on 
the identification and naming of substances in its pleadings;187 and (iii) in Etimine and 
in Nickel Institute (separate cases on the same issue handed down on the same day) 
Advocate General Bot cites, in each case in a footnote, the same ECHA ‘Practical 
Guidance’ document as authority for his explanation of how the read across method 
works.188 Given this thesis shows just how thickly ECHA’s guidance is wrapped up 
with the Regulation, this lack of reference in the cases on REACH is striking. Others 
have noted how, in the SPCM case, Advocate General Kokott references ECHA 
guidance to bolster her arguments on the requirement to register monomers (and not 
polymers).189 This is certainly true, and interesting, but AG Kokott’s reference to the 
guidance is both fleeting and not couched in any wider terms about the 
use/importance/role/power/limits etc of post legislative norms. Certainly, she does not 
refer to, or use, ECHA’s guidance in the later Lapin case on which she also opined.190 
Why the EU courts have been so silent on ECHA’s guidance in their REACH rulings 
is unknown. Scott and Sturm have suggested that courts are able to “prompt - and 
create occasions for - normatively motivated and accountable inquiry and remediation 
by relevant non judicial actors in response to signals of problematic conditions or 
practices.”191 Given the thinness of ECJ jurisprudence on REACH and its guidance, 
does this mean that the conditions and/or practices of ECHA’s guidance are not then 
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problematic? Or is it that the ‘wrong’ sorts of cases (i.e. those not really about 
ECHA’s guidance) have so far come to court? The answer may, of course, be a blend 
of the two. Certainly, what is known is that, of the cases on REACH before the EU 
courts thus far, they have mainly been about the inclusion of substances on the 
Candidate List, or on Restrictions (both areas of the Regulation underpinned by 
detailed ECHA guidance). 
 
In this context, what are more interesting than the decisions of the EU courts on 
REACH are the rulings of ECHA’s own Board of Appeal. To date, 25 appeals have 
been made to the Board, of which 9 were withdrawn.192 Of the remaining 16, four 
contain noteworthy observations about the nature of ECHA’s guidance. It may be that 
the Board of Appeal says more about ECHA’s guidance because the Board members 
are REACH experts (and so know more about the role/function/breadth of that 
guidance); and/or the relative thickness of the jurisprudence may simply a product of 
the cases before them. In N.V. Elektriciteits v ECHA, the appellant sought 
reimbursement of its registration fee, following the rejection by ECHA of its 
registration dossier.193 Part of the case concerned the relevance and legal nature of 
ECHA’s frequently answered questions (‘FAQs’). Referencing the ECJ’s ruling in 
Holland Malt BV v Commission,194 ECHA’s Board of Appeal commented that, “…it 
is clear that while administrative guidance does not constitute a source of law, which 
would be comparable to legislation, such administrative guidance, if published, can 
nevertheless bind the administrative body in question.”195 In N.V. Elektriciteits, the 
Board found that ECHA’s FAQs created “legitimate expectations” for registrants and 
ordered the repayment of the registration fee to the applicant.196 In many ways, this 
decision simply mirrors the existing jurisprudence of the ECJ, set out above. It is not 
surprising that the Board would rely on legitimate expectation as a standard of review: 
this is seen in other ECJ case law on soft instruments,197 and is a part of a general EU 
principle of legal certainty. However, the Board in N.V. Elektriciteits also commented 
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on the differences between the core guidance documents produced by ECHA and the 
Agency’s FAQs. These comments are worth setting out in full: 
 
“The legal nature of the FAQs needs to be distinguished from the REACH 
Guidance, which are drafted and issued in close co-operation with the 
stakeholders. Compared to the REACH Guidance, the legal nature of the 
FAQs is different and less complex as the Agency alone decides on the 
contents of the FAQs and their purpose is to directly inform registrants of 
the Agency’s administrative practice.”198  
 
Exactly how the legal nature of FAQs is “different” to other forms of ECHA guidance 
is not elaborated on by the Board. Differentiation within ‘guidance’ requires us to take 
a hard look at what counts (and does not count) for a variety of purposes in shaping 
the operationalization of legislation (as discussed earlier in this Chapter and more in 
depth in Chapter 9). Here, the Board accepted that FAQs created “legitimate 
expectations” for applicants, which is important given just how many ECHA FAQs 
there are. Would the same be said of the other types of guidance document that ECHA 
produces? Is there a point at which ‘guidance’ (however so labelled) stops creating 
legitimate expectations or is everything that a public body puts out which impacts on 
the operation of underlying legislation capable of creating expectations that are 
legitimate? There is no clear answer to this in the existing case law.   
 
The emphasis in N.V. Elektriciteits was on guidance produced by ECHA setting out 
the course of conduct the Agency would follow. The same theme was seen in the 
recent Board of Appeal decision in Infineum UK Ltd v ECHA, 199  in which the 
appellant argued that the Agency was requiring a greater level of detail in its 
registration dossier than the relevant guidance document suggested. However, unlike 
in N.V. Elektriciteits, where the Agency’s guidance acted as a check on what ECHA 
could and could not do, the Board of Appeal in Infineum found that the Agency was 
permitted to go beyond what was set out in its guidance, because of the underlying 
human health and environmental protection objectives found in REACH, and because 
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of ECHA’s need to identify substances of unknown or variable composition or 
biological origin.200 This case thus suggests that while the guidance produced by 
ECHA will normally act as a check on the Agency’s discretion, this limitation can be 
avoided when inconsistent with the fundamental tenets of the underlying legislation. 
This case confirms Stefan’s third conclusion from her review of EU competition law 
jurisprudence (discussed above). This also reinforces Scott’s argument, discussed 
above, as to the need for the EU courts to take a hard look at post legislative soft 
norms because they are inextricably linked to, and should be judged by, the 
underlying hard law.  
 
In Lanxess Deutschland GmbH v ECHA, the Agency asked the applicant to provide a 
developmental toxicity study on a second animal species, in addition to a study on a 
first animal species in the applicant’s registration dossier.201 Here, ECHA argued that 
the requirement for the second study was clear in its guidance. 202  The Board of 
Appeal disagreed, and argued that, “rather than clarifying the interpretation of those 
provisions, the Guidance may, although not claimed by the Appellant in these 
proceedings, contribute to a misunderstanding thereof.”203 This is striking: ECHA 
puts out guidance that elaborates on REACH and which shapes the operation of the 
legislation by channelling registrants, Member States and the Agency itself down 
certain paths of conduct. The Board of Appeal is suggesting that some of that 
channelling may be inaccurate. Certainly, this thesis has shown a number of other 
instances where ECHA’s guidance is not clear and may cause confusion. However, it 
is worth nothing that in this particular case the Board found that the request by ECHA 
for a second developmental toxicity study was legitimate, and flowed directly from 
the text of REACH itself.204 Here, and in Infineum, the backstopped hard law of 
REACH perfects imperfections in ECHA’s guidance to the advantage of the Agency. 
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Finally, in Momentive Specialty Chemicals v ECHA, the Agency had rejected the 
appellants’ registration dossier as inadequate. Here, Momentive had failed to comply 
with ECHA’s guidance on read-across (where endpoint information for one chemical 
is used to predict the same endpoint for another chemical). In this case, the ECHA 
Board of Appeal commented that, 
 
“…in not following the available guidance the Appellant did not avail 
itself of a tool designed to help registrants to prepare and submit their 
read-across proposals in an effective way. The Board of Appeal observes 
that in so doing the Appellant may have required additional effort to 
justify its case compared with following the approach described in the 
guidance.”205 
 
This comment suggests that while ECHA’s guidance is not necessarily binding on 
third parties, in that registrants are not obliged to follow it, where third parties use 
standards or take approaches different to those set out in the Agency’s guidance, 
“additional effort” will be required of them to justify taking that path. This suggests 
that ECHA’s guidance may, in practice, only really be semi-soft. This is explored in 
more depth in Chapter 9. Looking to the future, it will be interesting to see whether 
the EU courts engage with any of the jurisprudence discussed above from the Board 
of Appeal, either in the context of REACH or more generally. There is, it is 
suggested, greater nuance in the rulings from the Board on post legislative norms than 
in the rulings of the EU courts.  
 
Conclusions 
 
This Chapter has explored ECHA, the new regulator for chemicals created under 
REACH. Established given the “…need to ensure effective management of the 
technical, scientific and administrative aspects of [REACH] at Community level”,206 
the influence of ECHA and what it does on a day-to-day basis puts it at the very heart 
of modern chemicals regulation. ECHA is, however, not the only EU regulatory 
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agency with oversight of chemicals. Others (such as the European Environment 
Agency and the European Food Standards Agency) also play a role. There are then, in 
addition, a whole host of regulators with responsibility for chemicals control in the 28 
Member States. At the EU level, this creates a regulatory landscape with varying 
topology. The Agency has grown since its inception, from 38 staff in 2007 to over 
500 in 2013, and is likely to expand further as it becomes more deeply embedded into 
EU chemicals regulation and takes the role as responsible regulator for laws other 
than REACH.  
 
Since 2003, more than one million words of official guidance have been produced by 
ECHA on REACH. The Agency’s Document Library (the central repository for 
publicly available ECHA documents) contains 482 separate ‘support’ documents. 
This is made up of: (a) 138 guidance documents; (b) 34 Helpdesk documents; (c) 185 
documents relating to IT Tools; and (d) 67 Manuals.
207
 The power given to ECHA to 
produce such ‘support’ comes, in generic form, from Article 77(2) of REACH and 
also in a small number of specific provisions in the Regulation that directly mandate 
ECHA to produce guidance. The Agency accepts that some of its guidance is dense 
and complex and is working on making the documents more accessible and, where 
possible, more simple.
208
  
 
The breadth of the guidance produced by ECHA and the variety of forms that that 
guidance takes is striking. What is also interesting is the explicit acknowledgment by 
the Agency of a hierarchy of soft law norms within the differing types of guidance 
that it produces. So, for example, ECHA labels everything save for the core guidance 
documents as “quasi guidance”, with the intent that these are “in simple terms” and 
particularly intended for SMEs.
209
 The mechanics of how guidance is produced and 
updated by ECHA is also worthy of study. Many of the guidance documents were 
produced prior to the entry into force of REACH as ‘REACH Implementation 
Projects’/RIPs. Little publicly available information on how those RIPs were 
developed remains. Not every update to ECHA’s guidance is consulted on, and wide 
discretion is given to ECHA’s Secretariat who decide whom to consult and on the 
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time frames given for consultation.
210
 Much of that consultation is ‘closed’ in that it 
involves experts “whose nominations have been received by a specified deadline”211 
and who are then formed into so-called Partner Expert Groups (‘PEGs’). 212  The 
ECHA website does not detail lists of experts within PEGs formed as part of previous 
consultations on guidance. Only in limited situations (for example, for entirely new 
guidance) will ECHA engage in full public consultation. As a consequence, the 
procedures for guidance production and amendment lack full participation and 
transparency. These are causes for concern.  
 
The review of case law in this Chapter has shown how the EU courts are willing, in 
general, to consider and use soft norms to a certain degree, but that the volume of case 
law specifically on post legislative guidance is limited. The cases to date on REACH 
in the EU courts have said almost nothing on ECHA’s guidance. This, in and of itself, 
is interesting. More has been said by ECHA’s own Board of Appeal, but even that 
jurisprudence is somewhat thin. What this thesis means for EU law, and EU 
jurisprudence, is taken up in Chapter 10. However, it is worth noting here that the 
potential for the EU courts to act as an effective check on the exercise of power by 
ECHA in creating and promulgating guidance seems small. The following Chapters 
look at the various elements of REACH and explore, in detail, how ECHA’s post 
legislative guidance shapes the operation of the Regulation. As will be recalled from 
Chapter 1, four forms of shaping are suggested: amplification; standardisation; 
translation; and extrapolation. It is submitted that amplification occurs where 
guidance produced by ECHA goes beyond, but is not in direct contradiction with, the 
text of the Regulation. Standardisation is argued to be a subset of the amplification 
function. Here, the goal of ECHA is to channel registrants (and others) down given 
avenues of action (not set out specifically in the text of REACH) in order to make the 
tasks for which ECHA is responsible more manageable. ECHA extrapolates in its 
guidance where REACH is silent on something the Agency thinks is necessary for the 
effective working of the Regulation. With translation, I argue that while the text of 
REACH is clear, the Agency, in its guidance, implicitly contests the drafting of the 
Regulation and ‘translates’ the relevant provisions into something else. While the first 
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two of these actions by ECHA can be seen to be legitimate endeavours of an EU 
agency (and extrapolation a necessary step for the effective working of the 
Regulation), the translation function is more troublesome. The Chapter which follows 
looks at information creation under REACH and the role of SIEFs.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
INFORMATION CREATION AND SUBSTANCE INFORMATION EXCHANGE FORA 
 
 
Let us return to the example of the (hypothetical) chemical legalene (first introduced 
in Chapter 3). This Chapter sets out how information on this substance comes to be 
generated. While REACH obliges manufacturers and importers to register their 
substances, the Regulation is almost silent as to the underlying mechanics of data 
generation and assessment. All that is said is that those who have pre-registered are 
obliged to come together to share certain data and to generate missing information (in 
groupings called Substance Information Exchange Fora, or SIEFs). Exactly how such 
sharing and generation should happen is not specified, nor does REACH detail the 
form of SIEF or how it should be run. The Regulation is thus underpinned by the self 
regulation of pre-registrants (who number over 100,000),
1
 shepherded via a series of 
guidance documents produced by ECHA (discussed below). For our ten legalene 
manufacturers, coming together, sharing data, agreeing on new tests and executing 
such tests might not be a particularly difficult matter. However, what about the Pre-
Registrants of jurisite, a (hypothetical) substance used in the powdering of judges’ 
wigs, who number 3,000? For them, translating the bare command in REACH to 
share data may be much more problematic. It is estimated that more than 3,500 SIEFS 
have 100 members (and more than 400 have more than 500 members.)
2
 The 
simplicity of agreement on data sharing obviously diminishes as a function of the size 
of the SIEF.   
 
This Chapter outlines the processes of SIEF formation and operation, moving from 
the need to agree on substance “sameness” to questions of SIEF structure and 
ordering to the core task of data sharing (and the corollary need to share costs). In 
particular, the Chapter comments on the practical difficulties experienced in ‘real life’ 
SIEFs. To date, there have been a variety of issues with SIEFs, including: the 
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administrative and legal burdens on companies in their creation and operation; issues 
with communication in so-called “monster SIEFs” (that have thousands of members); 
divergence of opinion over SIEF membership (the question of substance “sameness”); 
and problems in data exchange.
3
  
 
There are three key ECHA guidance documents relevant to SIEFs and data generation 
and assessment: (a) Guidance on Data Sharing;
4
 (b) Guidance on Information 
Requirements and Chemical Safety Assessment (discussed more fully in the 
following Chapter); and (c) Guidance for Identification and Naming of Substances.
5
 
In addition, ECHA has produced two ‘User Manuals’ which assist registrants with the 
IT aspects of SIEF formation and data sharing.
6
 Of all the elements of REACH, the 
creation and running of SIEFs is the area in which guidance produced by ECHA 
amplifies the text of the Regulation and shapes the day to day operation of the 
legislation. It is submitted that without this guidance, data generation, assessment and 
sharing under REACH would fail.  
 
REACH and SIEFs 
 
Article 29 is notable for its lack of specificity. It states that, 
“All potential registrants, downstream users and third parties who have 
submitted information to the Agency… for the same phase-in 
substance…shall be participants in a substance information exchange forum 
(SIEF).”7  
 
The aim of each SIEF is to facilitate information exchange (avoiding duplicity of 
chemical tests),
8
 with SIEF participants providing each other with certain existing 
testing data, identifying the need for additional testing and arranging for such testing 
to be undertaken.
9
 Aside from Article 30 (discussed in depth below), which amounts 
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to a limited outline of how data should be shared in a SIEF, REACH is totally silent 
on the creation, formation, organisation and operation of these entities. As the Health 
and Safety Executive in the UK puts it, “REACH does not set precise rules for how a 
SIEF should operate. Consequently, this is up to the individual SIEF members 
collectively.”10  
 
The Pre-SIEF 
 
Reading the text of the Regulation, it appears as though SIEFs were expected to 
spontaneously appear. The reality has been much more complicated, as perhaps 
should have been foreseen for mandatory groupings of thousands of companies within 
and without the EU. Given this, the practice of having a pre-SIEF has emerged. 
ECHA comments that “The concept of pre-SEIFs was not foreseen in the REACH 
Regulation, but was introduced, with support from industry, to bring pre-registrants 
together and facilitate SIEF formation”.11 Prior to the formation of the SIEF, various 
matters need to be agreed, the most fundamental amounting to a decision on the limits 
of the membership of the SIEF (i.e. the basic question of who should, and who should 
not, be a part of the SIEF).  
 
As part of Pre-Registration, REACH-IT creates a dedicated web page for Pre-
Registrants of the “same” substance. This allows Pre-Registrants to see who else has 
Pre-Registered their substance. To take our legalene example, all ten manufacturers 
and importers would pre-register. Then, via REACH-IT, they would be able to see 
who had also pre-registered legalene and to then begin discussions on the formation 
of the SIEF. To facilitate this process, REACH-IT, ECHA’s web based software for 
chemicals data management, allows for a pre-registrant to volunteer as a SIEF 
Formation Facilitator. This role does not exist within REACH, which has raised a 
number of issues, mainly centred on the fact that, “Any pre-registrant may volunteer 
via REACH IT to be the SFF” (own emphasis added).12 The title of SFF is claimed; it 
is not bestowed following agreement among pre-registrants. The SFF does not have to 
be, for example, the pre-registrant with the largest production volume of the particular 
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 UK REACH Competent Authority, ‘Information Leaflet Number 17 – REACH – Substance 
Information Exchange Forum’ (March 2009) 
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 <http://echa.europa.eu/sief_en.asp> accessed 10 August 2014 
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substance (who may have an interest in being SFF as their registration deadline will 
be sooner than those of the other pre-registrants) or the largest pre-registrant entity 
(who might have better resources or expertise to bring to the role of SFF). Given this, 
there have been issues of “cowboy SFFs”.13 Here, ECHA advises that, 
 
“Where the current SFF isn’t working, or is perhaps using the pre-SIEF as an 
opportunity to earn money or blocking or slowing down the process… SIEF 
members are free to work around the SFF, perhaps using their own information 
text field in the pre-SIEF page in REACH IT to post comments, or outside of 
REACH IT, perhaps via their own website or webpage”.14  
 
The tone of this advice is somewhat odd. On the one hand, a pre-SIEF is obligatory 
(despite not being in the Regulation) through the way in which the REACH-IT system 
works. On the other, ECHA seems keen to distance itself from the mechanics of (and 
issues arising from) SIEF formation. There is a real lack of guidance on the pre-SIEF 
in ECHA’s Guidance on Data Sharing and the Agency simply points out that, “SIEF 
formation is industry’s responsibility.”15 It is also notable that the steering (set out 
above) from ECHA on pre-SIEF formation is set out in ‘Top Tips’ and ‘Key 
Principles’ documents and not in the core guidance. In practice, agreement on the 
SIEF has, in instances, taken months of negotiation and renegotiation.
16
  
 
The Formation of the SIEF 
 
REACH is silent as to exactly when and how a SIEF is formed. ECHA, however, in 
its Guidance on Data Sharing, states that,  
“…a SIEF is formed when the Potential Registrants of a substance in the 
pre-registration list, actually agree that they effectively manufacture, intend 
to manufacture or import a substance that is sufficiently similar to allow a 
valid joint submission of data”.17  
This is an example of the Agency extrapolating from a gap in text of REACH. The 
language used here is interesting as it diverges from the language in the Regulation. 
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 Karl-Franz Torges, ‘A consultant’s view of the lessons learned’ (2011) Chemical Watch 8, 8 
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 ECHA, ‘Getting Started in SIEFs – Top Tips’ (24 April 2009) 2 
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 Guidance on Data Sharing, 31 
16
 Uwe Wolfmeier, ‘What to bear in mind when becoming Lead Registrant’ (Presentation at REACH 
Lead Registrants Workshop, 11 September 2009) 3 
17
 Guidance on Data Sharing, 37 
  
114 
 
REACH talks of SIEFs being comprised of those who have pre-registered the “same” 
substance; ECHA (perhaps accepting that questions of sameness can be overly 
difficult; discussed below) talks of substances that are “sufficiently similar”. The 
Guidance also sees SIEF formation resting on ‘actual agreement’ and not, as is 
envisaged by REACH, simply operating via the fiat of pre-registration. In this regard, 
it is submitted that the function of this Guidance is to translate the text of REACH 
into something which works in practice for the day to day operation of the Regulation. 
Further instances of translation are seen later on in this Chapter.  
 
As a starting point, a wide discretion is granted to manufacturers and importers as to 
the formation of a SIEF: the SIEF comes into existence when the manufacturers and 
importers agree that they are each intending to register the “same”/“sufficiently 
similar” substance. ECHA will not become involved in refereeing questions of 
formation and advises companies to contact trade associations if necessary.
18
 The 
power of trade associations as to this aspect of REACH (and elsewhere) is significant. 
ECHA details 62 separate, industry-based stakeholder organisations with which it 
works, from the large and generic (including Cefic, the European Chemical Industry 
Council) to the small and specific (including AECM, the Association of European 
Candle Manufacturers).
19
 Many of these trade associations provide their own 
guidance on REACH. Cefic, for example, has 83 individual REACH guidance 
documents or tools, of which 19 touch on the formation and operation of SIEFs.
20
 
These trade associations, and the guidance they provide, add another layer of post 
legislative norm elaboration for REACH. Whether or not such ‘counts’ as soft law is 
explored in Chapter 9. 
 
Because of the lack of specificity in REACH on SIEF formation, it is perfectly 
possible for a manufacturer or importer who should properly be a member of a SIEF 
to be excluded from that SIEF (and potentially to be forced to register alone). It would 
also be possible, in theory, for SIEFs to be used to exclude parties for competitive 
advantage. Despite this, the Agency is quite clear when it states that it will not, 
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 ECHA (n 12) 2 
19
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“confirm or question the creation of a particular SIEF.”21 The lack of willingness on 
the part of ECHA to police the formation of SIEFs may mean that certain pre-
registrants (for example, SMEs) may be excluded where other pre-registrants consider 
that they should not belong to the same SIEF. The treatment of SMEs in SIEFs was 
raised as a particular concern in ECHA’s 2011 report on the operation of REACH and 
by the Commission in their review of the Regulation in 2012.
22
 ECHA has no power 
to order (and REACH does not provide for) the mandatory inclusion in a SIEF of a 
particular Pre-Registrant.  
 
Difficulties with Sameness 
 
Given the above, it is thus perfectly possible for two manufacturers of a substance 
which could be considered the “same” to participate in two different SIEFs. The 
obvious follow on consequence of this is that those two manufacturers may well 
submit different testing data as part of the Registration process. What is clear then is 
that the question of whether one substance is the “same” as another is key. For the 
majority of lawyers (and others without specialist chemical expertise), the 
identification of a substance would seem like a simple matter. Substance A is carbon; 
Substance B is mercury; Substance C is nickel. For those with more than a high 
school appreciation of the sciences, chemical identification can be horrendously 
complex. This is partly due to the way in which chemicals have been inventoried in 
the EU and partly due to complexities in the substances themselves. Under the pre-
REACH chemicals regime in the EU, there were three separate inventories of 
chemicals:
23
 EINECS
24
, ELINCS,
25
 and NLP.
26
 EINECS lists chemicals on the EU 
market between 1 January 1971 and 18 September 1981; ELINCS lists chemicals 
which were notified to the Commission and placed on the market after 18 September 
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 ECHA, ‘Guidance on Pre-Registration and Data Sharing’ (Version 2.0, April 2012), 37 (hereafter, 
‘Guidance on Pre-Registration and Data Sharing’) 
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Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions in accordance with Article 117(4) 
of REACH and Article 46(2) of CLP, and a review of certain elements of REACH in line with Articles 
75(2), 138(2), 138(3) and 138(6) of REACH: Staff Working Document ‘(SWD (2013) 25 final); 
European Chemicals Agency, ‘The Operation of REACH and CLP’ (Helsinki, 2011) 
23
 Each can be now be found via the European Chemical Substances Information System, here: 
<http://esis.jrc.ec.europa.eu/> accessed 10 August 2014 
24
 The European Inventory of Existing Commercial Chemical Substances 
25
 The European List of New Chemical Substances 
26
 The No Longer Polymers inventory 
  
116 
 
1981; and NLP contains chemicals which, as a result of change in legislation,
27
 are no 
longer considered as polymers, though they once had been.
28
 Each chemical in each 
of the three inventories (collectively known as the EC Inventory) has an EC number 
by which it can be identified.
29
 In the context of substance identification under 
REACH for the purpose of “sameness” discussions in pre-SIEFs, issues arise for four 
reasons. The first is because the EC Inventory contains typographical errors, mistakes 
which are expected to be corrected during registration via REACH (for example, EC 
numbers could have been transcribed incorrectly).
30
 The second is because certain of 
the substance descriptions in the EC Inventory are overly broad (and so could, 
properly, cover two or more substances that are not the “same”). The third is that for 
some substances, there may be more than one ‘correct’ EINECS entry and so 
manufacturers and importers could pre-register using different EINECS numbers. On 
a practical level, this could result in different SIEFs preparing different dossiers for 
registration on the same substance, unless the pre-registrants noticed the multiple 
EINECS entries and attempted to create one combined SIEF. The fourth reason for 
difficulties with substance identification is that there are some substances which are 
simply very difficult to identify, referred to as “UVCB substances” in Guidance 
produced by ECHA (a term, it is noted, not to be found anywhere in REACH itself, 
and another example of the extrapolation function of ECHA’s guidance).31 Under the 
Regulation, a substance is identified as part of Registration using the parameters set 
out in Section 2 of Annex VI. These include, but are not limited to, the name of the 
substance, its EINECS and CAS numbers, molecular formula and composition
32
.  For 
UVCB substances, however, these parameters may be insufficient to allow pre-
registrants to adequately identify their substances.
33
 In providing advice on UVCB 
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substances, ECHA’s ‘Guidance on the Identification and Naming of Substances under 
REACH and CLP’ (discussed in depth below) performs what I suggest can be called 
an ‘extrapolation’ function: filling in the gaps created by the legislation.  
 
For the academic lawyer, it is not (strictly) necessary to know how to identify a 
particular substance or to say whether Substance A is the “same” as Substance B. 
What is important to know is: (a) this is a complex, expert area; and (b) decisions on 
substance identification and “sameness” belong solely to the Pre-Registrant: neither 
ECHA, nor any other regulatory body, will suggest or confirm an identification. This 
combination of complexity and discretion mean that the formation of the SIEF (i.e. 
when agreement is reached on “sameness”) is not always an entirely straightforward 
or quick process.
34
 To assist companies on this ‘sameness’ question, ECHA has 
produced an 111 page document titled ‘Guidance on Identification and Naming of 
Substances under REACH and CLP’. As the Agency puts it, “To ensure that the 
REACH processes are working properly, correct and unambiguous substance 
identification is essential.”35 As might be expected given the nature of the topic, the 
Guidance is dense and technical. Much of this guidance, it is suggested, is an example 
of standardisation. Here, REACH would still work without the guidance, but the level 
of debate and divergence among pre-registrants as to whether they were each 
intending to register the ‘same’ substance would be such that it is conceivable that: (a) 
the deadlines for registration would have been missed; and/or (b) the number of 
registrations (and the subsequent burdens on ECHA) would have increased 
significantly. Standardisation is ECHA attempting to channel those with obligations 
under REACH down a set course of action which, while not spelled out specifically in 
REACH, is in line with the aims and objectives of the Regulation.  
 
Having discussed the formation of the SIEF and the identification of the “same” 
substance, the following looks at possible structures for that SIEF. What is also 
relevant (at least, from a practical point of view) is the internal commitment needed 
by SIEF members within that SIEF: commitment of expertise (which will, on 
occasion, even extend to the hiring of additional employees); commitment of money 
                                                        
34
 From his time in practice, the author is aware of companies who have spent more than 7 months 
debating the “sameness” of a single substance.  
35
 ECHA, ‘Guidance for Identification and Naming of Substances under REACH and CLP’ (Version 
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(and the “buy-in” of someone senior enough within the organisation to approve 
budget decisions related to REACH); and commitment of time (by a large number of 
SIEF member employees, including those in the IT, Legal, Finance, Sales, Marketing, 
Toxicology/Ecotoxicology and Management teams).
36
  
 
The Structure of the SIEF 
 
It is worth stating this explicitly: a SIEF is not a legal entity and it does not have a 
particular form.
37
 It is merely a grouping of pre-registrants of the “same” substance 
and REACH itself is silent as to form and structure. ECHA comments that, “Pre-
Registrants in a SIEF are free to start organising themselves as they see fit to carry out 
their obligations under REACH.”38 How a SIEF is organised has obvious impacts on 
the end result: that is, the data that is transmitted to ECHA as part of Registration. 
Some SIEFS (especially those with very small membership) may need no internal 
organising rules or structure. For others, however, internal rules are vital. In our 
example (hypothetical) jurisite SIEF, the expectation that 3,000 member companies 
will organise themselves without some form of overriding structure or system of 
internal rules is nonsensical. To that end, in its Guidance on Data Sharing, the Agency 
has set out various “forms of [SIEF] co-operation” which pre-registrants may choose 
to adopt.
39
 These vary from the more formal (consortia, discussed below) to the less 
formal (collaboration via IT software, with letters of access between pre-registrants 
sharing data).  
 
Though not required by REACH, consortia are common vehicles for the structure and 
ordering of SIEFs. Cefic comments that “A consortium can be seen as a practical 
means to meet the legal obligations of SIEF participants and prepare for 
registration.”40 Defining a consortium is not easy. ECHA comments that they the term 
can be,  
                                                        
36
 On this, see the discussion on “Company Preparations” in: Cefic, ‘Working together in SIEF’ 
(Version 2, March 2009) 10 
37
 Guidance on Data Sharing, 132. ECHA is very explicit on this, even though the grouping of pre-
registrants in the SIEF looks very much like a joint venture.  
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 Guidance on Data Sharing, 16 
39
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“…used to refer to a more organised and formal type of co-operation 
between parties, implying either a signed agreement or the adoption of 
operating rules or reference to an agreed set of general rules.”41  
 
In essence, a consortium is a legally ordered, structured grouping of some or all SIEF 
members. There is no obligation on SIEF members to form a consortium and, even 
where there is a consortium in relation to a particular SIEF, it may not include all of 
the SIEF members. At the same time, there can easily be more than one consortium 
for one substance (particularly where that substance is manufactured or imported for 
use in two or more different industry sectors). There are also consortia which cover a 
number of different SIEFs and substances, sometimes referred to as “super consortia”. 
In short, these entities take a variety of forms and there is no one set structure for 
them nor one particular method or mode of application. ECHA gives eight examples 
of possible consortia options, but the potential permutations of consortia and non-
consortia options in any given SIEF is vast.
42
  
 
One common structure is to have a consortium agreement which binds the consortium 
members. Here, one practical difference (which may be very important for SIEFs with 
many pre-registrants) involves the way in which the agreement is executed. It is 
common for the consortium agreement (or SIEF agreement, or however else it is 
titled) to be bilateral, between the Lead Registrant/SIEF Leadership Team and each 
SIEF member. The alternative is to have each SIEF member be a party to the same 
document (with exchanges of mutual covenants). Cefic has created a standard form 
SIEF/consortia agreement. This is free to use and available on the Cefic website,
43
 
having been developed with input from the in house and external legal teams of more 
than 50 EU companies.
44
 Whatever form of internal rules is adopted by a SIEF 
(whether through a consortium or otherwise), there are a core of matters upon which 
ex ante agreement is useful. In its Guidance on Data Sharing, ECHA details 15 
different “elements of co-operation that might be included in a consortium’s 
activities.”45 These include: provisions on the sharing of data and costs (on which, see 
below); the protection of confidentiality; and the allocation (and perhaps mitigation) 
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of liability among members. The Guidance then goes on to detail the typical clauses 
that may appear in a consortium agreement.
46
 These include rules on membership 
setting out the rights and obligations of each member and how to accommodate new 
members or those who leave; intellectual property rights and data protection clauses; 
budgetary matters (payments of invoices, taxes etc); intra-consortium dispute 
resolution; governing law;
47
 and other ‘boilerplate’ provisions. It is suggested that this 
guidance by ECHA is another example of standardisation: REACH requires SIEFs 
and ECHA engages in some form of channelling of registrants as regards the format 
that that SIEF takes. The Guidance on Data Sharing is striking in that it offers fairly 
detailed advice on creating and running consortia, while at the same time stating that 
the Agency has no preference as to (nor does REACH require) any particular format.     
 
Because REACH is silent on consortia, they lack regulatory oversight. Indeed, there 
have been reports of certain consortia amounting to “almost secret organisations” 
which, while they pretend to be open to new members, in reality they are not.
48
 This 
impacts on the regulatory burden placed on SMEs by the EU’s chemical regime, a 
common theme with the operation of REACH. It is also somewhat difficult to know 
how many consortia exist in relation to REACH. There is no obligation on them to 
notify ECHA (or anyone else) of their existence. Instead, certain REACH media 
outlets offer to publish a list of consortia; one, ran by ChemicalWatch, lists more than 
300 consortia, with the vast majority covering more than one substance.
49
  
 
SIEFs and Competition Law 
 
One important consideration for SIEF structure goes to notions of anti-competitive 
behaviour. Article 25(2) states that “Registrants shall refrain from exchanging 
information concerning their market behaviour, in particular as regards production 
capacities, production or sales volumes, import volumes or market shares.” Recital 48 
states that “This Regulation shall be without prejudice to the full application of 
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Community competition rules”. As Cefic puts it, “A SIEF is not a forum to conduct 
business with competitors”.50 Here, ECHA offers practical advice in its Guidance on 
Data Sharing and suggests that an “independent third party” or trustee be used to 
receive, hold and process any information from SIEF members which would be 
sensitive from a competition perspective.
51
 Such is not set out in REACH, but is 
obviously consistent with this aspect of the Regulation (another example of the 
standardisation function of guidance). While a trustee may be appropriate for some 
SIEFs, for others (perhaps those which are small and contain less sophisticated 
members), it could be regarded as an unnecessary additional administrative burden. 
Let us take an (imaginary) meeting of the legalene SIEF.
52
 Of the ten member 
companies, three send their in-house lawyer, who are each well versed in EU 
competition rules. Four send their in-house toxicologists, who have heard of 
competition rules, but do not know any detail. The remaining three companies are 
SMEs; they have neither in house lawyers, nor in-house toxicologists and send 
whoever is free on the day. Given this spread of roles among the participants, it is not 
beyond the realms of possibility to imagine two of the toxicologists (from separate, 
competing companies) talking about their work and what they do over coffee (a 
potential breach of EU competition rules, depending on the nature of the 
conversation). While this is not the place to go into depth on this particular area of 
law,
53
 a law such as REACH which makes mandatory the coming together of 
companies who manufacture or import the same substance (and so who may be direct 
competitors) raises serious anti-trust questions.  To give just one example, companies 
might share information about the tonnages in which they produce chemical X and on 
the price of chemical X. This, in turn, could lead, intentionally or unintentionally, to 
price fixing or abuse of the market.  
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Roles within a SIEF 
 
In the (hypothetical) legalene SIEF, the ten members have a fairly easy job of co-
ordination to comply with their obligations under REACH. Each member sends a 
representative to physical meetings; each responds to emails; agreement comes 
naturally to them. In the (hypothetical) jurisite SIEF, things are much different. For 
these so-called “monster SIEFs”, it is unrealistic to expect all SIEF members to have 
equal roles or indeed to contribute equally. Let us take one simple, but illuminating 
example. Imagine it is 1 January 2010 (the day after the end of the pre-registration 
period) and the jurisite SFF is keen to push matters forward to turn the pre-SIEF into 
a SIEF: how easy, on a practical level, will it be for the SIEF Formation Facilitator 
(‘SFF’) to organise a teleconference call or meeting in which all 3,000 jurisite pre-
registrants will participate? If every member will not participate, who will and how 
will it be decided who does and who does not get involved? 
 
Save for the position of Lead Registrant (discussed below), roles within a SIEF are 
not set out in REACH. In its Guidance on Data Sharing, it is set out that, 
 
“ECHA advises all companies to decide what role they wish to take in the 
SIEF. For more details, please consult the ECHA website and in 
particular the page ‘SIEF’…”54 
 
However, the SIEF page on the ECHA website contains no advice whatsoever on 
SIEF roles.
55
 Given this, SIEFs may allocate roles and organise responsibilities 
among their members as they see fit (matters which would, or should, be set out in the 
SIEF agreement or other body of internal rules). Cefic organises SIEF members into 
four roles (which are widely accepted throughout the EU, if not formerly endorsed by 
ECHA):
56
 Lead Registrant (a role set out in REACH and discussed below); Involved; 
Passive; and Dormant.
57
 As the names suggest, “involved” members actively 
participate in the operation of the SIEF; and “passive” members do not become 
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actively involved (for example, they may be companies who manufacture or import in 
small quantities, have no data to share within the SIEF and who may be happy for 
others to take the lead). At first glance, it may seem impossible to have a ‘dormant’ 
SIEF member, as Article 29 creates an obligation to share data in certain 
circumstances (and this in turn implies some form of participation.) However, there 
have been a number of problems with ‘free riders’; those who join the SIEF and then 
do nothing active and do not respond to communications from the SFF or Lead 
Registrant. ECHA advises that if a member of a SIEF does not respond to email (on 
two attempts) or fax (on one attempt), “there should be no further need to contact 
them.” 58  With these “dormant” members, it is possible that a number of pre-
registrations were made either as a precaution,
59
 or for commercial reasons (i.e. to 
gain access to a SIEF to then on-sell services or products).
60
 Indeed, it is difficult to 
know how many of those who pre-registered will go on to register. Following a 
survey to members of the SIEFs in which the trade association ‘concawe’ participates, 
only 20% confirmed their intention to register the substance they had pre-registered.
61
 
For another consortium (which participates in 130 SIEFs, with 37,000 initial, 
potential members), they report that only 10% of pre-registrants are likely to 
register.
62
  
 
Data Holders 
 
Article 29 of REACH details that, in addition to potential registrants, SIEFs shall also 
include, “downstream users and third parties who have submitted information to the 
Agency in accordance with Article 28.” These are termed by ECHA to be “Data 
Holders”, though that term does not appear in the text of the Regulation. In its 
Guidance on Data Sharing, ECHA details that Data Holders include any person 
holding information in relation to a phase-in substance that is willing to share it. It is 
suggested that this is ECHA amplifying the text of REACH (i.e. where guidance 
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produced by ECHA goes beyond, but is not in direct contradiction with, the text of the 
Regulation). Data Holders might be a downstream user of a substance or trade 
association, but could equally be a NGO keen to be involved with the SIEF.
63
 
REACH does not provide for any active role for Data Holders: all the Regulation 
permits them to do is to supply their data and ask for a share of the cost of its 
production. ECHA’s website does not detail how many Data Providers have made 
themselves known to it. 
 
Third Party Representatives 
 
In addition, pre-registrants may appoint a so-called “Third Party Representative” 
(TPRs) to act as an agent on their behalf within a SIEF.
64
 ECHA sees TPRs appointed 
“typically…when a company wishes not to disclose their interest in a particular 
substance as this may give indications to competitors about production or commercial 
secrets.”65 However, what has happened in practice is that industry associations or 
consortia leaders have commonly been appointed TPRs on behalf of a number of 
SIEF members (especially where a SIEF contains members some of whom are linked 
to a trade association and others who are not). Once appointed, while the TPR 
represents the pre-registrant at the SIEF, the entity which appoints the TPR remains 
full legal responsibility for complying with its obligations under REACH.
66
 This is in 
stark contrast to Only Representatives (‘ORs’), who may also be members of SIEFs. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, an OR may be appointed where the non-EU manufacturer 
of a chemical wishes to take responsibility for the registration of that chemical out of 
the hands of the EU based importer. There is now even an Only Representatives 
Organisation, which seeks to set up OR quality standards and develop commonality of 
approaches among various ORs.
67
 As the organisation is members only, it is not clear 
as to the extent of guidance it provides.  
 
Finally, it is also worth noting that different SIEF members may, practically (if not 
legally), be the same entity. Because REACH requires Registration by each legal 
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entity which imports or manufactures above 1 tonne per year, this means that a group 
of EU companies (where each company in the group is a separate legal entity and 
separately subject to REACH) would need to be represented in the SIEF individually. 
Using a TPR is a practical way of overcoming this problem.  
 
Lead Registrants 
 
We turn now to the Lead Registrant. Article 11(1) states that, where a substance 
subject to Registration has more than one manufacturer and/or importer certain 
information,  
“…shall be first submitted by the one registrant acting with the agreement 
of the other assenting registrant(s) (hereafter referred to as ‘the lead 
registrant’).”  
This is the principle of “one substance, one registration”; namely, in order to reduce 
costs for those subject to Registration, only one registrant need submit the relevant 
data on behalf of all registrants. While participation in a SIEF is mandatory, the joint 
submission of registration data via the lead registrant (‘LR’) is not obligatory and 
registrants have three opt-outs: the first, that joint submission would be too costly;
68
 
the second, that joint submission would lead to the disclosure of commercially 
sensitive information;
69
 and the third, that the registrant disagrees with the LR on the 
selection of the registration data.
70
 Where registrants do opt out of joint submission, 
they need to submit their justification for opt out along with their Registration 
dossier.
71
  
 
Save for Article 11(1), REACH is almost silent about the role of a Lead Registrant
72
 
and ECHA comments that the Regulation, “…does not specify rules as to how the 
Lead Registrant should be selected.”73 This is perhaps somewhat odd as having an 
efficient and effective LR is one of the key foundations for a SIEF. In ECHA’s 
Guidance on Registration, the Agency notes that the LR may be registrant with the 
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highest production volume of the substance but that this is is, “not obligatory.”74 The 
Guidance then notes that, “the joint submission registrants have the possibility to 
appoint a lead registrant with a lower tonnage.”75 The Guidance on Data Sharing, 
however, comments that the LR, “may be the EU manufacturer or EU importer with 
the highest interest in registration (e.g. highest tonnage, most data, …).”76 While the 
two Guidance documents are not contradictory, they do not offer a definitive line of 
advice for SIEF members. Both documents aim at going beyond the text of the 
Regulation (and so engage in the amplification function discussed above), but neither 
is determinative.  
 
Industry associations are similarly vague about LR appointment. Cefic advises that 
the “main players in industry must consider taking responsibility for the SIEF process 
and leading the discussions,”77 but it does not go so far as to say which entity should 
shoulder the burden of being LR. Quite aside from the administrative tasks required in 
being LR, there also comes the corollary potential for liability,
78
 something which can 
put off certain companies from assuming the LR position.
79
 This lack of definitive 
guidance for establishing the LR has led to some practical issues and ECHA admits 
that there are cases of SIEFs with more than one Lead Registrant.
80
 As it has no 
power to order a company to step down from the LR role (or appoint any particular 
company to that role), all ECHA can do is advise “communication to decide [the] best 
LR for the SIEF.”81  This aspect of REACH is an instance in which the lack of 
specificity in the Regulation has led to practical issues in the operation of the 
legislation and in which ECHA has failed to produce definitive guidance for SIEF 
members.  
 
The preceding discussion has highlighted how SIEFs come into being, SIEF 
membership and the various roles of those members. This is somewhat complicated. 
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To bring this discussion together, Diagram 5.1 (at the end of this Chapter) depicts the 
(hypothetical) jurisite SIEF, whose members include Data Holders, Only 
Representatives, Third Party Representatives (representing 1,800 SIEF members from 
two separate consortia) and ‘ordinary’ Pre-Registrants, as well as the Lead Registrant.  
 
Data Sharing 
 
Having formed a SIEF, selected a structure, allocated roles and decided on a LR, the 
‘proper’ work can then begin: namely, the sharing of data. Article 29(3) provides that, 
“SIEF Participants shall provide other participants with existing studies, 
react to requests by other participants for information, collectively identify 
needs for further studies…and arrange for such studies to be carried out”.  
 
As set out in Chapter 3, the amount of data needed to be submitted by a pre-registrant 
as part of registration depends on two factors: (a) the inherent properties of the 
substance (with more information needing to be submitted for more harmful 
substances); and (b) the manufacture or import volumes of the pre-registrant of the 
particular substance. Given that SIEFs are collections of all pre-registrants of the 
same substance (with “sameness” the only criteria for inclusion or exclusion), the 
majority of SIEFs are likely to contain pre-registrants who manufacture or import in 
different tonnage bands (and so who need to submit different levels of data on 
different dates). For example, substances manufactured at levels of 10 tonnes or less 
do not need to submit data on dermal toxicity or in-vitro gene mutation studies in 
mammal cells, whereas such data is required where the substance is manufactured at 
levels greater than 10 tonnes.
82
 The issue here is that when SIEF members are sharing 
data and identifying data gaps, they will each be potentially be driven by different end 
goals, depending on what REACH requires of them as to the breadth of the data to be 
submitted for Registration and the deadline for such submission.  
 
‘Go Fish’ and Practical Problems 
 
Aside from Article 29(3), the REACH data sharing provisions are short and promote a 
style which is reminiscent of the card game “Go Fish”. Article 30 sees individual 
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SIEF members asking other members whether a particular data set exists and then, 
where it does, requesting that data. This request (and subsequent sharing) is 
mandatory for data involving tests on vertebrate animals and optional for all other 
data.
83
 A SIEF member who fails to share data from tests on vertebrate animals is not 
allowed to proceed with Registration until such sharing occurs.
84
 Imagine this process 
taking place in the (hypothetical) jurisite SIEF:  
 
(a) SIEF member I sends an email to the other 2,999 member asking if anyone has 
Study X on invertebrate animals, but no one has Study X;  
 
(b) then SIEF member II sends an email relating to Study Y on vertebrate 
animals, which SIEF member CCXI has a copy of and which SIEF member II 
is then required (Article 30(1)) to request;  
 
(c) SIEF member III sends an email concerning Study Z on invertebrate animals, 
which SIEF member XXI has a copy of, although because the study is not on 
vertebrate animals Article 30(1) says that the requesting company, SIEF 
member III, then has a choice whether or not to then request a copy of that 
study (and this process would go on… ad infinitium.) 
 
Such a stilted and formulaic process is obviously too mechanical (and inefficient) for 
the majority of SIEFs. Instead, ECHA advises that, 
“In practice, the potential registrants have the task to organise the data 
sharing activities: i.e. to use more direct forms of cooperation to gather 
the required information, to agree on the necessary data package and on 
the classification and labelling, and to prepare for the joint submission of 
data.”85 
 
The use of “In practice” is instructive and suggests ECHA’s awareness of a 
disconnect between the drafting of REACH and the actual, real world operation of the 
Regulation. Instead of the stilted approach that is a necessary follow on from the draft 
of Article 30, the Agency suggests instead what it calls a “collective route” to data 
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sharing.
86
 It is interesting here how the regulator offers SIEF members a particular 
approach to data sharing which is, in effect, a work around the particular drafting of a 
particular provision of REACH. This, it is suggested, is another example of 
‘translation’, where the Agency, in its guidance, implicitly contests the drafting of the 
Regulation and ‘translates’ the relevant provisions into something else. 
 
The Collective Route 
 
The ‘collective route’ under ECHA’s Guidance on Data Sharing sees individual SIEF 
members gathering what data they hold on the substance to be registered, collating 
and inventorying all the data gathered by all SIEF members, evaluating that 
information en masse and considering the need for additional data to complete the 
registration dossier.
87
 In short, the ‘collective route’ promotes a common sense 
approach to data sharing; one which is supported by Cefic, who recommend that all 
SIEF members share all relevant data, whether or not obtained from tests involving 
vertebrates.
88
 The language used and the approach taken in this part of the Guidance 
on Data Sharing is particularly interesting. ECHA gives SIEF members 17 pages of 
detailed advice on the 9 steps (not found in REACH) that it sees as forming part of the 
‘collective route’. However, the Agency also says that, “The participants of the SIEF 
are free to organise these steps as they best see fit.”89  This tension, between the 
prescriptive and the permissive, arguably reflects the desire of the Agency to offer 
guidance to those with obligations under REACH while at the same time being aware 
of not going beyond its remit. Despite this, the qualifier comes across as somewhat 
‘thin’ when compared to the 17 pages of guidance on the “collective route.” 
 
Data Type and Quality 
 
As for the nature of the data to be shared, a strict reading of REACH shows that only 
hazard based information is obligatory to share (i.e. data on the intrinsic properties of 
the particular substance).
90
 Other data required for registration (such as data on the 
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use of the chemical or studies relating to exposure to the chemical) do not have to be 
shared. Partly this goes to the notion that certain uses of chemicals will be 
confidential and, as a consequence, SIEF members should not be forced to share such 
sensitive information. However, Cefic advises the disclosure and sharing of all data 
on the substance that may be relevant, save for what they term “exceptional cases of 
confidentiality”.91  
 
With existing data that has been shared, SIEF members are given wide ranging 
discretion to decide on the quality of that data. REACH is silent as to when SIEFs are 
allowed to discard data that already exists because it is not of appropriate quality. 
Indeed, REACH is almost silent on the entire issue of quality. In Annex VI of the 
Regulation, which sets out the broad steps needed to comply with registration 
obligations, it is observed that (when a decision is taken about data gaps, on which see 
below), “It is important at this stage to ensure that the available data is relevant and 
has sufficient quality to fulfil the requirements.” Such decisions about quality and the 
rejection of data can be very subjective: what company X thinks of Study A may be 
very different to what company Y thinks of that same study. Given this, Cefic advises 
that “Efficiency can be highly increased if one qualified SIEF participant, e.g. the lead 
registrant, or a competent consultant is fulfilling the task of data validation and the 
other members rely on his/her expertise and judgements.”92  
 
In its Guidance on Data Sharing, ECHA frames the issue of the assessment of data 
quality through OECD guidance. The Agency notes that, “In line with the OECD 
guidance, the process of determining the quality of existing data should take into 
consideration three aspects, namely adequacy, reliability and relevance of the 
available information, to describe a given study” and goes on to explain each of the 
aspects in some detail.
93
 Again, we see tensions between prescription and permission: 
on the matter of the initial data quality screening of reports, ECHA details that, “two 
approaches have been proposed by the OECD”, goes on to set out those two 
approaches but then concludes by noting that, “Other systems [i.e. approaches] may 
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also be considered.”94 Given the lack of detailed advice on this issue in REACH and 
the wish of ECHA to have some sort of uniformity in this area (notwithstanding the 
qualification noted above), this is another attempt by the Agency at channelling the 
actions of registrants (and so is a further example of the ‘standardisation’ function of 
ECHA’s guidance). 
 
Data Gaps 
 
When gaps are identified in the existing data in the possession of SIEF members, 
there are two options. The first, if the missing data is required to comply with 
Registration obligations in Annexes VII and VIII, is that the data is generated by the 
SIEF (or on behalf of the SIEF) and submitted as part of registration. The second, if 
the missing data is needed to comply with the requirements in Annexes IX and X (i.e. 
requirements for substances manufactured above 100 tonnes or more), is that testing 
proposals are created which would generate the missing data;
95
 such proposals are 
then included as part of the Registration dossier, with ECHA then deciding whether or 
not such proposals are appropriate.
96
 In order to reduce unnecessary testing, certain 
instances of “reading across” are permitted. Here, it may be that Chemical A is 
similar to, but not the same as, Chemical B. Where data is missing for Chemical A, 
but not for Chemical B, it may be possible to “read across” the data for Chemical B to 
Chemical A (i.e. to take the data for Chemical B and use it in place of the missing 
data for Chemical A).
97
  
 
Cost Sharing 
 
Having discussed the sharing of data, we now turn to the sharing of the costs of 
generating that data. In our (hypothetical) jurisite SIEF, let us pretend that one 
member has a key study that is vital for registration. Although this particular study 
was undertaken in 1989, the SIEF agrees (going down the ‘collective route’ to data 
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sharing advised by ECHA, discussed above) that the study is still relevant and of the 
highest quality. In 1989, the study cost the SIEF member £5,000 to perform. Were the 
same study to be undertaken at the time when the SIEF is debating the issue of data 
sharing, it would cost £50,000 to perform. Given this, how should the study be valued 
and the SIEF member compensated for sharing the study with the other members: on 
the basis of the historic cost or on the basis of the cost to replace the study? All that 
REACH says is that SIEF members, “…shall make every effort to ensure that the 
costs of sharing the information are determined in a fair, transparent and non-
discriminatory way.”98 While ECHA does not, in its guidance, prescribe a particular 
method of calculation, its advice has changed over time. In 2007, the (then) Guidance 
on Pre-Registration and Data Sharing stated that, “Which of those two methods 
(historic costs or replacement costs) is more appropriate is a matter for discussion 
within the SIEF.”99 The current Guidance on Data Sharing, however, now states that, 
“Nothing prevents the potential registrant(s) from agreeing on valuation methods, 
such as the “replacement value”, i.e. the price that would be paid today to obtain the 
same study.”100 This shift, it is suggested, sees EHCA placing greater emphasis on the 
‘replacement value’ approach as valid.  
 
There are 20 pages of guidance on cost sharing in the Guidance on Data Sharing, 
detailing specific factors (sales volumes, production volumes etc) that could be taken 
into account and offering up 10 worked out examples of study cost allocation.
101
 This 
guidance is specifically provided for in the text of REACH, where Article 30(1) says 
that SIEF members, 
“shall make every effort to ensure that the costs of sharing the 
information are determined in a fair, transparent and non-discriminatory 
way. This may be facilitated by following any cost sharing guidance 
which is based on those principles and is adopted by the Agency in 
accordance with Article 77(2)(g).” 
 
Where agreement cannot be reached on cost sharing, the default (in Article 30(1)) is 
equal allocation. Cefic, meanwhile, promotes (but does cross over the line into 
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actually recommending) the compensation-free sharing of existing data.
102
 While 
ECHA provides detailed guidance on costs sharing, it is not, it is suggested, 
attempting to favour one model of cost sharing over another. Given this, it is 
submitted that this guidance is simply amplifying the text of REACH.  
 
In the (hypothetical) legalene SIEF, each manufacturer produces between 1 and 10 
tonnes of the substance each year. In the (hypothetical) jurisite SIEF, of the 3,000 
members, some produce over 1,000 tonnes per year of the substance (given the heavy 
powdering of judges’ wigs); some produce between 10 and 100 tonnes per year; some 
produce between 100 and 1,000 tonnes per year and others produce between 1 and 10 
tonnes. Here, depending on the tonnage band of manufacture, each pre-registrant will 
have different obligations as regards the information necessary for Registration. Some 
will have registered in 2010; others in 2013; others in 2018. This has implications for 
the sharing of costs: what should one member (who produces only 5 tonnes per year 
and does not need to register until 2018) have to pay compared to another (who 
produces 2,500 tonnes per year and registers in 2010)? Here, the Cefic standard form 
SIEF agreement gives three options for costs sharing.
103
 The first involves a 
calculation of costs before each registration deadline with all costs shared by the 2010 
registrants; there is then a recalculation in 2013 and 2018 with appropriate refunds to 
the 2010 registrants. The second sees the 2010 registrants making a 50% advance 
payment on a “best estimated costs” basis (with the balance payable at the moment of 
joint submission); the 2013 and 2018 registrants make their payments (with no 
refund). The third option is an equal lump sum payment for all registrants at the 
beginning of the SIEF process. ECHA, in the Guidance on Data Sharing, does not 
provide this level of specificity in its cost allocation advice. 
 
A less than obvious matter turns on the costs of cost sharing. Where the sharing of a 
particular study is contentious and great time is spent by the SIEF debating how costs 
should be shared in relation to that study, the cost of that debate may outweigh the 
cost of the study itself. Given this, Cefic advises that, “…careful consideration should 
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be given to the application of any cost sharing mechanism to avoid that more 
resources are spent on sharing the costs than are gained by compensation.”104  
 
Conclusions 
 
Getting pre-registrants together and compelling them to share data in a SIEF is one of 
the core purposes of REACH. Given this, the lack of specificity on SIEFs in the text 
of the Regulation is striking.  Wide discretion is given to pre-registrants as how a 
SIEF is formed, what format the SIEF takes and how it operates (membership, roles, 
data evaluation, cost sharing etc). It is probably fair to say that those who drafted 
REACH did not expect the level of administrative architecture created by SIEFs (pre-
SIEFS and consortia) as has happened to date. An entire industry of SIEF 
management has been created off of the back of the Regulation. The topography of 
each SIEF will vary considerably: some will amount to small groupings of specialist 
chemical manufacturers, where each SIEF member has some parity of input and 
contribution; others will contain thousands of members, be ran by a small core of 
manufacturers and importers and may ‘drag’ other participants along with them; 
others still will be barely functioning, non-distinct groups of competitors unable or 
unwilling to cooperate and agree.  
 
REACH makes collaborative self-regulation mandatory for certain matters (namely, 
being a member of a SIEF) but in others (for example, opting out of joint submission) 
companies are allowed to go it alone.  This disconnect is odd, especially given the 
principle of ‘one substance, one registration’ which is said to underpin the Regulation.  
There is also something discordant in letting the private sector order itself so fully as 
the foundation of the EU’s chemical regime. In short, SIEFs are independent of 
ECHA (and of REACH) and yet are critical to the effective functioning of the 
Regulation.  
 
This independence is, however, shaped by the guidance produced by ECHA relevant 
to SIEFs, namely the: (a) Guidance on Data Sharing;  (b) Guidance on Information 
Requirements and Chemical Safety Assessment (discussed more fully in the 
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following Chapter); and the (c) Guidance for Identification and Naming of 
Substances.  In addition, ECHA has produced two User Manuals which assist 
registrants with the IT aspects of SIEF formation and data sharing.  Of all the 
elements of REACH, the creation and running of SIEFs is the area in which guidance 
produced by ECHA amplifies the text of the Regulation, channels the day to day 
operation of the legislation via standardising the behaviours of pre-registrants and, in 
more limited circumstances, breaks away from the provisions of the legislation. There 
are are also examples in this area of ECHA cementing gaps in the Regulation through 
its guidance. It is submitted that without this guidance, data generation, assessment 
and sharing under REACH would fail. However, the impact of ECHA’s guidance is 
variable. The level of amplification, standardisation and translation differs between 
ECHA guidance documents and between different aspects of the operation of 
REACH. 
 
In the context of amplification, this Chapter has highlighted a number of instances in 
which ECHA’s guidance has built on provisions in REACH: in how registrants assess 
the quality of the data they hold; in how costs of sharing might be shared among 
registrants; and in the role and functioning of ‘Data Holders’. Here, the Agency is not 
engaged in forcing registrants down any particular course of action, but instead is 
offering what might be thought of ‘pure’ advice on the text of REACH. In contrast, 
this Chapter has also highlighted a number of areas in which ECHA, in its guidance, 
does express (albeit often implicitly) a preference for how the operationalisation of 
the Regulation should work: in the processes the Agency suggests for determining 
chemical “sameness”; in the detailed advice on consortia and provisions in consortia 
agreements; and in the use of independent third parties to avoid falling foul of 
competition law. These latter examples, I would suggest, demonstrate the 
standardisation function of ECHA’s guidance. 
 
In two instances, ECHA’s guidance stands in stark contrast to the text of REACH: on 
the issue of exactly when a SIEF is formed; and on how a SIEF member should go 
about the mechanics of data sharing (i.e. the “collective route” as opposed to ‘Go 
Fish’). These examples, it is suggested, demonstrate the ‘translation’ function of the 
guidance: where ECHA does not (for whatever reason) like how the Regulation could 
be read, and so sets out its views in other words.  
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Away from ECHA, this Chapter has also explored the shaping of SIEFs via guidance 
produced by trade associations. Cefic, for example, has 83 individual REACH 
guidance documents or tools, of which 19 touch on the formation and operation of 
SIEFs.  These trade associations, and the guidance they provide, add another layer of 
post legislative norm elaboration for REACH. Similarly, the power of consortia 
agreements to act as a form of regulatory control is also striking. Their drafting shapes 
the parameters of how companies will respond to REACH and yet fall without 
traditional accounts of hard and soft law.  
 
These four functions of ECHA’s guidance on data sharing and substance 
identification (amplification; extrapolation; standardisation; and translation) are seen, 
to varying degrees, in ECHA’s other guidance documents. These are highlighted in 
the following three Chapters. What is worth emphasising is that not every guidance 
document has the same type or level of impact and not every one of the above four 
functions is seen in every one of those guidance documents. This makes 
understanding what ECHA’s guidance actually does both interesting and challenging. 
In exploring REACH through the lens of the Regulation and of its associated 
guidance, the “complex normativity” that Scott highlighted of this regulatory response 
to chemicals risk management becomes even more complex.
105
 Having reviewed the 
creation and functioning of SIEFs, the Chapter which follows explores various 
aspects of REACH which relate to information exchange, transmission and disclosure 
upwards from registrants to ECHA and beyond.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
REGISTRATION, EVALUATION AND THE  
WIDER ROLE OF INFORMATION UNDER REACH 
 
 
Information generation and disclosure form the heart of REACH. Expressly 
created to address a data deficit within the EU on the intrinsic properties of 
chemicals, the underpinning basis of the Regulation is that information on these 
chemicals is key and should be generated by the private sector (before 
transmission to regulatory bodies where it then becomes available to the wider 
public). The stated aim is that greater information on the intrinsic properties of 
chemicals will lead to more effective management of the risks from those 
chemicals (risks which will be ‘known’ following the information generation 
process).
1
 Two matters are worth stating at the outset. The first is that the 
relationships created under the REACH provisions on information generation and 
disclosure are not linear. It is not simply a case of chemical producers feeding 
information up to the regulator. Instead, there are a series of interconnected and at 
time overlapping streams of information which pool (and occasionally stagnate) at 
different points. The second is that creating and having information only goes so 
far: a large part of whether or not regulating by information is effective turns on 
the quality of the information produced, the capacity of any regulator to evaluate 
the information and the ability of third parties (consumers, NGOs etc) to 
understand and act on that information. These themes underpin this Chapter and 
those that follow. 
 
This Chapter explores various aspects of REACH which relate to information 
exchange, assessment, transmission and disclosure. These take four broad forms 
(although it is important to note that the information provisions within REACH are 
spread throughout the Regulation and are not explicitly grouped as in this 
Chapter): the first relates to the transmission of chemical testing data to ECHA and 
the subsequent dissemination of that data; the second concerns the right of ECHA 
                                                        
1
 Commission, ‘White Paper on the Strategy for a future Chemicals Policy’ COM (2001) 88 final 
  
139 
 
to evaluate the data it receives; the third relates to rights granted to third parties to 
call for or be provided with information on chemicals contained within articles; 
and the fourth touches on third party (i.e. non-registrant, non-supplier) information 
obligations.  
 
Supplementing the text of the Regulation on these matters are seven guidance 
documents (though arguably all of the guidance produced by ECHA concerns, in 
some way, chemicals data): (a) Guidance on Registration;
2
 (b) Guidance on the 
Communication of Information on the Risks and Safe use of Chemicals;
3
 (c) 
Guidance on Requirements for Substances in Articles;
4
 (d) Guidance on 
Information Requirements and Chemical Safety Assessment;
5
 (e) Guidance on the 
Compilation of Safety Data Sheets;
6
 (f) Guidance on Dossier and Substance 
Evaluation;
7
 and (g) Guidance on Priority Setting for Evaluation.
8
 These 
documents are discussed in further detail throughout this Chapter. However, what 
is striking is that of all the elements of REACH, data transmission and 
dissemination receive the least attention in the guidance documents produced by 
ECHA. Data creation is another matter, as was seen in Chapter 5. What is also 
striking about these guidance documents is that they are largely dense and 
technical. To date, ECHA has not produced guidance to assist in the translation of 
complex chemical data to third parties, in particular to the wider public who have 
                                                        
2
 ECHA, ‘Guidance on Registration’ (Version 2.0, May 2012) – hereafter the ‘Guidance on 
Registration.’ See: <http://echa.europa.eu/documents/10162/13632/registration_en.pdf> accessed 
10 August 2014 
3
 ECHA, ‘Guidance on the Communication of Information on the Risks and Safe use of Chemicals’ 
(Version 1, December 2010). See: 
<http://echa.europa.eu/documents/10162/13639/risk_communications_en.pdf> accessed 10 August 
2014 
4
 ECHA, ‘Guidance on Requirements for Substances in Articles’ (Version 2, April 2011). See: 
<http://echa.europa.eu/documents/10162/13632/articles_en.pdf> accessed 10 August 2014 
5
 ECHA, ‘Guidance on Information Requirements and Chemical Safety Assessment’ (Part A, 
Version 1.1, December 2011). See: <http://echa.europa.eu/web/guest/guidance-
documents/guidance-on-information-requirements-and-chemical-safety-assessment> accessed 10 
August 2014 
6
 ECHA, ‘Guidance on the Compilation of Safety Data Sheets’ (Fourth Draft, July 2011). See: 
<http://echa.europa.eu/documents/10162/13563/fourth_draft_sds_guidance_july_2011_en.pdf> 
accessed 10 August 2014 
7
 ECHA, ‘Guidance on Dossier and Substance Evaluation.’ This document, once housed on the 
ECHA website, is now said to be “obsolete” and has been removed: see - 
<http://echa.europa.eu/guidance-documents/guidance-on-reach> accessed 10 August 2014. The 
author has a hard copy of this guidance on file. Copy on request.  
8
 ECHA, ‘Guidance on Priority Setting for Evaluation.’ This document, once housed on the ECHA 
website, is now said to be “obsolete” and has been removed: see - <http://echa.europa.eu/guidance-
documents/guidance-on-reach> accessed 10 August 2014. The author has a hard copy of this 
guidance on file. Copy on request. 
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‘rights to know’ under REACH. This disconnect is also explored in more depth 
below. 
 
By way of introductory overview to the elements of REACH discussed in Chapter 
3, manufacturers and importers submit information on the intrinsic properties of 
chemicals to ECHA through the process of Registration. This information is, in 
part, then made publicly available and is also transmitted along the substance 
supply chain and to employees. Some of the data which ECHA receives is 
evaluated by the Agency, but most is not. Consumers have the right to ask for 
information from suppliers on whether the ‘articles’ (essentially, products) they 
own contain substances “of very high concern” which have been prioritised for 
potential regulatory action (namely, Candidate List substances).
9
 Such information 
is also required to be disclosed (without the need for request) to ‘industrial’ 
customers (i.e. non consumers) of such articles. Here, the information provisions 
in REACH can be split between those which apply to substances per se and those 
which apply to articles (in which certain substances are present). In addition, 
downstream users of chemicals, other actors in the supply chain, Member States, 
ECHA and the Commission each have a variety of obligations under REACH to 
either notify various parties of certain chemical information or to report on their 
activities. These elements are brought together in Diagram 6.1 at the end of this 
Chapter.  
 
Transmission and Dissemination of Testing Data 
 
The Substance Dossier 
 
As a starting point, manufacturers and importers of substances subject to REACH 
are required to provide to ECHA a dossier of information on that substance as part 
of the Registration process
10
. The contents of the dossier depends on the tonnage 
band in which the substance is manufactured or imported (more than 1,000 tonnes 
per year; more than 100 tonnes but less than 1,000 tonnes per year etc). For all 
chemicals, a “Technical Dossier” is required as part of Registration. For chemicals 
                                                        
9
 On which, see Chapter 7 
10
 Article 6; Article 10  
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manufactured or imported in quantities greater than ten tonnes per year, a “more 
formal” 11  “Chemical Safety Report” is required in addition to the Technical 
Dossier.
12
  
 
The broad contents of the Technical Dossier are set out in Article 10(a) (and more 
particularly in Annex VI) which requires the submission of the following data: 
 
(i) the identity of the manufacturer(s) or importer(s); 
(ii) the identity of the substance; 
(iii) information on the manufacture and use(s) of the substance; 
(iv) the classification and labelling of the substance; 
(v) guidance on safe use of the substance; 
(vi) study summaries of the information derived from the application 
of Annexes VII to XI; 
 (vii) robust study summaries of the information derived from the 
application of Annexes VII to XI, if required under Annex I; 
(viii) an indication as to which of the information submitted under 
(iii), (iv), (vi), (vii) or subparagraph (b) has been reviewed by an 
assessor chosen by the manufacturer or importer and having 
appropriate experience; 
(ix) proposals for testing where listed in Annexes IX and X; and 
(x) for substances in quantities of 1 to 10 tonnes, exposure 
information as specified in section 6 of Annex VI. 
 
As noted above, the relative breadth of information needed to be included in the 
Technical Dossier varies as a function of the tonnage in which the substance is 
manufactured or imported. The higher the tonnage, the more information Annexes 
VI to XI of REACH require to be included on the intrinsic properties of the 
substance. On a general basis, most of the information to be submitted relates to 
the intrinsic properties of the substance. What this means is that the information 
should detail how and to what extent the chemical impacts, or has the potential to 
impact, on the environment and human health: Is it carcinogenic or toxic?; Does it 
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 Guidance on Registration, para 1.3  
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persist in the environment? etc.  Where a Chemical Safety Report is required, this 
details the human health and environmental hazards posed as well as an 
assessment of exposure and risk. Risk and exposure assessments are only required 
for certain chemicals, namely those which, as a result of the hazard assessment, 
meet the criteria for classification as dangerous in accordance with the CLP 
Regulation or which are assessed as persistent, bioaccumulative or toxic (“PBT”) 
or very persistent or very bioaccumulative (vPvB). On a practical level, the 
registration dossier needs to submitted using a REACH specific software 
application known as IUCLID (the International Uniform Chemical Information 
Database).
13
 
 
The production of data on the intrinsic properties of chemicals is the heart of 
REACH. Given this, it is not surprising that ECHA has produced detailed 
guidance to assist registrants with their obligations. The Guidance on Information 
Requirements and Chemical Safety Assessment is the most dense and most 
technical of all that published by ECHA. It is in fact 28 separate guidance 
documents, amounting to more than 200,000 words of text across 2,232 pages.
14
  
These 28 are (implicitly) addressed to chemists and regulatory scientists and detail 
processes for chemicals data collection and assessment, the identification of data 
gaps and the subsequent generation of additional data to fill those gaps. The more 
accessible Guidance on Registration is written for those “with or without expert 
knowledge in the field of chemicals” and acts as an umbrella overview of the 
implementation of REACH.
15
 This guidance document details helpful examples 
and the language used is markedly different (namely, more layperson friendly) 
than that used in the Guidance on Information Requirements. The Guidance on 
Registration takes the text of REACH and puts it into more accessible language. 
Without these two documents, REACH would still operate, in the sense that the 
legislative framework found in the Regulation is, in this area (chemicals testing), 
sufficiently detailed for registrants to comply with their obligations without further 
support. However, the complexity and depth of the Guidance on Information 
Requirements is an obvious attempt to bring some standardisation to chemicals 
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 ECHA (n 5) 
15
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assessment and to channel registrants down good practice avenues. This in turn 
provides benchmarks by which ECHA can assess the quality of the data submitted 
to it and, as a corollary, should allow for comparisons between chemicals. 
However, ECHA has found the quality of information submitted to it to be 
variable and, on many occasions, inadequate. Both the 2011 review of REACH by 
ECHA and the 2012 review of the Regulation conducted by the Commission 
highlighted the poor quality of much of the information that had been created.
16
  
 
The Registration requirement to transmit data to ECHA is not a once and for all 
time information communication obligation. Rather, REACH contains various 
provisions concerning when the dossier held by ECHA on a substance needs to be 
updated. Article 22(1) provides that registrants are to update their dossiers 
“without undue delay with relevant new information”. Here, “relevant new 
information” includes, among other matters, “new knowledge of the risks of the 
substance to human health and/or the environment of which he may reasonably be 
expected to have become aware which leads to changes in the safety data sheet or 
the chemical safety report”.17 An update is also required for a “change in…status” 
of the registrant,
18
 which is of importance on corporate finance transactions on the 
asset transfer of a business which is a REACH registrant. 
 
The ECHA ‘Library’ 
 
Article 77(2) obliges ECHA’s Secretariat to make certain information provided to 
ECHA in Registration dossiers available to the public free of charge over the 
internet.
19
 This information can be found on a subsection of the ECHA website.
20
 
The overriding aim with dissemination to the public of information on chemical 
properties is to grant the public, “free and easy access to basic data held in the 
Agency's database, including brief profiles of hazardous properties, labelling 
requirements and relevant Community legislation including authorised uses and 
                                                        
16
 ibid, 102; European Chemicals Agency, The Operation of REACH and CLP (ECHA-11-R-003-
EN, 2011) 24 
17
 Article 22(1)(e) 
18
 Article 22(1)(a) 
19
 The exact information to be provided is listed in Articles 119(1) and (2) but amounts to a large 
proportion of the registration dossier.  
20
 See: <http://apps.echa.europa.eu/registered/registered-sub.aspx> accessed 10 August 2014 
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risk management measures”. 21  As an aim, this is laudable and ECHA’s 
Management Board have stated that they consider the dissemination of registration 
information a “cornerstone of REACH and vital for achieving the REACH 
goals”.22 However, such dissemination is beset by the following four foundational 
issues, each of which will be discussed in turn: (a) what is there is not useful in 
any really meaningful way for the public; (b) what is there has likely never been 
checked for quality; (c) some information might be missing; and (d) some of the 
information might be contradictory. 
 
On the question of utility, data on the ECHA website which the public may access 
relates only to substances (and does not, for example, relate to the end products 
which contain those substances). As ECHA puts it, “In other words, you can find 
information about methanol or butane, but not for example about a shampoo, 
cleaning product or pencils”.23 Given that few members of the public regularly 
purchase isolated chemicals (as opposed to mixtures of chemicals or products in 
which chemicals are contained or in whose production chemicals have been used), 
it is questionable how useful this information really is. It also questionable 
whether, as a matter of fact, any members of the public would ever access the 
database to look up specific chemicals. What may be more likely, however, is that 
specialist NGOs and other third party organisations would actively interrogate the 
ECHA database for data on chemicals of concern to them.  
 
The issue of utility also goes to the content of the information that is made public. 
Given the data disseminated on ECHA’s website comes from substance 
registration dossiers, it is necessarily technical in nature and there is no obligation 
in REACH for registrants to provide non-technical summaries of their 
                                                        
21
 Recital 117 
22
 Antonello Lapalorcia, ‘The Importance of Dissemination’ (ECHA Stakeholder’s Day Speech, 
2010) – see: 
<http://echa.europa.eu/doc/press/events/stks_day_20100519/importance_of_dissemination_antonel
lo_lapalorcia.pdf> accessed 10 August 2014  
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 ECHA, ‘Questions and Answers about ECHA’s public database with information on registered 
substances’ (webpage) – see: <http://echa.europa.eu/support/faqs/q-and-a-about-echas-public-
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registrations.
 24
  Let us take the substance N-(2,6-dimethylphenyl)pyridine-2-
carboxamide as an example (as this was the first substance on a search of the 
ECHA website for all registered substances).
25
 The ‘dossier’ for this substance 
available to the public is set out in five headings: (i) General Information; (ii) 
Classification and Labelling; (iii) Manufacture, Use and Exposure; (iv) Guidance 
on Safe Use; and (v) Reference Substances.
26
 Many of the subsections for these 
(such as “Biocidal Information” and “Exposure Estimates”) contain no 
information whatsoever (and there is no commentary or other guide to indicate 
why this is so or what this lack of data means); and those that do contain 
information are weak as regards public access and usefulness. For example, in the 
subsection on “Classification and Labelling”, there is the remark “Caution – 
substance not yet fully tested”, although the same subsection also contains the data 
that the substance is “harmful if swallowed…irritating to eyes and skin…[and] 
harmful to aquatic organisms”. The foregoing somewhat goes against the comment 
by ECHA that the public availability of chemical information will, “allow 
[consumers] to make fully informed decisions about their use of chemicals”.27 It 
may be (as noted above) that the public availability of chemical data under 
REACH will allow NGOs with specialist employees or other third parties with a 
consumer agenda to access and evaluate chemical properties, but such seems 
remote for the average member of the public. It is also worth noting how limited 
any consumer recourse might be in pursuing a complaint regarding information 
housed on ECHA’s website. Thus the determination of the configuration of the 
website and its contents may lie some distance from the formal requirements of 
Article 77.  
 
The second foundational issue with the data made publicly available on the ECHA 
website goes to the quality of that data. As detailed in Chapter 3, only 5% of all 
registration dossiers will be Evaluated. For the rest, as long as the dossier passes 
                                                        
24
 Unlike, for example, in European Union legislation on environmental impact assessments of 
certain developments – see Council Directive (EC) 85/337 on the assessment of the effects of 
certain public and private projects on the environment [1985] OJ L 175 
25
 Search performed on 1 July 2010 (and rechecked on 10 August 2014) 
26
 See: <http://apps.echa.europa.eu/registered/data/dossiers/DISS-76fd30e3-f86b-2690-e044-
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the “completeness check” (i.e. as long as all the boxes in the Registration dossier 
template are filled in with something, whatever that something might be), there 
will be no evaluation of content or other form of review by a regulatory agency.
28
 
ECHA therefore does “not guarantee the correctness or adequacy of the 
information or that the dossiers are compliant with REACH”.29  Given this, a 
consumer looking at a dossier on the ECHA website has little by way of comfort 
as to the accuracy of the data they are reviewing. As noted above, the likelihood is 
that much of the data they see is of questionable quality. Given the robust nature 
of the guidance produced by ECHA on the generation of chemicals data (discussed 
in Chapter 5) there is then a disconnect between policy and practice. We might 
then ask how the provisions in REACH (and the associated guidance) are 
enforced. This is explored in Chapter 8. 
 
Not all data sent to ECHA as part of a Registration dossier for a substance 
necessarily appears on the ECHA website and is available to the public. Article 
10(a)(xi) details that, as part of Registration, a registrant may also submit, 
“a request as to which of the information in Article 119(2) [i.e. that 
information which would ordinarily be disclosed on the ECHA 
website] the manufacturer or importer considers should not be made 
available on the Internet in accordance with Article 77(2)(e), including 
a justification as to why publication could be harmful for his or any 
other concerned party's commercial interests.” 
 
Thus, registrants may request that certain data is not published on what effectively 
amounts to grounds of business confidentiality. Matters which are 
“normally…deemed to undermine the protection of commercial interests” are set 
out in Article 118(2) as follows: 
“(a) details of the full composition of a preparation; 
(b) without prejudice to Article 7(6) and Article 64(2), the precise 
use, function or application of a substance or preparation, including 
information about its precise use as an intermediate; 
(c) the precise tonnage of the substance or preparation manufactured 
or placed on the market; 
(d) links between a manufacturer or importer and his distributors or 
downstream users.” 
                                                        
28
 Obviously, it would be open to third parties to review the quality of registration dossiers and to 
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For the public, there is also the issue of the ECHA website hosting different data 
on the same substance. Information is displayed per registration. As is detailed in 
Chapters 3 and 5, under certain situations, registrants of the same substance are 
allowed to depart from the “one substance, one registration” principle and submit 
separate registration dossiers for the same substance. ECHA comments that “the 
separate submission of data may result in the display of several entries in the 
database”,30 but does not go on to state that these entries may contain substantially 
different information of the intrinsic properties of the same substance and that, for 
the average member of the public, understanding which of the registrations may 
have the ‘right’ data would be all but impossible.  
 
Information Dissemination Outside the EU 
 
Article 120 empowers ECHA to disclose information received by it to certain 
governments of “third countries” and international organisations in specific 
situations.
31
 Information may be disclosed by ECHA notwithstanding it may 
otherwise be afforded protection under Articles 118 and 119 of REACH (i.e. it 
might undermine commercial interests), although there are two criteria for 
disclosure, as follows: (a) the purpose of the agreement must be cooperation on the 
implementation or management of legislation concerning chemicals covered by 
REACH; and (b) the third party must protect confidential information as mutually 
agreed. 
 
Information Communication by Member States 
 
Article 123 states that, “the competent authorities of the Member States shall 
inform the general public about the risks arising from substances where this is 
considered necessary for the protection of human health or the environment.” This 
                                                        
30
 ECHA (n 23) 
31
 This is either in accordance with: (i) Article 212 TFEU (formerly Article 181a(3) of the EC 
Treaty), which states that, “Within their respective spheres of competence, the Community and the 
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is a good example of a framework norm under REACH in which the Regulation 
explicitly sees (and commands) the need for further elaboration via guidance: 
“The Agency, in consultation with competent authorities and 
stakeholders and drawing as appropriate on relevant best practice, shall 
provide guidance for the communication of information on the risks 
and safe use of chemical substances, on their own, in mixtures or in 
articles, with a view to coordinating Member States in these 
activities.”32 
 
The document produced by ECHA, Guidance on the Communication of 
Information on the Risks and Safe Uses of Chemicals, amounts to 68 pages or 
23,924 words.
33
 Addressed to Member States (and the regulatory bodies therein 
responsible for chemicals, ‘MSCAs’) the caveat in the introduction to the guidance 
is instructive: 
“Most, if not all, Member States will have some existing systems in 
place for communicating about the risks of chemicals. Therefore, 
this guidance is intended to be a manual of practical relevance for 
those with less experience to enable them to carry out necessary risk 
communication effectively and a starting-point for further reference 
for others. It is not intended to prescribe to all MSCAs how to carry 
out risk communications [emphasis as in the original].”34 
 
When the guidance is read, the reasons for these caveats become obvious. What is 
set out is both basic and generic. For example, ECHA comments that risk 
communication helps to build trust with the public and that it is important that 
effective working relationships be built up with people that will need to be 
involved in the future.
35
 Much of what is written is also suggestive: MSCAs are 
advised to “consider” doing X or Y on 59 separate occasions in the guidance. 
There is a sense that the Agency was trying to spell out minimum requirements on 
risk communication for those Member States without a history of public 
engagement on chemicals while at the same time placating other Member States 
where there are a variety of different approaches. This guidance, it is suggested, is 
an example of ECHA amplifying the text of REACH. What is also striking about 
this guidance is that this guidance on risk communication is addressed to Member 
States; there is not a comparable guidance document addressed to 
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33
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registrants/industry. This is despite the fact that REACH requires pro-active 
communication along the supply chain and re-active data dissemination to the 
wider public. These aspects are discussed in the sections that follow.  
 
Supply Chain Communication on Substances 
 
Prior to REACH, “safety data sheets” (“SDS”) were used by industry to 
communicate risks relating to the use of chemicals along a supply chain. Given 
this practice, it was thought appropriate to expand their use, making them an 
“integral part” of the Regulation.36 Under Article 31(1), a SDS is required to be 
provided, free of charge on paper or electronically,
37
 and in an official language of 
the Member State(s) where the substance or preparation is placed on the market,
38
 
by the supplier of a substance meeting one of the following classification criteria: 
(a) “dangerous”; (b) PBT or vPvB; or (c) on the Candidate List. Though this is an 
obvious point to make, the supplier of a substance may not be the same person or 
entity as its manufacturer or importer (and so these provisions cast the net of 
REACH information obligations wide). The content and format of the SDS are set 
out in Annex II, with further elaboration via the 125 pages of the Guidance on the 
Compilation of Safety Data Sheets document produced by ECHA.
39
 Broadly, the 
SDS should describe, document and notify in an appropriate and transparent 
fashion the risks stemming from the production, use and disposal of each 
substance for which a SDS is required.
40
 In other situations, the recipient of a 
substance may request a SDS notwithstanding the lack of positive obligation in 
Article 31(1) to provide a SDS (e.g. for a substance for which there are 
Community workplace exposure limits).
41
 SDSs are to be updated without delay 
on the occurrence of certain events (e.g. a restriction for that substance is 
imposed).
42
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40
 Recital 25 
41
 Article 31(3) 
42
 Article 31(9) 
  
150 
 
Even where there is no obligation to provide a SDS, a supplier must still furnish 
the recipient of a registered substance with certain limited information: namely, 
the substance’s registration number, details of any authorisation or restriction and 
“any other available and relevant information about the substance that is necessary 
to enable appropriate risk management measures to be identified and applied.”43 
Such information is to be provided “at the latest at the time of the first delivery of 
a substance on its own or in a preparation after 1 June 2007,”44 and, as with the 
SDS, this is free of charge and needs to be updated on the occurrence of certain 
events.
45
  
 
While Articles 31 and 32 of REACH may seem detailed (with further specifics set 
out in Annex II of the Regulation), it is the associated guidance document that 
provides the real specificity of exactly how a SDS should be compiled, who 
should compile it and what competencies the author of the SDS should have.
46
 The 
guidance also helpfully puts the SDSs required under the Regulation in context 
and explains how they differ to the SDSs required pre-REACH.
47
 As with the 
Guidance on Information Requirements discussed earlier in this Chapter, the 
Guidance on the Compilation of Safety Data Sheets aims at standardisation of 
approach and at channeling registrants down a particular course of action. Without 
the guidance, SDSs would still be produced and would still need to comply with 
Annex II of the Regulation and would, broadly, contain similar information but it 
is likely they would look very different. As well as standardisation, the Guidance 
on Compilation of Safety Data Sheets also amplifies the text of REACH. For 
example, Annex II of the Regulation details that the SDS should be produced by a 
“competent person”. This term is not defined in REACH. However, the Guidance 
sets out that a “competent person” is: 
“a person (or combination of persons) – or a coordinator of a group of 
people - who has or have, as a result of their training, experience and 
continued education, sufficient knowledge for the compilation of the 
respective sections of the SDS or of the entire SDS.”48 
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With the above example, the guidance is not prescribing a suggested or possible 
course of action, but is instead simply building on the framework of REACH. 
This, it is suggested, is the key difference between the standardisation and 
amplification functions of the guidance produced by ECHA.  
 
The Guidance on the Compilation of Safety Data Sheets further details that the 
supplier of the SDS can delegate the role of “competent person” to a third party 
and that there should be continuing education and training of whoever takes on the 
role.
49
 The third function of this Guidance is extrapolation. Take for example the 
obligation in Article 31(5): 
“The safety data sheet shall be supplied in an official language of the 
Member State(s) where the substance or preparation is placed on the 
market, unless the Member State(s) concerned provide otherwise.” 
 
One could argue that the use of “the Member State(s) concerned” is ambiguous. 
However, the Guidance makes it clear that,  
“it is for the recipient Member State (MS) to provide otherwise – for 
example the existence of an exemption in the MS of manufacture does 
not give an exemption in a different MS where the substance or 
mixture is placed on the market”50 
and in so doing extrapolates meaning where the text of REACH is lacking. 
Access to information for workers 
 
Articles 31 and 32 detail how information flows from suppliers to purchasers. 
Article 35 sees this information flow outwards and provides that workers and their 
representatives are to be “granted access” by their employer to the information 
provided in accordance with Articles 31 and 32 (i.e. data provided in a SDS or 
other information provided on a substance or preparation) in relation to substances 
or preparations that they use or may be exposed to in the course of their work. 
Exactly what it means to “grant access” is not clear. The Guidance on the 
Compilation of Safety Data Sheets is oddly quiet on this matter and simply states: 
“The SDS (in the EU) is aimed at the employer. The employer has a 
responsibility to transform the information into suitable formats to 
manage risks at the specific workplace. Nonetheless access must be 
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given to relevant SDS information to workers and their representatives 
according to Article 35 of REACH.”51 
 
As discussed in more depth below, while guidance produced by ECHA is detailed 
when it comes to business to business communication or technical matters, there is 
little which speaks to risk communication by registrants and suppliers with 
employees or the general public.  As a consequence, this means that the extent to 
which the hard law bricks of REACH are joined together by the soft law mortar of 
guidance is a matter of great discretion.  
 
Evaluation – The Assessment of Data Submitted to ECHA 
 
Once a registration dossier is received by ECHA, it is assigned a registration 
number, for the purposes of identification.
52
 A ‘completeness check’ is then 
undertaken. As set out in Chapter 3, this is essentially a box checking exercise to 
see if any of the elements required for registration are missing. This check does 
not look at the quality of the data being submitted. It simply checks whether the 
right types of data have been included. The completeness check is required to be 
undertaken within three weeks of submission of registration and, where such 
check highlights incomplete or missing data from a registration, the registrant will 
be informed of this by the Agency and given a “reasonable deadline” to submit an 
amended, hopefully complete, registration.
53
   
 
After registration (and a successful completeness check), ECHA will then evaluate 
(or assess) a certain number of registration dossiers and registered substances. The 
recitals to REACH detail that evaluation is said to be required in order to, 
“…instil confidence in the general quality of registrations and to ensure 
that the public at large as well as all stakeholders in the chemicals 
industry have confidence that natural or legal persons are meeting the 
obligations placed upon them.”54 
 
On its website, EHCA comments that the Member States and the Agency evaluate 
the information submitted by companies, “to examine the quality of the 
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registration dossiers and the testing proposals and to clarify if a given substance 
constitutes a risk to human health or the environment.” As will be seen below, the 
actual amount of evaluation that goes on means this statement may be somewhat 
disingenuous.  
 
The Evaluation processes under REACH are split into two parts: (a) dossier 
evaluation; and (b) substance evaluation. The relevant provisions can be found in 
Title VI of the Regulation, Articles 40 to 54 inclusive. In June 2007, ECHA 
published Guidance on Dossier and Substance Evaluation (hereafter, ‘Guidance on 
Evaluation’). 55  Unlike many of the Agency’s other guidance documents, the 
Guidance on Evaluation has not been updated since its publication. The Guidance 
on Evaluation stands at 139 pages and is said to be, “primarily intended” for use 
by staff within ECHA and Member State competent authorities responsible for 
carrying out evaluation tasks.
56
 The document is stated to, “also be useful” for 
registrants, downstream users and third parties, “to better understand” how 
evaluation will be performed and how decisions relating to evaluation will be 
taken.
57
 Accompanying the Guidance on Evaluation is the August 2008 Guidance 
on Priority Setting for Evaluation (hereafter, the ‘Guidance on Priority Setting’).58 
This document is unusual in that it states that it, “is not intended to be used as 
stand alone guidance and takes into account other REACH guidance and 
processes, in particular the guidance on evaluation.”59 The Guidance for Priority 
Setting is “primarily intended” to be used by staff within ECHA who are dealing 
with the priority setting of dossier evaluation, but “will also be useful” for 
registrants and Member State competent authorities.
60
 
 
The Guidance on Evaluation is technical and process oriented, containing a series 
of step-by-step flowcharts, tables of tasks and responsibilities, reporting formats 
and checklists to be used by Agency staff. In this regard, this guidance (produced 
by ECHA) mainly aims at channelling the actions of the Agency’s own staff. Even 
more prescriptive (as regards process) is the Procedure for Dossier Evaluation 
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published by ECHA in March 2011. This is not one of the Agency’s guidance 
documents and is housed on that part of ECHA’s website dedicated to 
Evaluation.
61
 The Procedure for Dossier Evaluation is very clearly aimed at ECHA 
staff and sets out the 26 separate steps that form part of dossier evaluation.
62
 It is 
noteworthy that such an important procedural guide is not one of ECHA’s 
guidance documents and yet it actively sets out norms for how the Agency’s staff 
should work. In the context of hard/soft law, the specificity of this procedure 
document would seem to suggest that it shapes and channels the day-to-day 
operation of REACH just as much as the official guidance documents and, 
arguably, just as much as the text of the Regulation itself. ‘Guidance’, as was 
demonstrated in Chapter 4, comes in a variety of forms under REACH. ECHA has 
20 ‘Procedure’ documents on its website, all housed in the ‘The Way We Work’ 
section and not in the ‘Support’ section (where the other guidance is housed).63 
 
Dossier Evaluation – Compliance Check 
 
Dossier evaluation is split into two sub-categories: (i) a compliance check (not to 
be confused with the completeness check detailed above); and (ii) an examination 
of testing proposals. While the three evaluation tasks (compliance checks, testing 
proposal reviews and substance evaluation) are independent of each other in 
REACH, the Guidance on Evaluation suggests that, “certain links [between them] 
are evident, and results and information obtained in the different tasks should be 
used and linked in an intelligent manner.”64 This lack of clarity on overlaps is seen 
elsewhere in REACH (for example, in the following Chapter on Authorisation and 
Restriction). 
 
The aim with the compliance check is for ECHA to examine the chosen 
registrations in order to verify that certain information is in compliance (in terms 
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of content, format, quantity etc) with the requirements of the Regulation.
65
 The 
Guidance on Evaluation details that, “The main purpose of a compliance check is 
to evaluate whether a registrant is meeting his obligations.”66 For this process, the 
difference in language between the text of REACH and the Guidance on 
Evaluation is striking. Article 40(1) of REACH sets out the purpose of the 
compliance check simply in terms of compliance with rules found elsewhere in the 
Regulation. The Guidance on Evaluation, however, sets out that the purpose of a 
compliance check, “is to check the adequacy of the information submitted, which 
can be defined by its reliability and relevance.”67 These criteria, reliability and 
relevance, are then defined in more depth in the Guidance on Evaluation. The 
reader will recall the use of these criteria in other ECHA guidance (see Chapter 5 
on SIEFs and the Agency’s guidance on data sharing and information 
requirements). This, it is suggested, is something more than ECHA simply 
amplifying the text of REACH and that, in putting forward two new criteria, the 
Agency is effectively translating the requirements of the Regulation to something 
potentially more than is required.  
 
When it comes to selecting dossiers for a compliance check, ECHA is entitled to 
rely on any information submitted by a third party on a substance which 
underwent pre-registration,
68
 or on any information on substances submitted to 
them by competent authorities in the Member States.
69
 Thus, it is possible for 
Member States and third parties to ‘suggest’ specific registration dossiers for 
compliance check evaluation. From inception of the compliance check, ECHA has 
twelve months within which to draft a decision requiring the registrant(s) to 
submit any information needed to bring the registration into compliance with the 
relevant information requirements and specifying adequate time limits for the 
submission of further information.
70
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Article 41(5) of REACH sets out that compliance checks are intended to take place 
for no fewer than 5% of all registration dossiers received for each tonnage band.
71
 
Without wishing to state the overly obvious, this means that up to 95% of all 
registration dossiers sent to ECHA will never undergo any form of assessment 
(other than the completeness check box ticking exercise). Article 40(5) of REACH 
sets out that certain substances may be prioritised for a compliance check as part 
of dossier evaluation. The text of REACH is not exhaustive as to when a substance 
should be prioritised for a compliance check, but three possible criteria are given. 
The first is where information on classification and labeling or study summaries 
has been submitted separately to the registration dossier.
72
 The second is where a 
registration dossier is submitted without all of the information required by Annex 
VII.
73
 The third is where a dossier is submitted for a substance listed in the 
Community Rolling Action Plan. This plan is discussed in more depth below in 
the section on Substance Evaluation. In its Guidance on Priority Setting on 
Evaluation, ECHA details that, “with the exception of random selection”, no other 
criteria (save those detailed in REACH and discussed above) should be used to 
prioritise registration dossiers for a compliance check.
74
 The reason given for this 
approach is interesting. Here, the Agency comments that, 
“Rationale for this recommendation is that random selection is 
considered the best means to render the selection of a registration 
dossier for compliance check unpredictable for a registrant and thus 
will help to ensure that the quality of the submitted dossiers increases 
over time.”75 
 
Given this, it may not make as much difference that only 5% of all dossiers are 
evaluated. The numbers to date of evaluations are discussed later on in this 
section. In terms of how prioritisation actually happens, it is worth stating that the 
Guidance on Priority Setting for Evaluation is very much a ‘how to’ guide for 
ECHA staff, in particular on how to search the REACH-IT systems according to 
the various prioritisation criteria. This is another example of the standardisation, or 
action channeling, function of the Agency’s guidance.  
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Dossier Evaluation – Testing Proposals 
 
Where a substance is manufactured in quantities greater than 100 tonnes per year, 
the registration dossier for that substance will set out proposals for how certain 
missing data on the intrinsic properties of that substance will be generated. Under 
the second element of dossier evaluation, all testing proposals for these so-called 
“higher tier studies” need to be examined by ECHA.76  
 
REACH is silent on how the examination should be conducted or on the purposes 
of the examination. Article 40(1) simply states that, “The Agency shall examine 
any testing proposal set out in a registration or a downstream user report for 
provision of the information specified in Annexes IX and X for a substance.” The 
Guidance on Evaluation is more expansive and sets out that “two main aspects” in 
relation to the examination of testing proposals can be identified.
77
 The first is 
whether the testing proposal complies with standard testing requirements; the 
second is whether the reasons for proposing additional testing are appropriate.
78
  
Article 40(1) further sets out that, 
“Priority shall be given to registrations of substances which have or 
may have PBT, vPvB, sensitising and/or carcinogenic, mutagenic or 
toxic for reproduction (CMR) properties, or substances classified as 
dangerous according to Directive 67/548/EEC above 100 tonnes per 
year with uses resulting in widespread and diffuse exposure.” 
 
As detailed earlier in this section, ECHA has produced Guidance on Priority 
Setting for Evaluation. In the context of priority setting and the review of testing 
proposals, the language used in the guidance is striking. It details that, 
“With regard to the criteria that should be used for priority setting, it 
was agreed that the prioritisation criteria mentioned in the legal text 
(i.e. Art. 40(1)) should in principle be given preference over further 
criteria proposed. Ideally, the legal criteria should be used for initial 
selection of the testing proposals that should be examined with priority 
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and the supplementary criteria be used to further rank (i.e. order) the 
prioritised proposals.”79 
 
It is submitted that this statement in the guidance is an intentional mis-reading of 
Article 40(1). Elsewhere in REACH (for example, in the context of compliance 
check prioritisation, discussed above), the Agency is given a non-exhaustive list of 
substances or classes of substance that may be prioritised. This flexibility and 
discretion is not, however, seen in Article 40(1), which clearly states that “Priority 
shall be given…” As a result, there is not the room for ECHA, in this particular 
instance, to say that it will “give preference” to the Article 40(1) criteria over 
further criteria that may be proposed. This, it seems, is a translation of the clear 
wording of REACH into something quite different by the Agency. 
 
The review by ECHA of the testing proposals may lead to one of five possible 
decisions, namely: (i) approval of the test proposal; (ii) approval of the test 
proposal as modified; (iii) a rejection of the test proposal; (iv) a rejection or 
approval of the test proposal combined with an obligation to do additional tests; or 
(v) where a number of registrants or downstream users have submitted the same 
proposal, approval of that proposal subject to agreement within 90 days of one 
actor performing the test on behalf of all who submitted.
80
 For non phase-in 
substances, ECHA must prepare a draft decision within 180 days of receiving a 
registration or downstream user report containing a testing proposal.
81
 For phase-
in substances, the deadlines for the draft decisions are staggered depending on 
when the testing proposals are received (so, for example, for a test proposal 
received by 1 June 2018, ECHA has until 1 June 2022 to prepare its draft 
decision.)
82
  
 
Substance Evaluation 
 
Substance evaluation is the pro-active assessment of registration dossiers by 
Member States. In many ways, it resembles the compliance check undertaken by 
ECHA, discussed above. The main difference is that substance evaluation is meant 
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to be targeted to particular chemicals of concern as identified by ECHA and 
Member States and has the potential to lead to further regulatory action. However, 
there are overlaps between the two processes.  Article 44(1) of REACH sets out 
that, 
“In order to ensure a harmonised approach, the Agency shall in 
cooperation with the Member States develop criteria for prioritising 
substances with a view to further evaluation. Prioritisation shall be on a 
risk-based approach.” 
 
These criteria (based on hazard information, exposure information and substance 
tonnage) lead into a three year Community rolling action plan (known as the 
‘CoRAP’), detailing the substances to undergo substance evaluation each year and 
which Member State has responsibility for evaluating which substance.
83
 The 
evaluating Member State has 12 months from the publication of the CoRAP to 
decide whether it needs to request further information from the registrants to 
clarify the concern. This request might go beyond the standard information 
requirements of REACH (Annexes VII to X) and may relate to the intrinsic 
properties of the substance or its exposure.
84
 The first CoRAP was adopted by 
ECHA on 29 February 2012 and covers a period of three years (2012-2014). It is 
updated annually. The CoRAP is housed on ECHA’s website and includes: (a) the 
names of the substances to be evaluated; (b) an indication of the initial concern 
about the substances; (c) the names of the Member States responsible for the 
evaluation of each substance; and (d) the year of evaluation.
85
 At present, 152 
substances are on the CoRAP.
86
 
 
With substance evaluation, the role of ECHA is one of co-ordination, with the 
active assessment of the relevant substance undertaken by competent authorities in 
the Member States (or third parties appointed on their behalf.)
87
 The Guidance on 
Evaluation is detailed on the steps to be taken as part of substance evaluation and 
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aims at harmonising approaches between Member State competent authorities. For 
example, it offers practical suggestions on ‘targeted’ substance evaluation, where 
foci are applied to specific parts of the registration dossier;
88
 as well as setting out 
a detailed methodology for how to conduct substance evaluation.
89
 While the 
language of the guidance is normative (and the use of ‘should’ abounds) the tone 
is not prescriptive and there is a sense of the Agency setting out what it considers 
best practice without actually telling MSCAs what to do. This best practice advice 
is a clear example of ECHA’s guidance having a standardisation function.  
 
Article 48 sets out that, once substance evaluation has taken place, “the competent 
authority shall consider how to use the information obtained for the purposes of” 
either: (a) identifying a Substance of Very High Concern (see Chapter 7); (b) 
initiating the Restriction process under REACH (see Chapter 7); or (c) 
harmonising the classification and labeling of substances (which is outside the 
scope of this thesis). ECHA’s own website sees the purposes of substance 
evaluation as somewhat wider, 
“The evaluation may in the end conclude that the risks are sufficiently 
under control with the measures already in place. Otherwise, it may 
lead to the proposal of EU-wide risk management measures such as 
restrictions, identification of substances of very high concern, 
harmonised classification or other actions outside the scope of 
REACH.”90 
 
This wider view of possible next steps is also seen in the Guidance on 
Evaluation, which sets out the potential for action under the Water 
Framework Directive and/or voluntary measures by registrants (in addition to 
those actions set out in REACH).
91
 This, it is suggested, is an example of 
ECHA translating the text of REACH into something which the Agency sees 
as more workable, and more effective, in day to day regulation of chemicals 
within the EU.   
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Reports on Evaluation 
 
In line with Article 54 of REACH, by 28 February of each year, ECHA has to 
publish a report on the progress it has made over the previous calendar year on its 
obligations in relation to Evaluation. ECHA is specifically required to include 
recommendations to potential registrants to foster improvement in the quality of 
future registrations in these reports. 6 reports have thus far been published.
92
 The 
story told in these reports, of the progress of REACH and the embedding of ECHA 
into the regulatory landscape of the EU, is worth exploring. A mere 98 registration 
dossiers were submitted to the Agency in 2008: of these, only 10 passed the 
completeness check and ECHA started a compliance check on 3.
93
 The 2008 
report is available only in English and consists of 6 sparse pages. By 2009, the 
Article 54 report looks more professional and, at 30 pages, is more expansive.
94
 
The report also details the increasing workload of ECHA. In 2009 ECHA received 
406 complete registration dossiers and initiated evaluation of 35 dossiers, 27 
compliance checks and 8 examinations of testing proposals. By 2012 (the most 
recent report), one registration deadline has passed and the Agency is operating at 
full speed, having conducted 295 compliance checks, examined testing proposals 
from 557 dossiers and facilitated the acceptance of 36 substances Member States 
for substance evaluation.
95
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Information Provisions in Relation to Articles 
 
The Consumer “Right To Know” 
 
We turn now to rights granted to non-business third parties under REACH to be 
sent (or to be provided with on demand) various classes of REACH related 
information. Labelled an “important responsibility”, 96  Article 33(2) grants to 
consumers a limited ‘right to know’ about the products they buy and the 
substances contained therein. The text of this provision is worth replicating in full: 
“On request by a consumer any supplier of an article containing a 
substance meeting the criteria in Article 57 and identified in 
accordance with Article 59(1) [i.e. substances on the Candidate List] 
in a concentration above 0.1 % weight by weight (w/w) shall provide 
the consumer with sufficient information, available to the supplier, to 
allow safe use of the article including, as a minimum, the name of 
that substance.” 
 
The relevant information has to be provided, free of charge, within 45 days of the 
request. The term “consumer” is not defined in REACH, but a “supplier of the 
article” means “any producer or importer of an article, distributor or other actor in 
the supply chain placing an article on the market”. 97  The definition of what 
constitutes an “article” is equally broad.98 Note here that the sole requirement for 
Article 33(2) to activate is the concentration threshold of the Candidate List 
substance in the article. There is not, as is elsewhere common in REACH (for 
example, see below in relation to Article 7(2) notification obligations), a tonnage 
trigger as well, in which suppliers would only have an obligation where the 
concentration level in a given product was met and the sum total of that substance 
in all products supplied over the course of a year exceeded a certain volume 
threshold. Given this, the importer of a single article into the EU which contained 
a Candidate List substance in the relevant concentration would be captured by 
Article 33(2) (and Article 33(1) (below) as well).  
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In Chapter 3, an hypothetical scenario concerning the (fictitious) chemical 
legalene was introduced, where legalene is a highly catalytic substance used in the 
production of inks for the printing of law textbooks. Let us now say that legalene 
has been found to be a SVHC and has been placed on the Candidate List (a 
process explored in depth in Chapter 7). As is set out in Chapter 3, under REACH 
the primary regulatory obligations for legalene rest with its manufacturers. 
However, under Article 33(2) and the consumer ‘right to know’, the printing 
company that prints the textbook, the wholesaler who then buys the textbooks and 
the small, independent bookstore that sells the textbooks on to students would 
potentially each be required to provide certain information to consumers where a 
request for that information had been put to them.
99
 This, at first glance, seems 
somewhat odd. Let us take the small bookstore that sells to students the textbooks 
that contain legalene. They may well have never heard of REACH,
100
 or if they 
have, they may have limited resources with which to understand and/or manage 
their REACH obligations. One might question what meaningful purpose is served 
in allowing the student owner of the textbook to ask the bookstore for information 
on legalene in this situation? Under Regulations 11 and 12 of The REACH 
Enforcement Regulations 2008, discussed in more depth in Chapter 8, breach of 
the Article 33(2) obligation could lead (in the worst case) to an unlimited fine or 
imprisonment for up to two years (or both).  
 
ECHA has produced Guidance on Requirements for Substances in Articles, which 
relates to obligations under Article 7,
101
 and Article 33 of REACH.
102
 This 
guidance is detailed as regards what is (and is not) an article and when (and when 
not) substances are intended to be released from articles. However, less than 2 of 
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the 87 pages of the Guidance are devoted to the communication obligations in 
Article 33.
103
 There is no attempt made at standardisation in this particular area nor 
any discussion of what form good practice risk communication with the public 
might take. This is striking. The Guidance simply notes that there are variety of 
formats which could be used to communicate data and that the relevant supplier 
etc, “must choose a format that will ensure that the information is readily available 
to the recipient of the article or the consumer, always taking into account the 
particular situation of use.”104 While not relevant to this specific issue, it is worth 
noting that this Guidance document did not find full support from all Member 
States and is published with a covering caveat. This details the lack of full support 
and warns that, “Consequently, companies may face diverging enforcement 
practices as to some of its aspects.” This is striking for two reasons. The first, and 
most obvious, is that of divergence in enforcement: while REACH is a Regulation 
and directly applicable, enforcement is a matter for individual Member States. As 
will be seen in Chapter 8, this has caused a number of issues. The second is that 
the warning implies that, where guidance does have the full support of Member 
States, it will be treated as authoritative by Member State authorities with 
competence for REACH enforcement and by ECHA and the Commission. As 
such, ECHA’s post legislative guidance helps to shape the enforcement of the 
Regulation across the EU. The lack of consensus with this guidance document is 
discussed in further depth in Chapter 9.  
 
For the purposes of the following discussion, let us call articles to which Article 33 
applies “Applicable Articles”. Guidance from ECHA details that the Article 33 
obligations apply to articles supplied after the publication of the Candidate List.
105
 
Let us assume that legalene went onto the Candidate List on 1 September 2012. 
Students who bought textbooks on 31 August 2012 have no Article 33(2) rights. 
However, their friends, who bought the same textbook from the same supplier, but 
one day later on 1 September 2012, would have had such rights. This distinction 
seems somewhat arbitrary. On a practical level, the ability of a supplier to provide 
information to consumers relating to Applicable Articles requires them to know: 
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(a) which substances are present in their articles; and (b) in what concentrations 
those substances are present. This may be no easy thing, especially for products 
with cross border supply chains and in which the ultimate supplier may have no 
power whatsoever to compel disclosure by an entity far down the supply chain of 
the chemicals they are using.
106
   
 
As set out above, the text of REACH is such that discharge of the Article 33(2) 
obligation can be achieved simply through the disclosure of the name of the SVHC 
on the Candidate List which is included in the article above the relevant 
concentration. Going back to our legalene example, the bookseller could respond 
to the student textbook owner simply by saying “The textbook which I supplied 
you does contain legalene in [X] concentration”. One might query what value this 
holds for the student? Given this, it would appear that Article 33(2), while 
seemingly laudable in aim and outlook, suffers from impracticality of discharge 
and limited real world worth. This supposition is borne out by a number of 
empirical enquiries into the operation of Article 33. One study found that some 
companies provide the consumer with a reply in a different language from that of 
the request.
107
 Others responses from suppliers provide only very general 
information about safety bearing little relation to the consumer’s query.108 At the 
other end of the spectrum, some companies have provided consumers with a 30-
page technical Safety Data Sheet (designed for industry stakeholders for 
occupational health and safety purposes).
109
  Given this divergence of practice, this 
is an area in which ECHA guidance might usefully have been produced. 
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recalcitrant entities further down the supply chain. This then left the supplier needing to undertake 
so-called ‘destructive testing’ in an attempt to understand the chemical composition of their 
products and the relevant (and all important) concentration levels of those substances. 
107
 BEUC, ‘Chemicals, Companies and Consumers: How Much Are We Told?’ (Report by the 
European Consumers Organisation, 2011) 11  
108
 Crioc, ‘REACH – The Right to be Informed of the Presence of Dangerous Chemical Substances 
in Products’ (Report by the Belgian Centre for Research and Information for Consumer 
Organisations, 2012) 7 - see:  <http://www.oivo-crioc.org/files/fr/6587fr.pdf> accessed 10 August 
2014 
109
 EEB, ‘The Fight to Know’ (European Environmental Bureau 2010) 15 – see: 
<http://www.eeb.org/EEB/?LinkServID=8BBC1DF8-C9C7-8B93-CA5F42033F11A3AD> 
accessed 10 August 2014 
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The “Industrial Customer” Right to Know 
 
Article 33(1) is a form of mirror to Article 33(2), but applies to non-consumers 
(“recipients of articles”) 110  and is a positive, pro-active obligation to provide 
information on the “safe use” of Applicable Articles (rather than the reactive 
Article 33(2) which requires the trigger of a request for information from the 
consumer). Like Article 33(2), there is little specificity in Article 33(2) on the 
breadth or depth of information required to be transmitted (other than the fact that 
the information needs to allow the “safe use” of the Applicable Article and, as a 
minimum, needs to include the name of the substance).  
 
Article 33(1) is also silent as to the method of delivery of the “safe use” 
information to recipients of Applicable Articles. Here, such information could be 
transmitted via the article’s packaging; it could be sent via email or hard copy 
correspondence; it could be detailed on a specific website etc. Given that the aim 
of the provision to ensure the “safe use” of the article, the lack of uniformity on 
delivery may water down its impact. As noted above, the Guidance produced by 
ECHA on substances in articles lacks specificity in this area. It is also worth 
noting here that existing product safety legislation within the EU (such as the 
General Product Safety Directive)
111
 already requires safe use information to be 
contained on a product’s packaging or in user manuals or as part of the product 
description (and so there may be a degree of overlap). REACH’s sister Regulation 
(i.e. the CLP Regulation)
112
 deals with the packaging of chemicals (and not the 
products into which they are ultimately incorporated). However, as noted in 
Chapter 1, CLP is wholly without the scope of this thesis. 
 
Supplier Notification Obligations 
                                                        
110
 Article 3(35) defines a recipient of an articles as “an industrial or professional user, or a 
distributor, being supplied with an article but does not include consumers” 
111
 Council Directive (EC) 2001/95 on general product safety [2001] OJ L 011  
112
 Council Regulation (EC) 1272/2008 on classification, labeling and packaging of substances and 
mixtures [2008] OJ L 353 
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In addition to the ‘right to know’ provisions detailed above, there are also 
notification obligations on suppliers to notify ECHA, under Article 7(2), if certain 
conditions are met regarding the content of Candidate List substances in articles 
they supply. Notification is required when: (a) the substance is present in those 
articles in quantities totaling over one tonne per producer or importer per year; and 
(b) the substance is present in those articles above a concentration of 0.1 % weight 
by weight (w/w). In addition, registration is only required where the substance has 
not yet been registered for that specific use.
113
 The Guidance on Substances in 
Articles produced by ECHA makes it clear that the threshold concentration above 
applies to articles as produced or imported and “does not relate to the 
homogeneous materials or parts of an article, as it may in some other 
legislation”.114 ECHA gives the following example in their Guidance: 
“If imported buttons for jackets contain such substance in 
concentrations of 0.5% (w/w), this needs to be communicated to the 
recipient. If these buttons are imported as part of jackets the 
concentration of the substance in relation to the imported article (the 
jacket) will probably be lower than 0.1% (w/w) and in that case no 
information would have to be communicated.”115 
 
In this instance, the Guidance produced by ECHA reduces the burdens on 
industry. This is an example of the Agency translating the text of the Regulation 
(in this instance for the benefit of registrants). The contents of the notification are 
set out in Article 7(4). There is an exemption for notification where the supplier 
can exclude exposure to humans or the environment during normal or reasonably 
foreseeable conditions of use including disposal.
116
 In such cases, the producer or 
importer are obliged to supply “appropriate instructions” to the recipient of the 
article. Notification is only required as from 1 June 2011 and, thereafter, no later 
than 6 months after the substance has been included on the Candidate List.
117
 This 
then places an obligation, if not legal then practical, on suppliers to: (a) know 
every substance in their articles (and in what concentrations);
118
 and (b) regularly 
monitor the Candidate List and cross check against the substance lists they have 
                                                        
113
 Article 7(6) 
114
 ECHA (n 4) para 2.2 
115
 ECHA (n 4) para 2.3 
116
 Article 7(3) 
117
 Article 7(7) 
118
 This data would also be needed for a supplier to comply with Article 33.  
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created (in case a notification is required at some point). While there is no 
obligation to notify if the use has already been registered, would/how would 
suppliers know this if they were not themselves engaged in the process of 
Registration? Especially if they are low down a supply chain? On a practical level, 
this is a somewhat odd provision.  
 
Third Party Obligations 
 
Supply Chain Obligations – Risk Communication 
 
We turn now to information requirements imposed on non-registrants and non-
suppliers. Article 34 details that “any actor” in the supply chain of a substance or a 
preparation is required to communicate the following information to the next actor 
or distributor up the supply chain: 
 
(a) new information on hazardous properties, regardless of the uses 
concerned; and 
 
(b) any other information that might call into question the 
appropriateness of the risk management measures identified in a 
safety data sheet supplied to him. 
 
Distributors are then to pass on that information to the next actor or distributor up 
the supply chain, creating (in theory) an upwards flow of information flow. This 
provision is extremely wide in ambit and it is questionable how effective it will be 
as a matter of practice (much like Articles 32 and 33 noted above). There is no 
ECHA guidance on the operation or application of Article 34.  
 
Downstream User Notification Obligation 
 
Though not a positive obligation, Article 28(5) empowers downstream users of 
chemicals to notify ECHA if a chemical which they use does not appear on the 
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List of Pre-Registered Substances
119
. The underlying rationale for this provision is 
that notification by the downstream user (which appears on ECHA’s website) may 
prompt or remind those manufacturers or importers who should have pre-
registered (but failed to do so) of their obligations under REACH. However, as of 
10 August 2014, no DU had notified ECHA under this provision.
120
 While ECHA 
has produced Guidance for Downstream Users, there is no reference to Article 
28(5).  
 
Reports (by ECHA, Commission, Member States) 
 
As well as obligations on the private sector, REACH also contains provisions 
(common in EU law) on data generation and transmission by relevant regulatory 
agencies.
121
 Article 54 details that by 28 February of each year, ECHA is obliged 
to publish on its website a report on the progress made over the previous calendar 
year towards discharging the obligations incumbent upon it in relation to 
Evaluation. This report must include, in particular, recommendations to potential 
registrants in order to improve the quality of future registrations. ECHA has 
published reports on its website for 2007 through 2012.
122
  
 
Article 117 details other reports required in respect of REACH. By 1 June 2010, 
the Member States are obliged to report to the Commission on the operation of the 
Regulation within their respective lands. By 1 June 2011, ECHA is obliged to 
report to the Commission: (a) on the operation of REACH; and (b) on the use of 
non-animal test methods and strategies used to generate the information required 
under the Regulation. Finally, by 1 June 2012, the Commission itself was then to 
report on the operation of REACH. The findings of the Commission’s 2012 report 
have been noted where appropriate throughout this thesis.  
 
                                                        
119
 The reader will recall that the mechanics of pre-registration, and the ensuing List of Pre-
Registered Substance, are set out in Chapter 3. 
120
 See: <http://echa.europa.eu/en/information-on-chemicals/pre-registered-substances/substances-
of-interest> accessed 10 August 2014 
121
 See: Deirdre Curtin, ‘Holding (Quasi-)Autonomous EU Administrative Actors to Public 
Account’, (2007) 13(4) European Law Journal 523 
122
 See: <http://echa.europa.eu/web/guest/about-us/the-way-we-work/plans-and-reports> accessed 
10 August 2014 
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Conclusions 
 
This Chapter has outlined the main provisions in REACH which relate to 
information transmission, communication and dissemination. The Regulation also 
extends to data retention, with Article 36(1) obliging each manufacturer, importer, 
downstream user and distributor to “keep available” all the information they 
require to carry out their duties under this Regulation for a period of at least 10 
years after they last manufactured, imported, supplied or used the substance or 
preparation.  
 
What we see with REACH and information as a regulatory tool is a series of 
complex data flows (upwards, outwards and downwards) between and among the 
private and public sectors. While the Regulation is based on the principle that 
information on the intrinsic qualities of chemicals is a good in and of itself, the 
provisions in REACH that relate to information transmission, communication and 
dissemination are not always ideal, sufficiently well thought out on a practical 
level and/or able to meet their stated aims.  
 
The guidance produced by ECHA in this area has highlighted examples of 
amplification, standardisation and the translation of the text of REACH. In the 
context of standardisation, the mammoth Guidance on Information Requirements 
and Chemical Safety Assessment is the most dense and most technical of all that 
published by ECHA. It is in fact 28 separate guidance documents, amounting to 
more than 200,000 words of text across 2,232 pages.
123
  This Guidance aims to 
channel registrants down set paths as regards the compilation of the registration 
dossier to be sent to ECHA. The same is also true of the advice in the Guidance on 
the Compilation of Safety Data Sheets. One interesting point to arise from the 
review in this Chapter is that the Agency seeks to channel not only registrants in 
its guidance, but also ECHA staff and Member State competent authorities (as 
seen in the Guidance on Evaluation, which is primarily aimed at harmonizing 
Member State practices, and in the ‘how to’ Guidance on Priority Setting for 
Evaluation that effectively amounts to an ECHA staff manual).  
                                                        
123
 ECHA (n 5) 
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In the Guidance on the Communication of Information on the Risks and Safe Uses 
of Chemicals, however, ECHA goes some way to avoid telling Member States 
what to do in the context of risk communication. Here, the guidance provides an 
amplification and not a standardisation function, in that the Agency is offering up 
‘pure’ advice without attempting to channel Member States down any particular 
course of action. This Chapter has also highlighted three specific instances of the 
ECHA translating the clear text of REACH for their own purposes: in the 
seemingly intentional misreading of Article 40(1) (over what criteria can, and can 
not, be used to set priorities for examining testing proposals); in setting out the 
permittable next regulatory steps following substance evaluation; and in the 
guidance on relevant threshold concentrations of SVHCs in articles for 
notification. The latter is a novel situation in which the Agency has translated the 
text of REACH as requiring something less of registrants than would seem to be 
required by the wording of the legislation. 
 
More generally, it is worth noting that while the guidance produced by ECHA on 
information is thick with detail when it comes to business-to-business 
communication or technical matters, there is little that speaks to risk 
communication by registrants and suppliers with employees or the general public. 
In the following Chapter, how substances are banned, in full or in part, under 
REACH is reviewed.  
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DIAGRAM 6.1 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
SUBSTANCE BANS UNDER REACH 
 
 
Let us return to the application of REACH to the (hypothetical) chemical legalene 
(introduced in Chapter 3 and further discussed in Chapter 5). The members of the 
SIEF for legalene are undergoing the Registration process of REACH (see Chapter 
6). As a result of their data gathering, generation and analysis, it becomes apparent 
(for the first time) that legalene is carcinogenic. The legalene SIEF files the 
registration dossier for legalene with ECHA, including the research reports 
detailing that the substance is carcinogenic, before the relevant registration 
deadline. The same REACH Registration process is also underway for the 
(hypothetical) chemical jurisite (introduced in Chapter 5). It becomes apparent that 
this chemical is toxic to the reproductive system. The jurisite SIEF file their 
registration dossier, with data detailing that jurisite is toxic, with ECHA. Due to 
recent reported fertility problems among the EU judiciary, and the widespread use 
of jurisite to powder judges’ wigs, officials at Norway's environmental regulator 
had put jurisite on an informal watch list of substances they thought could be of 
concern. As a result, they ask ECHA to actively target jurisite and to review the 
jurisite registration dossier under the REACH Evaluation process (see Chapter 6). 
When ECHA look at the jurisite dossier filed by the jurisite SIEF, they see the 
data on toxicity, decide the substance could be a 'substance of very high concern' 
and begin to employ the REACH Authorisation process to ban any use of jurisite 
on the EU market. While ECHA is reviewing the jurisite dossier, France puts 
forward a proposal to engage the REACH Restriction process for the substance, 
arguing that urgent Community wide action in the form of an immediate ban is 
needed to protect the EU judiciary.
1
  The operation of these processes, 
Authorisation and Restriction, which allow for limitations on the use and placing 
on the market of chemical substances under REACH, forms the heart of this 
Chapter.  
                                                        
1
 This hypothetical example somewhat mirrors what has happened to date in the context of the risk 
management of certain phthalates under REACH. This issue is discussed in more depth in the body 
of this Chapter.  
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While the jurisite dossier is actively reviewed, the dossier on legalene is never 
reviewed by ECHA, or by anyone other than the members of the legalene SIEF. 
As detailed in Chapter 6, only 5% of all registration dossiers are checked by 
ECHA and those substances subject to Evaluation under REACH are likely to be 
the 'known offenders' (that is, substances which regulators have reason to suspect 
are harmful, but for which they lack full chemical assays). There is no obligation, 
under REACH, on a SIEF to notify ECHA (or anyone else) if the data that 
registrants gather as part of the registration process suggests the relevant chemical 
is harmful. As a result, legalene, having been registered in accordance with 
REACH, is free to be manufactured, placed on the market or otherwise used in the 
EU despite it being carcinogenic.
2
  
 
On first blush, this seems nonsensical. It is conceptually difficult to reconcile 
Registration under REACH with Authorisation and Restriction in the context of 
chemical risk management given the lack of correlation between data generation 
and analysis (Registration) and the pro-active regulation of harmful substances 
(Authorisation and Evaluation). Had one been asked to design a regulatory regime 
for chemicals from scratch, one might have thought that private sector information 
generation on chemicals, which flowed automatically into regulator-led chemical 
risk management would be a productive starting point. This is simply not the case 
under REACH. As the above legalene example illustrates, there is no obligation 
under REACH on private sector registrants to notify ECHA (or anyone else) if 
they determine that a chemical is harmful as part of registration. What this means 
then is that, on a date years to come, there could be harmful chemicals on the EU 
market which have been processed through the Registration elements of REACH 
but which were never caught by Evaluation, Authorisation or Restriction. This is 
somewhat worrying. 
 
                                                        
2
 In the real world, whether or not there is a regulatory obligation to notify a regulator, a company 
which becomes aware that a chemical is carcinogenic would have a difficult time avoiding future 
liability (post the point at which this knowledge accrued to them) for that substance (especially 
when the REACH registration dossiers are publicly available). However, the lack of positive 
reporting/notification obligation on the registrant/SIEF is striking. 
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As discussed above, REACH restricts the placing on the market or use of harmful 
substances through two processes: Authorisation and Restriction. The operation of 
these processes forms the heart of this Chapter. Though similar in regulatory 
outcome (the limiting of the use of harmful substances), and while both may be 
initiated by a Member State or the Commission via the preparation of a dossier of 
information, the scope, operation and consequences of the two processes are very 
different.
3
 While both are 'thin' in detail under REACH, each process is 
underpinned by detailed regulatory advice. ECHA has produced five guidance 
documents which directly relate to Authorisation and Restriction: (a) Guidance for 
the preparation of an Annex XV dossier on the identification of substances of very 
high concern;
4
 (b) Guidance for the preparation of an Annex XV dossier for 
Restrictions;
5
 (c) Guidance on the preparation of an application for Authorisation;
6
 
(d) Guidance on the preparation of socio-economic analysis as part of an 
application for Authorisation;
7
 and (e) Guidance on Socio-Economic Analysis – 
Restrictions.
8
 Of these, three are principally aimed at Member States and the 
Commission,
9
 and two at industry/registrants.
10
 These five documents amount to 
800 pages or over 305,000 words of guidance from ECHA. They are dense and 
technical pieces of advice. It is worth noting here that there was formerly a sixth 
guidance document produced by ECHA in 2008, which detailed how chemicals 
became ‘substances of very high concern’ (a trigger for regulatory action, 
discussed below). This document was, however, withdrawn by ECHA and 
                                                        
3
 ECHA, ‘Workshop on the Candidate List and Authorisation as Risk Management Instruments’ 
(Workshop Proceedings, Helsinki, 21-22 January 2009) 28 
4
 ECHA, ‘Guidance for the preparation of an Annex XV dossier on the identification of substances 
of very high concern’ (Version 1, June 2007). See:  
<http://echa.europa.eu/documents/10162/13638/svhc_en.pdf> accessed 10 August 2014 
5
 ECHA, ‘Guidance for the preparation of an Annex XV dossier for restrictions’ (Version 1, June 
2007). See: <http://echa.europa.eu/documents/10162/13641/restriction_en.pdf> accessed 10 
August 2014 
6
 ECHA, ‘Guidance on the preparation of an application for authorisation’ (Version 1, January 
2011). See: <http://echa.europa.eu/documents/10162/13637/authorisation_application_en.pdf> 
accessed 10 August 2014 
7
 ECHA, ‘Guidance on the preparation of socio-economic analysis as part of an application for 
authorisation’ (Version 1, January 2011). See: 
<http://echa.europa.eu/documents/10162/13637/sea_authorisation_en.pdf> accessed 10 August 
2014 
8
 ECHA, ‘Guidance on Socio-Economic Analysis – Restrictions’ (Version 1, May 2008). See: 
<http://echa.europa.eu/documents/10162/13641/sea_restrictions_en.pdf> accessed 10 August 2014 
9
 (a), (b) and (e)  
10
 (c) and (d)  
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replaced with two ‘General Approach’ documents. 11  This withdrawal, and its 
consequences, are discussed later on in this Chapter. 
 
Despite this voluminous guidance, what is not at all clear is whether or how 
Authorisation and Restriction are meant to operate vis-à-vis each other. ECHA 
itself admits that, “whereas Authorisation and Restriction are the main processes 
under REACH to limit the use (and risks) from chemicals, the choice for either of 
the two is not always obvious but very important as it can have major 
consequences.” 12  This is important because, as the Commission notes, “the 
decision to start one of the processes may limit the use of the other process for the 
same substance in the future.”13 The tensions between these two processes are 
further discussed later on in this Chapter. We begin by looking Authorisation and 
the concept of a 'substance of very high concern'. 
 
Authorisation 
 
Authorisation is somewhat a misleading name, implying abstract regulatory 
approval. Given the purpose and ambit of the relevant provisions, the process of 
Authorisation under REACH would perhaps have been better, although more 
verbosely, named 'substance bans with limited opportunity for consent of certain 
specified uses for certain specified short periods of time.' Authorisation seeks to 
identify the most harmful chemicals on the EU market in order to ban them, either 
in full or in particular circumstances, with the possibility of private sector 
applications for authorised uses of the substances so banned.  Article 55 of 
REACH details that the (ambitious) aim of Authorisation is,  
 “… to ensure the good functioning of the internal market while 
assuring that the risks from substances of very high concern are 
properly controlled and that these substances are progressively replaced 
by suitable alternative substances or technologies where these are 
economically and technically viable.”  
 
This concept of substitution (the replacement of harmful substances with safer 
                                                        
11
 See: <http://echa.europa.eu/guidance-documents/guidance-on-reach> accessed 10 August 2014 
12
 ECHA, ‘Workshop on the Candidate List and Authorisation as Risk Management Instruments’ 
(Workshop Proceedings, Helsinki, 21-22 January 2009) 6 
13
 ibid, 28 
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alternatives) is a key part of REACH, having been hard fought for during the 
negotiation of the Regulation.
14
 It is discussed in more depth later on in this 
Chapter. 
 
The text of REACH sets out that there are several steps involved in the 
Authorisation process: the first is the identification of a “substance of very high 
concern” ("SVHC"); the second the creation of a Candidate List of SVHCs and 
prioritisation of substances from that list for regulatory action; and the third sees 
certain substances taken from the Candidate List and included in Annex XIV (the 
list of substances which may not be used in the Community save with specific 
authorisation). Once a substance is on the Annex XIV list, applications may be 
made for authorisation (that is, for specific uses of the substance to be permitted 
for a specific amount of time). Thereafter, authorisations will be granted or refused 
by the Commission. REACH sets out that certain substances are exempt from the 
Authorisation provisions. In addition, there are a number of situations in which, as 
provided by REACH, Annex XIV does not apply. These exemptions and 
exclusions, together with the various steps of the Authorisation process, are 
discussed in greater detail below.  
 
It is worth noting here that, under REACH, Authorisation is not linked to 
Registration. It is, therefore, not a pre-requisite that a substance which is singled 
out for the Authorisation process must have first been registered. Indeed, there is 
no tonnage limit trigger for Authorisation (as there is for Registration). What this 
means then is that any substance on the EU market, whether or not it is caught 
within REACH’s Registration requirements, may be banned or have its uses 
limited. This has been of particular interest in the context of nanosubstances 
(where low production volumes mean there is likely to be little regulatory action 
under REACH via registration obligations).
15
  
 
 
 
                                                        
14
 See Chapter 4 for a review of the history of REACH and associated literature.  
15
 For an overview, see: Robert G Lee and Steven Vaughan, ‘REACHing Down: Nanomaterials 
and Chemical Safety in the EU’ (2010) 2(2) Journal of Law, Innovation and Technology 193 
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SVHCs 
 
As detailed above, the first step in the Authorisation process is the identification of 
a SVHC. Article 57 lays down broad guidelines for the substances which may be 
considered as SVHCs. These guidelines include the following three categories of 
substance: 
“Those meeting the criteria for classification as carcinogenic category 
1A or 1B, mutagenic 1A or 1B, or toxic for reproduction category 1A 
or 1B in accordance with Annex I to the CLP Regulation;
16
 or 
 
Substances which are persistent, bioaccumulative and toxic (or very 
persistent and very bioaccumulative) in accordance with the criteria 
set out in Annex XIII of REACH; or 
 
Substances (such as those having endocrine disrupting properties or 
those having persistent, bioaccumulative and toxic properties or very 
persistent and very bioaccumulative properties) which do not fulfill 
the criteria of the first two broad categories, but for which there is, 
“scientific evidence of probable serious effects to human health or the 
environment which give rise to an equivalent level of concern.”17 Such 
“other” substances will be identified on a case-by-case basis in 
accordance with a procedure set out in Article 59.” 
 
What should be apparent from the above is that not every harmful substance will 
be capable of classification as a SVHC. This is for two reasons: the first is that the 
categories of SVHC are somewhat fixed and limited by Article 57 (there being no 
apparent regulatory appetite thus far to use the catch all “equivalent level of 
concern” limb of the provision); and the second is that REACH seeks only to 
regulate those harmful substances with the most serious effects.  
 
On a practical level, the first step in the identification of a SVHC is the preparation 
of a dossier of information (the ‘Annex XV dossier’) by a Member State or by 
ECHA, the latter acting following a request from the Commission.
18
 In this 
dossier, the proposer needs to argue why a substance has properties of very high 
concern. Once the dossier is received by ECHA (or generated by the Agency 
itself) there is then a period of consultation, both with the public and with Member 
                                                        
16
 Council Regulation (EC) 1272/2008 on classification, labeling and packaging of substances and 
mixtures [2008] OJ L 353 
17
 Article 57(f) 
18
 Article 59(2) and (3) 
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States.
19
 If no comments are made during the consultation process, ECHA will 
then include the SVHC on the Candidate List (on which, see the section below).
20
 
If there are comments, these are referred to the Member State Committee of 
ECHA for review (following which, the substance may be included on the 
Candidate List).
21
 
 
The preparation of the Annex XV dossier for a SVHC is akin to the process in 
preparing a Registration dossier: namely, the collection of available data, the 
review and evaluation of that data, consideration of the need for new testing and, 
where appropriate, the execution of that new testing and its subsequent 
evaluation.
22
 This is set out in detail in ECHA’s Guidance for the Preparation of an 
Annex XV Dossier on the Identification of Substances of Very High Concern 
(hereafter, the ‘Annex XV Dossier Guidance’). Given that one of the reasons for 
REACH was the putting of the onus for chemical risk assessment onto the private 
sector from the State, it is interesting how the Authorisation (and Restriction) 
processes retain the pre-REACH status quo. It is also interesting to note that while 
consultation (of consumers, industry etc.) is required once a dossier has been 
finalised,
23
 and there is then need for a decision on whether the substance goes 
onto become subject to Authorisation, Annex XV of REACH places no obligation 
on Member States (or ECHA, as appropriate) to consult during the preparation of 
the dossier (which would seem like a useful and practical step in data collection, if 
nothing else). However, the Annex XV Dossier Guidance sets out that,  
“Although Annex XV includes no specific requirement for Authorities 
to engage in consultation, stakeholder involvement in the process is 
important. Consultation of industry and other stakeholders may be an 
important way for the Authority to obtain additional information 
although stakeholders have no legal obligation to provide information 
on the basis of informal consultation during the development of an 
Annex XV dossier.”24 
 
This is a good example of the Agency shaping behavior (in this instance, of itself 
and Member States) where the text of REACH is silent on something that seems to 
                                                        
19
 Article 59(4) 
20
 Article 59(6) 
21
 Article 59(7)-(9) 
22
 ECHA (n 4) 13ff 
23
 Article 59(4) 
24
 ECHA (n 4) 15 
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make common sense and is in the public interest. This is not an amplification of 
what is in the Regulation, but an additional (if softly phrased) requirement. As 
such, it is another example of the extrapolation function of ECHA’s guidance. 
 
Under the text of REACH and the Annex XV Dossier Guidance produced by 
ECHA, Member States and the Commission have complete discretion in the 
selection of potential SVHCs for which an Annex XV dossier will be produced. 
Importantly, REACH does not place any obligations whatsoever on Member 
States or the Commission to actively identify SVHCs and refer them to ECHA for 
consideration. As a consequence, any given Member State would be perfectly at 
liberty to never put forward an Annex XV dossier. Such inaction, while not 
impossible, would seem politically more difficult for the Commission. 
 
In terms of where the information for an Annex XV dossier will come from, while 
it may appear, as drafted in REACH and discussed above, that the onus for 
preparing an Annex XV dossier rests with Member States (and occasionally 
ECHA), the guidance produced by the Agency suggests that such dossiers will 
build upon data sets generated by the private sector as a consequence of REACH: 
“The normal procedure during the initial development of the Annex 
XV dossier would be that the readily available sources such as 
registration dossiers and results from previous evaluation(s) are 
obtained and reviewed.”25  
 
In many ways, this makes perfect sense. If a previous or current legal regime has 
already made a determination that a substance is of very high concern, there 
should be no need for a Member State to replicate this work. For example, the 
CLP Regulation lists the classification of certain substances. Here, for a substance 
which has been already classified and listed under that Regulation as a CMR, all a 
Member State may need to do is refer to such classification in the preparation of 
its Annex XV SVHC dossier.
26
  
 
However, in other instances, expecting Member States to rely on (or, indeed, wait 
for) substance data they have not themselves created may be problematic. For 
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 Articles 59(2) and (3) of REACH states that SVHC dossiers, “…may be limited, if appropriate, 
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example, a substance may be exempt from Registration under REACH or the date 
for registration of a given substance may not be until 2018 (which would leave a 
Member State with years of inaction). It might also be the case that a substance of 
concern to a Member State is only produced in quantities lower than ten tonnes per 
year. Here, the registrant of that substance will not need to produce a Chemical 
Safety Report. However, CSR-like data (namely, relating to exposure and use 
risks) is needed for the Annex XV SVHC dossier (no matter what the production 
volume of the chemical concerned). ECHA’s advice is also somewhat contrary in 
promoting the use of Registration dossiers for the purposes of SVHC identification 
when Authorisation is supposed to operate in respect of any substance, whether or 
not it has been registered and whether or not it is produced above the tonnage 
threshold at which Registration obligations kick in. Thus, for example, it is 
unlikely that many nanosubstances will be registered under REACH and, as a 
consequence, unlikely that Member States will target them for Authorisation (as 
the burden of producing all of the relevant data for the Annex XV dossier would 
be too great). 
 
The other key problem with the Annex XV Dossier Guidance is that it assumes 
active review of Registration dossiers by Member State competent authorities. 
There is no evidence to suggest that this is, as a matter of fact, the case. Without 
wishing to belabour the point any further, the lack of any obligation on registrants 
to notify ECHA (or anyone else) that their registration dossier contains data 
suggesting the to-be registered substance is potentially a SVHC is a serious flaw. 
 
As a final point in this area, the technical difficulty in having Member States and 
ECHA identify CMR substances and substances with PBT or vPvB properties may 
not be particularly great (whether they have the appetite to do so is another 
matter). However, as noted above, Article 57(f) also details that so-called “other” 
substances may be SVHCs where they give rise to an “equivalent level of 
concern”. ECHA, in its guidance, does not specify criteria for when a substance 
will be of equivalent concern and acknowledges that “…science in this area is 
constantly developing.” 27  At the same time, in the first official report on the 
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operation of REACH, ECHA comment that while the identification of mono 
constituent substances as SVHCs is “fairly straight forward”, there is greater 
difficulty when it comes to multi-constituent substances or substances of unknown 
or variable composition or of biological origin (UVCBs).
28
 These are two 
examples of where our materials science is lagging behind our regulatory 
ambitions (much like with REACH and nanomaterials). As a consequence, due to 
these issues in the practical identification of SVHCs and the preparation of Annex 
XV SVHC dossiers, the ability of the REACH authorisation process to lead to 
effective and robust chemical risk management may be (for the time being) 
limited.  
 
The Annex XV Dossier Guidance, addressed to Member States, is 58 pages long. 
Created in June 2007, it is one of a small number of ECHA guidance documents 
produced in the early years of the Agency not to have been subsequently updated. 
Its specificity, density and length also stand in very much stark contrast to the very 
detailed, very technical and very long guidance given to registrants on the 
information required in their registration dossiers (see Chapters 5 and 67).  
 
The Candidate List 
 
Article 57 does not say that every SVHC will be included in Annex XIV (and thus 
banned save where specifically authorised), only that such substances “may” be so 
included. From the SVHCs for which ECHA has received (or generated) Annex 
XV dossiers, a number of these will be prioritised by ECHA and put onto a 
“Candidate List” (i.e. a list of substances which are potential candidates for 
banning and thereby subject to the REACH authorisation procedures).
29
 There is a 
three month consultation window on all SVHC dossiers, after which ECHA 
prepares a recommendation for the Commission as to which of the substances 
should be prioritised for inclusion into Annex XIV. Recital 78 to REACH details 
that:  
"The Agency should provide advice on the prioritisation of substances 
to be made subject to the authorisation procedure, to ensure that 
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decisions reflect the needs of society as well as scientific knowledge 
and developments".  
 
This language (on Candidate List decisions reflecting the needs of society) is 
somewhat odd and vague and does not appear anywhere else in the text of the 
Regulation.  
 
In its Annex XV Dossier Guidance, ECHA comments that prioritisation of SVHCs 
for regulatory control is important because: 
“As the number of substances with identified properties of very high 
concern is expected to be relatively high, it is necessary to prioritise 
the progressive inclusion of identified substances into the system.”30  
 
This "high" volume of SVHCs put forward for consideration has not materialised. 
As of 10 August 2014, 155 substances have been put on the Candidate List,
31
 from 
165 dossiers submitted by Member States and ECHA.
32
 Given that the 
Commission estimates that there are 3,000 SVHCs on the market and that REACH 
entered into force in June 2007, this is slow progress. Equally slow is the process 
of prioritisation of substances from the Candidate List for Authorisation. As of 6 
February 2014 (the date of the last set of prioritisations), five sets of substances 
had been prioritised by ECHA for inclusion in the Authorisation List: the first set 
(of seven substances) in June 2009; the second (of eight substances) in December 
2010; the third set (of 13 substances) in December 2011; the fourth set (of ten 
substances) in January 2013; and the fifth set (of five substances) in February 
2014.
33
 Article 56(3) details that ECHA should put forward substances to the 
Commission for consideration for inclusion in Annex XIV at least every two 
years. 
 
Perhaps one of the reasons for the piecemeal and slow progress to date lies in the 
fact that there are no time periods set out in REACH (or ECHA guidance) as to 
when substances should be added to the Candidate List or recommended for 
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Annex XIV inclusion. Somewhat unsurprisingly, there has been much criticism of 
the pace at which substances have been added to the Candidate List. In its review 
of the operation of REACH, ECHA comments that this process, “is now [June 
2011] proceeding relatively smoothly according to agreed procedures after a 
somewhat slow start.”34 Despite this, the Chair of the Environment Committee of 
the European Parliament says that there are, “…around 500 substances that clearly 
meet the criteria of a substance of very high concern” and has berated the lack of 
slow progress by ECHA and Member States.
35
 Early in 2010, the European 
Commissioners for DG Environment and DG Enterprise (Janez Potočnik and 
Antonio Tajani, respectively) secured the commitment from ECHA for a 
“roadmap” to put 136 SVHCs onto the Candidate List by 2012.36 ECHA in turn 
wrote to Member States asking for their commitment to this target.
37
  
 
There are two points worth making here. The first is that the ‘roadmap’ target was 
ambitious and arbitrary. The second is that there have been very disparate efforts 
between Member States when it comes to preparing Annex XV dossiers on 
SVHCs. Table 7.1 below has been compiled from information on the ECHA 
website.
38
 What is striking is: (a) the fact that only 12 of the 28 EU Member States 
have put forward dossiers for consideration; and (b) the difference in volume of 
dossiers produced by ECHA and Germany compared to the other proposers. As 
regards relative strength within the EU chemicals sector, Germany is the largest 
chemicals producer in Europe, followed by France, Netherlands and Italy.
39
 In 
2011, these four countries together generated 64.4% of EU chemicals sales, valued 
at €347.2 billion. 40  Such might explain then why Germany and France have 
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submitted so many dossiers, but it does not explain the lack of dossiers put 
forward by Italy or the large number submitted by Austria, Sweden and Norway. 
 
Table 7.1: Annex XV Dossiers 
 Proposer  Number of Dossiers Submitted 
 ECHA/Commission  54 
 Germany  38 
 France  17 
 Netherlands  14 
 Austria  10 
 Sweden  10 
 Norway  7 
 Belgium  3 
 Denmark  3 
 Slovakia  2 
 UK  2 
 Poland  1 
 Spain  1 
 
 
While the SVHC 'roadmap' target was met, this was in large part down to the 
efforts of ECHA and not as a result of Member State activity. In its review of the 
operation of REACH, ECHA commented that, “MSCAs appear to suffer from a 
lack of resources for their [Candidate List] work and struggle with identification of 
suitable substances for further work.”41 Somewhat worryingly, the Agency also 
comments that, while (as set out above) in theory registration dossiers could be 
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used by ECHA or the MSCAs to provide the basis for the Annex XV dossiers, 
“the quality of information in these dossiers…is not necessarily sufficient to 
support the identification [of a SVHC]”42. Furthermore, “the data is not easy to 
screen in an automated manner.” 43  A second roadmap (known as the ‘2020 
Roadmap’) is currently being debated, which would see ‘all known SVHCs’ on the 
Candidate List by 2020.
44
 It does not appear as though a numerical target will be 
agreed. The draft 2020 Roadmap states that, “The Commission considers that no 
numerical goal should be identified in the Roadmap for the number of substances 
that will be included in the candidate list, as it cannot be pre-judged how many or 
which substances will be identified as relevant SVHCs.” 45  Exactly what this 
means is not entirely clear, but the draft does go on to give a ‘worst case 
estimation’ of an additional 440 substances being added to the Candidate List by 
2020.
46
 Arguably, these roadmaps are also soft law instruments and help to shape 
the day-to-day operation of one of the most important aspects of REACH (the 
removal of harmful substances from the market).  
 
The Annex XIV Authorisation List 
 
At the end of the SVHC prioritisation period (discussed above), there are three 
primary decisions to be taken by the Commission. These decisions were 
previously detailed in ECHA’s Guidance on the Inclusion of Substances in Annex 
XIV,
47
 but (as noted earlier in this Chapter) this guidance document has been 
withdrawn. 
 
Notwithstanding the removal of the guidance, the decisions to be taken by the 
Commission remain. The first is whether or not the prioritised SVHC will be 
subject to Authorisation under REACH. Here, different data is required at the 
different stages of the Authorisation process. For a chemical to go on the 
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Candidate List, what is relevant is data on the intrinsic properties of that chemical. 
For a chemical to go on the Authorisation List (i.e. for it to be banned), what is 
relevant is information on the uses of the chemical and what alternatives to that 
chemical exist.
48
  
 
The second of the three decisions to be taken, if the substance is to be subject to 
Authorisation, concerns which uses of the substance will not need authorisation 
(perhaps because other areas of EU law already regulate such uses). The third is 
the determination of the so-called “sunset date” (i.e. the final date on which the 
substance may be used for the particular uses without the need for authorisation). 
For the first seven substances recommended by ECHA for inclusion in Annex 
XIV, a sunset date of 18 months after “the relevant application date” (being the 
last date on which an application for authorisation could be received) was detailed 
for each.
49
 In practice, what this means is that it could be up to four years after the 
date on which a substance is added to the Annex XIV Authorisation List that its 
use in the EU market will no longer be permitted.
50
 This time lag is one of the key 
differences between the Authorisation and Restriction processes.  
 
As set out above, five sets of substances (43 in total) have been prioritised by 
ECHA for inclusion in the Authorisation List. Of these, 22 have been put by the 
Commission onto the List.
51
 Whereas ECHA submitted the first list of SVHCs it 
thought suitable for inclusion in the Annex XIV Authorisation List to the 
Commission in June 2009, it was not until February 2011 that the Commission 
made a decision on inclusion.
52
 It has been reported that this delay was due to 
disagreement over guidance to be produced on applications for authorisation (and 
in particular the obligation to provide a substitution plan.)
53
 Somewhat oddly, 
while REACH is prescriptive in other areas of the Authorisation process as regards 
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deadlines for regulatory action by EHCA and its various committees (on which, 
see below), there is no time frame given in the Regulation in which the 
Commission must (or should) take a decision following recommendations by 
ECHA on SVHCs suitable for authorisation.  
 
Applying for Authorisation 
 
Once a substance is included in the Authorisation List, there are two routes by 
which an application for authorisation can be made: the “adequate control route” 
and the “socio economic route”.54 With the former, if an applicant can demonstrate 
adequate control of risks arising from the use of the substance on the Authorisation 
List, he may be granted an authorisation if: (a) there are no alternatives to that 
substance; or (b) there are alternatives and the applicant is going to provide a 
substitution plan for these (in which case the authorisation operates until the 
alternative substance can be put into use).
55
 In this context, adequate control 
means that a threshold (i.e. a theoretically safe exposure level) can be established 
and the applicant is able to demonstrate, through exposure scenarios, that the 
relevant risks are below that threshold.
56
  
 
Where the “adequate control route” is not available (because adequate control 
cannot be demonstrated), an applicant will only be granted an authorisation via the 
“socio economic route”. Here, the applicant must demonstrate that: (a) there are no 
alternatives to the substance for which the authorisation is sought; and (b) the 
socio economic benefits of the use of substance (for the uses for which the 
authorisation is sought) outweigh the risks to human health and the environment.
57
  
 
Applications for authorisation are made to ECHA and may be made by the 
manufacturer(s), importer(s) and/or downstream user(s) of the relevant 
substance.
58
 Applications may be made by one or several persons.
59
 REACH is 
somewhat limited on what is expected as regards the content of authorisation 
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application. Article 62(4) details that the application should include certain 
information, including the uses of the substance for which the application is 
sought, an analysis of alternatives and (where not submitted as part of registration) 
a chemical safety report for that substance. Article 62(4) amounts to a mere 184 
words and, unlike elsewhere in REACH, there is no linked Annex to the 
Regulation specifying the application content in further detail. Instead, applicants 
wishing specifics on the authorisation application must look to guidance produced 
by ECHA. Published in January 2011, the ‘Guidance on the preparation of an 
application for Authorisation’ (hereafter, the ‘Application Guidance’),60  is 125 
pages long and amounts to some 61,706 words. What is particularly interesting in 
the Application Guidance is the discussion on alternatives. As noted at the start of 
this Chapter, one of the fundamental aims of the authorisation process is the 
substitution of SVHCs detailed on the Authorisation List with suitable alternatives. 
The Application Guidance details that, “An alternative is a possible replacement 
for the Annex XIV [Authorisation List] substance. It should be able to replace the 
function that the Annex IV substance performs.”61 The concept of “function” is 
not defined in the Application Guidance and may lead to future issues. Take a 
hypothetical example: the (fictional) substance nanoweight is a metal at the 
nanoscale used to make tennis rackets. It has been chosen because it is ten times 
lighter than its non-nanoscale (fictional) counterpart racketite, but provides equal 
strength and durability. However, nanoweight is found to be carcinogenic and a 
SVHC. Here, it could be easily argued that one should replace nanoweight with 
racketite, that the function of nanoweight is to give the tennis racket its shape and 
form and that racketite can perform an equivalent function just as well. It could 
also be argued that the benefits gained from using nanoweight (i.e. ten times 
lighter than racketite) are simply due to the properties of nanoweight and not to the 
function it serves. Article 60(5) sets out that, when assessing alternatives as part of 
the authorisation application, all “relevant aspects shall be taken into account by 
the Commission”, including whether the transfer to the alternative would result in 
“reduced overall risks to human health and the environment” and the “technical 
and economic feasibility of alternatives”.  
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Article 62(5)(a) of REACH details that the application for authorisation, “may 
include…a socio economic analysis conducted in accordance with Annex XVI”. 
This permissive (rather than obligative) language is somewhat odd, given that one 
of the authorisation application routes (detailed above) is that the socio economic 
benefits of the substance outweigh the relevant risks (for which it might be thought 
a SEA would be obligatory). Here, ECHA comment that, “In these cases [where 
applicants proceed with the “socio economic route” for authorisation], submission 
of an SEA [socio economic analysis] is, in practice, a compulsory part of an 
authorisation application. This is because presenting an SEA with the application 
is the only way for the applicant to demonstrate that socio-economic benefits 
outweigh the risks.” 62  This, it is suggested, is an example of ECHA, in its 
guidance, translating the text of REACH to something which makes more real 
world sense than the Regulation as drafted. The language of the guidance in this 
respect makes important procedural demands not seen in the text of REACH. 
Some might argue that this is ECHA over stepping the limits of its authority. 
However, I would suggest that, in this instance, the particular drafting of Article 
62(5)(a) of REACH is wholly at odds with the wider purpose of the Regulation 
and so ECHA’s ‘translation’ of the legislation in its guidance is acceptable.  
 
If an applicant proceeds with the “adequate control route”, there is no obligation 
on him under REACH to provide a socio economic analysis (SEA). However, 
guidance from ECHA on SEA as part of authorisation applications (hereafter, the 
“SEA Authorisation Guidance”), 63  details that, “the [adequate control route] 
applicant is strongly advised to submit an SEA to support his [authorisation] 
application where he believes that socio-economic information is relevant.” 64 
While not amounting to a full requirement for SEA (due to the “belief” 
qualification), this language does go further than the text of REACH in the 
practical obligations placed on “adequate control route” applicants. It is worth 
noting that the SEA Authorisation Guidance aims to “describe good practice” 
(emphasis as in original).
65
 Describing this good practice takes up 238 pages and 
almost 100,000 words. What is not at all clear is the legal status of ‘good practice’ 
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(particularly where, as here, the norms are so detailed and so prescriptive). This 
channeling of applicants to provide an SEA is more than amplification of the text 
of REACH and is another instance of ECHA effectively legislating to cover what 
may be perceived as gaps in the Regulation (i.e. another example of the 
extrapolation function) 
 
Committee Opinions and Decision Making 
 
Once an applicant has submitted an application for authorisation to ECHA, 
opinions on the application are given by ECHA’s Committees for Risk 
Assessment (“the RAC”) and Socio-economic Analysis (“the SEAC”) within ten 
months of the application submission date.
66
 Members of the RAC and the SEAC 
are appointed by ECHA’s Management Board from candidates put forward by 
Member States and are to have expertise in the relevant areas. For the current RAC 
members, this appears to be expertise in toxicology and for the current SEAC 
members, expertise in economics and impact assessment.
67
 
 
The RAC is obliged to provide an assessment of the risks to human health and/or 
the environment arising from the use(s) of the substance, including the 
appropriateness and effectiveness of the risk management measures as described in 
the application and, if relevant, an assessment of the risks arising from possible 
alternatives.
68
 The SEAC is obliged to provide an assessment of “the socio-
economic factors,”69 and the availability, suitability and technical feasibility of 
alternatives associated with the use(s) of the substance as described in the 
application.
70
 These opinions, which must be prepared within ten months of 
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receipt by ECHA of the authorisation application,
71
 are on forwarded by ECHA to 
the applicant, the Commission and the Member States
72
.  
 
Whereas applications for authorisation are sent to ECHA and ECHA’s committees 
provide opinions on those applications, the Commission is the body with the 
power to grant authorisations.
73
 It is obliged to provide a draft decision on 
authorisation within three months of receipt of the RAC and SEAC opinions.
74
 
The final decision on whether or not to grant the authorisation is taken by the 
Commission via the ‘advisory procedure’ (in which the Commission is assisted by 
an advisory committee composed of representatives from the Member States.)
75
 
Any authorisation granted will be granted with conditions,
76
 and will be subject to 
review after a set amount of time.
77
 Importantly, Article 60(10) provides that, 
“Notwithstanding any conditions of an authorisation, the holder shall ensure that 
the exposure is reduced to as low a level as is technically and practically possible.”  
 
As of 17 September 2013, only 1 application for authorisation had been received 
by ECHA.
78
 By 8 July 2014 (the latest date on which statistics are available), this 
had grown to 13 applications.
79
 There are a number of possible reasons for this. 
One might simply be a lack of time and that authorisation applications are 
currently being prepared by the relevant party/parties but have not yet been 
submitted. This reason seems credible given substances were only added to the 
Authorisation List for the first time in February 2011.  However, another reason is 
that possible applicants have found alternatives to the SVHCs thus far identified 
and are, as a corollary, amending their production lines. A third is that the EU 
market for certain substances and products has contracted, as manufacturers and 
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importers abandon the practical application of identified SVHCs. Or, of course, it 
may be some combination of the three.  
 
 
 
 
Exemptions from Authorisation 
 
Once a substance is listed in Annex XIV and the ‘sunset date’ has passed, it cannot 
be used (on its own, in a preparation or incorporated into an article) by a 
manufacturer, importer or downstream user unless: (a) that use has been authorised 
(the discussion above); or (b) that use is exempt from authorization.
80
 However, 
substances on the Annex XIV authorisation list may still be used for scientific 
research and development or (in certain situations) product and process orientated 
research and development.
81
 As for exempt uses, inclusion of substances in Annex 
XIV does not apply to: 
(a) uses in plant protection products within the scope of Directive 
91/414/EEC; 
 
(b) uses in biocidal products within the scope of Directive 98/8/ EC; 
 
(c) use as motor fuels covered by Directive 98/70/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 1998 relating to the 
quality of petrol and diesel fuels; and 
 
(d) uses as fuel in mobile or fixed combustion plants of mineral oil 
products and use as fuels in closed systems.
82
  
 
The first three of these arguably exist because of overlapping protections in other 
areas of EU law, but the fourth is more curious and may have been the result of 
sectoral industry lobbying during the negotiations of REACH.  
 
In addition, Article 56(5) details that in the case of substances that are subject to 
authorisation only because they meet the criteria in Article 57(a), (b) or (c) (that is, 
CMRs) or because they are identified in accordance with Article 57(f) (the 
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equivalent concern provision) only because of hazards to human health, inclusion 
in the Annex XIV authorisation list does not apply to the following uses: 
(a) uses in cosmetic products within the scope of Directive 76/ 
768/EEC; 
 
(b) uses in food contact materials within the scope of Regulation (EC) 
No 1935/2004. 
 
The preceding discussion has reviewed the Authorisation process under REACH. 
The following discusses Restriction. As outlined in the introduction to this 
Chapter, these two processes are fundamentally similar (having identical common 
aims of chemical risk management via forms of substance bans) but operate quite 
differently on a practical level.  
 
Restriction 
 
ECHA comments that, “…restriction is designed as a “safety net” to manage risks 
that are not addressed by the other REACH processes.”83 The thinking (whatever 
the drafting of REACH and the opinions of the Member States, on which see 
below) is that Restriction will be a regulatory response of last resort for the most 
harmful of substances for which urgent action is necessary. The Restriction 
process under REACH takes the place of previous EU legislation on chemical risk 
management, and substances which were already banned (in full or in certain 
applications) under pre-REACH EU law
84
 (such as asbestos fibres, mercury, 
arsenic etc.) have been grandfathered into Annex XVII of REACH (the 
“Restriction List.”)85 In this context, it is worth replicating Recital 84 of REACH 
in full: 
“In order to accelerate the current system the restriction procedure 
should be restructured and Directive 76/769/EEC, which has been 
substantially amended and adapted several times, should be replaced. In 
the interests of clarity and as a starting point for this new accelerated 
restriction procedure, all the restrictions developed under that Directive 
should be incorporated into this Regulation. Where appropriate, the 
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application of Annex XVII of this Regulation should be facilitated by 
guidance developed by the Commission.” 
 
From this recital, two points are worth making. The first is that Restriction under 
REACH is supposed to be an ‘acceleration’ of previous approaches to substance 
bans. This seems somewhat at odds with Authorisation and the fact that, according 
to ECHA, “restrictions normally address concerns which are in one way or another 
exceptional.”86  The second is that Recital 84 contains one of the few explicit 
references in REACH to the production of specific guidance. Here, we are told 
that the Commission will develop guidance to ‘facilitate’ the application of the 
Restriction List. While there is guidance on Restriction (see below), this has come 
from ECHA and not the Commission (and it is not at all clear where or how the 
Commission delegated this guidance making power to the Agency.)  
 
In the context of how Restriction operates vis-à-vis authorisation, Article 3(31) of 
REACH details that Restriction means “any condition for or prohibition of the 
manufacture, use or placing on the market”. On this reading, one would be 
forgiven for confusing the Restriction process with the Authorisation process, as 
both seek to limit the ability to manufacture, use or place on the market certain 
chemical substances. At the same time, the text of the REACH does not 
differentiate particularly well between the two processes. Aside from Article 58, 
which details that certain substances which have been included in the Annex XIV 
Authorisation List should not then undergo Restriction, REACH is silent in this 
regard. Recital 80 to the Regulation details that: 
“The proper interaction between the provisions on authorisation and 
restriction should be ensured in order to preserve the efficient 
functioning of the internal market and the protection of human health, 
safety and the environment.”  
 
However, there is no guidance in the text as to what “proper interaction” may 
mean. Let us take one example. There are currently four phthalates on the 
Candidate List. However, there have been calls for six phthalates (including three 
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of those on the Candidate List) to be restricted under REACH.
87
 This dual 
approach seems a waste of regulatory resources.  
 
ECHA has acknowledged the issues with the interface between Authorisation and 
Restriction in their first official report on the operation of REACH. They comment 
that, while in certain circumstances, it would be possible to have both Restriction 
and Authorisation operating at the same time, “there may be reasons not to initiate 
the two procedures in parallel for the same substance, e.g. the effective use of 
resources in authorities and industry, legal clarity and predictability.”88 What is 
clear, at least from the recitals to REACH, is that the primary onus for the risk 
management of the most harmful chemicals in the EU is supposed to be on the 
private sector. As detailed above, Restriction under REACH is seen as the last 
resort. Here, Recital 86 details that:  
“It should be the responsibility of the manufacturer, importer and 
downstream user to identify the appropriate risk management measures 
needed to ensure a high level of protection for human health and the 
environment from the manufacturing, placing on the market or use of a 
substance on its own, in a preparation or in an article. However, where 
this is considered to be insufficient and where Community legislation is 
justified, appropriate restrictions should be laid down.”  
 
How and when a regulator would know that risk management by the private sector 
of the most harmful chemicals is “insufficient” is not set out. Having discussed 
background, the following sections set out the practical operation of restriction.  
 
Title VIII – How Restriction Works 
 
Title VIII of REACH contains the provisions relating to the restriction of 
substances. Article 67 details that those substances listed in the Annex XVII 
Restriction List cannot be manufactured, placed on the market or used unless they 
comply with the conditions of the relevant restriction. Using substances on the 
Restriction List in cosmetics or for scientific research and development is 
permitted, as is, in certain instances, using those substances for product and 
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process oriented research and development.
89
 Any decision to add a substance 
onto the Restriction List must, “take into account the socio-economic impact of the 
restriction, including the availability of alternatives.”90 
 
As with authorisation, the process by which a substance is added to the Restriction 
List is highly technical, as well as being somewhat protracted and tortuous.
91
 As 
with authorisation, the process begins with the preparation of a dossier (here, a 
‘restriction’ dossier that complies with the requirements of Annex XV of REACH 
– on which, see below). As with authorisation, the dossier is prepared either by 
ECHA (following a request by the Commission) or by a Member State.
92
 Article 
69(1) of REACH details that the Commission is obliged to request an Annex XV 
restriction dossier from ECHA where the Commission,  
“considers that the manufacture, placing on the market or use of a 
substance on its own, in a preparation or in an article poses a risk to 
human health or the environment that is not adequately controlled and 
needs to be addressed.” 
 
This wording in the Regulation is vague (especially in the context of ‘adequate 
control’) and leaves great discretion to the Commission. Similar wording appears 
in relation to the preparation of dossiers by Member States.
93
 What is noteworthy 
here is the lack of any reference to SVHCs. Unlike Authorisation, where the 
identification of a SVHC is a pre-requisite, the Restriction process under REACH 
in the context of dossier preparation simply refers (save for one isolated example 
below) to substances posing risks that are “not adequately controlled”. What this 
means then is that, in theory, Restriction under REACH could address a much 
wider range of harmful substances than under Authorisation.  
 
The only time at which the Restriction process set out in REACH does cross 
reference the notion of a SVHC is in Article 69(2), which grants ECHA the power 
to prepare a restriction dossier, of its own initiative, for SVHCs in articles which 
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are on the Authorisation List and for which the sunset date has expired (i.e. for 
SVHCs in articles which can no longer be manufactured or placed on the market 
without specific authorisation under REACH.)
94
 This is a much narrower power 
and sits somewhat oddly with the other Restriction provisions: (a) in that it is a 
power granted to ECHA alone to prepare a dossier (and not to the Member States); 
and (b) because of the reference to SVHCs.   
 
In order to prevent overlap and duplication of work, Member States are required to 
notify ECHA of their intentions to prepare an Annex XV dossier for a restriction.
95
 
ECHA is, in turn, obliged to maintain a public ‘registry of intentions’ which 
details the notifications it has received from the Member States.
96
 Where the 
Commission asks ECHA to prepare an Annex XV restriction dossier, and where 
this dossier details that, “Community wide action is necessary”, ECHA is obliged 
to suggest restrictions within 12 months of the initial request.
97
 Where the 
restriction dossier is to come from a Member State, that State has 12 months (from 
the date of notification of its intention to produce the dossier) to submit the dossier 
to ECHA.
98
  
 
RAC and SEAC Review of the Restriction Dossiers 
 
Following the preparation of the restriction dossier, the second step in the 
Restriction process involves the checking of the restriction dossier by the RAC 
and the SEAC. This is akin to the completeness check undertaken in Registration 
(that is, this check does not look to substance, but simply to form, the relevant 
question being: does the dossier comply with the requirements set out in Annex 
XV?)
99
 It is worth noting that this process of verification by the RAC and SEAC 
does not also occur with the Annex XV SVHC dossiers that are the first step in the 
Authorisation process. Restriction dossiers which pass the RAC/SEAC check are 
then published on ECHA’s website, after which follows a six month public 
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consultation on the contents of the dossier.
100
 Article 69(6) details that, as part of 
the consultation, interested parties can submit a, “a socio-economic analysis, or 
information which can contribute to one, of the suggested restrictions, examining 
the advantages and drawbacks of the proposed restrictions.”  
 
Within 9 months of the publication of the dossier on ECHA’s website, the RAC is 
obliged to provide an opinion on the dossier. Article 70 details that the opinion, 
“shall take account of the Member State dossier or of the dossier prepared by the 
Agency at the request of the Commission, and the views of interested parties 
[resulting from the public consultation]”. What this means as a matter of practice 
is that the RAC has three months following the end of the public consultation to 
consider the data generated by that consultation and feed that data in to the 
production of its opinion on the dossier. The text of REACH does not specify any 
obligation for a public consultation on the RAC opinion. Such, however, is 
required for the opinion produced by the Committee for Socio Economic Analysis 
(“SEAC”), which is required within 12 months of the publication of the dossier on 
the ECHA website.
101
 No reason is given, either in the text of REACH or in 
associated guidance, as to: (i) why the SEAC is given an extra three months for the 
preparation of its opinion (compared to that of the RAC); or (ii) why the SEAC 
opinion (and not the RAC opinion) is subject to public review. ECHA has called 
for these differences to be regularised.
102
  
 
Three months after the restriction dossier is published on the ECHA website, a 
rapporteur from each of the RAC and the SEAC meets with the party that 
submitted the dossier (that is, ECHA or the relevant Member State) to discuss the 
contents of the dossier.
103
 This meeting is not detailed in the text of REACH, but 
there are obvious practical benefits in the submitting party and the two committees 
meeting and sharing information. However, what this means is that for data 
submitted as part of the public consultation to be discussed during this meeting, 
that data needs to be submitted within the first three of the overall six month 
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consultation window. A previous iteration of the ECHA website contained the 
advice that, “it is highly recommended to give comments within the first three 
months of the consultation period.” The current website however, states, 
“The public consultation lasts for six months…Provide your 
comments within the first three months of the consultation period to 
ensure that your comments are taken into account when the 
rapporteurs of ECHA's Risk Assessment Committee (RAC) and the 
Committee for Socio-Economic Analysis (SEAC) meet three months 
after the publication of the proposal.”104 
 
While the practical benefits of this advice are obvious (and the Committees have 
little time in which to produce their reports), the exhortation from ECHA that the 
public provides their comments “within the first three months” goes against the 
text of Article 69(6) which very clearly states that, “The Agency shall invite 
[comments from] all interested parties to submit individually or jointly within 6 
months of the date of publication [of the dossier].” This, it is suggested, is a clear 
example of ECHA translating the text of REACH into something other.  
 
Once drafted, ECHA publishes the opinions from the RAC and SEAC on its 
website and on forwards them to the Commission for review.
105
 Following receipt 
of the RAC and SEAC opinions, if the Commission is of the view that, “there is an 
unacceptable risk to human health or the environment, arising from the 
manufacture, use or placing on the market of substances, which needs to be 
addressed on a Community-wide basis,”106 it has three months in which to prepare 
an amendment to Annex XVII: that is, three months to prepare a Commission 
regulation which would add the relevant substance to the Restriction List.
107
 This 
language of “unacceptable risks” in Article 68(1) is different to that in Article 69 
(which empowers the Commission to call for a restriction dossier). As set out 
above, in Article 69 the Commission is allowed to call for a dossier where the risk 
from the substance is “not adequately controlled and needs to be addressed”.  This 
mismatch in language is not discussed in guidance produced by ECHA on the 
restriction process (on which, see below).  
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The final decision on including the substance in the restriction dossier in the 
Restriction List is taken via the standard comitology procedure with scrutiny.
108
 In 
short, if the Council and the European Parliament do not oppose the suggested 
restriction, the Commission adopts it. Thereafter, the amendment to the Restriction 
List set out in Annex XVII is published in the Official Journal.  
 
 
The Restriction Dossier 
 
As detailed above, the Restriction process begins with the preparation of a dossier 
that complies with the requirements of Annex XV. However, the text of Annex 
XV setting out those requirements is both vague and limited. ECHA has called for 
“clarification” as regards the necessary information needed, particularly as regards 
the data required in the discussion of the cost of a restriction and other socio 
economic information.
109
 
 
In June 2007, ECHA issued guidance on the preparation of an Annex XV 
restriction dossier (hereafter, the “Restriction Dossier Guidance.”) 110  In it, the 
Agency comments that “Annex XV…lays down general principles for preparing 
dossiers to propose and justify restrictions.”111 Much of the Restriction Dossier 
Guidance is technical in nature, providing detail on the preparation and content of 
the restriction dossier. Compared to the text of REACH, the guidance is 
expansive: 130 pages and more than 40,000 words compared to the 5 pages and 
773 words of Annex XV.  
 
The Restriction Dossier Guidance details a list of non-exhaustive “triggers” which 
may prompt Member States to begin the process of creating a restriction dossier. 
These, it is submitted, perform an amplification function and expand on the bare 
bones of Annex XV. The triggers include, “substances having a wide range of uses 
associated with multiple exposures”, “substances which may be widely used by 
consumers in several applications and for which the conditions of safe use cannot 
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be ensured” and “where there are a number of available Chemical Safety Reports 
for one substance.”112 In addition, the guidance details that the restriction dossier 
process might be started by a Member State as a result of the REACH Evaluation 
process. However, as discussed in Chapter 6, Evaluation is very limited and is 
unlikely to lead to a large number of substances registered under REACH being 
reviewed. At the same time, Restriction, like Authorisation, is supposed to be 
independent of Registration under REACH. Despite this, in the Restriction Dossier 
Guidance, ECHA acknowledges that “The amount of information available to an 
Authority when beginning the preparation of an Annex XV dossier will, therefore, 
depend on the status of the substance in REACH [i.e. whether it has been 
registered or not], and this may have an influence on the development of the 
dossier.”113 
 
These example triggers (and the others set out in the guidance) are based in a good 
deal of presumption: presumption about the effective operation of the Evaluation 
process; presumption about proactive review by Member States of registration 
dossiers; and presumption about REACH enforcement mechanisms. The extent to 
which Member States will actively go looking for data on which to base a 
restriction dossier is questionable. As noted above, Restriction is a “safety net”, 
designed to address unacceptable risks. Given this, the fact that preparation of 
restriction dossiers is so dependent on registration timelines and on the imperfect 
information generated by the private sector via Registration is concerning. In 
particular, where a substance will not undergo Registration, Member States, 
ECHA and the Commission are likely to have a much more limited data set on 
which to draw. Take, for example, certain nanosubstances. As discussed above, it 
is unlikely that many of these will undergo registration and yet concerns exist 
about their impact on human health and the environment. A Member State 
thinking such substances might pose unacceptable risks on a Community wide 
basis would have a difficult time sourcing relevant literature on which to base a 
restriction dossier.
114
 We might then question the effectiveness of Restriction as a 
substance risk management process. Even though Restriction is possible for a 
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substance which has not undergone Registration, the likelihood this will be happen 
as a matter of practice seems small indeed given the practical difficulties in 
creating the relevant restriction dossier.  
 
Annex XV is silent on whether those preparing restriction dossiers should consult 
with those who might be affected. Despite this, the Restriction Dossier Guidance 
comments, that “stakeholder involvement in the [dossier preparation] process is 
important” and details that, “Authorities are encouraged to engage stakeholders 
and other interested parties in the development of the dossier as early in the 
process as possible.”115  Similar advice, it will be recalled, was also given by 
ECHA in the context of consultations on authorisation dossiers.   
 
Socio Economic Analysis 
 
There is no obligation under REACH on a party proposing a restriction to include 
a socio economic analysis (“SEA”) of that restriction.116 However, a SEA may be 
included in the restriction dossier. If it is so included, ECHA comment that the 
SEA would be, “used in the decision making process (by the SEA Committee and 
the European Commission) to assess the benefits and costs of the proposed 
restriction.”117 The information which a SEA might address (if it is included) is set 
out in Annex XVI of REACH. This Annex is one page long and made up of 476 
words. Annex XVI details that “The Agency shall prepare guidance for the 
preparation of SEAs.” This is one of the few specific instances in the text of 
REACH in which ECHA is mandated to produce guidance (rather than, as seen in 
the recitals to REACH, generic comments as to the utility of guidance). The 
guidance produced by ECHA, “Guidance on Socio Economic Analysis: 
Restrictions” (hereafter, the “SEA Restriction Guidance”), in May 2008 is 211 
pages long and contains just under 80,000 words. Unlike many of the other 
guidance documents produced by ECHA, the SEA Restriction Guidance has not 
been updated since its publication.  
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The SEA Restriction Guidance highlights that if Member States want ECHA’s 
Committees for Risk Assessment to SEA to act quickly in response to a 
Restriction proposal, then the Member State needs to submit “a good quality 
Annex XV dossier.”118  As noted above, a SEA in a restriction dossier is not 
necessary as REACH is drafted. However, the SEA Restriction Guidance 
comments, after stressing the tight deadlines in which the Commission needs to 
make a restriction decision and the need for the restriction dossier to contain 
sufficient information to give the Commission a basis to decide that restriction is 
appropriate, that, “although not compulsory, Member States or the Agency 
preparing a restriction proposal should seriously consider analysing the socio-
economic impacts to support the restriction proposal”119. Given this language, and 
the associated framing of the issue, it is suggested that the SEA Restriction 
Guidance makes the inclusion of a SEA in an Annex XV an absolute (practical if 
not legal) requirement if that dossier is to lead to a restriction. This is almost 
certainly the view held by Geert Dancet, ECHA’s Executive Director, who 
commented that, “socio-economic analysis is an integral part of the preparation of 
a restriction dossier.”120 This is another example of ECHA creating an effective 
obligation on Member States (and itself) where REACH is silent, and so is another 
example of extrapolation.  
 
The SEA Restriction Guidance details that there are five stages to the preparation 
of a SEA. These are, as one would expect, identical to the stages set out above in 
the SEA Authorisation Guidance. Hence, the first is to set out the aims of the SEA; 
the second to set the scope of the SEA; the third to identify and assess the impacts 
of a restriction; the fourth to interpret the data and draw conclusions; and the fifth 
to present the results of the SEA.
121
  
 
SEA appears an enormously difficult task. For the party proposing a restriction, 
ECHA details that they will, 
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“need to decide whether it is possible to draw a robust conclusion 
concerning the proposed restriction when assessing the net benefits to 
human health and the environment and the net costs to manufacturers, 
importers, downstream users, distributors, consumers and society as a 
whole.”122  
 
This seems an onerous task and a high benchmark, the practical consequence of 
which means that it is likely that few Member States will be confident enough to 
put forward an Annex XV restriction dossier. At the same time, however, ECHA 
also seems to suggest that it may not be possible to have an overly detailed SEA:  
“In general the Authority should seek to build as robust a case as 
possible, but as there are limited resources available to develop SEAs, 
the level of detail should be proportionate to the problem in hand.”123 
 
These tensions, the need for a robust SEA versus practical limitations on Member 
State resources, are apparent throughout the SEA Restriction Guidance. They do 
not sit well together and make the guidance appear, at times, dislocated. At a 
workshop organised by ECHA on SEA and held in Helsinki in October 2008 
(hereafter, the “SEA Workshop”), 124  one of the “main conclusions” was that, 
“SEAs will not be perfect. We will need to learn to live with imperfect 
information.”125  
 
Despite being 211 pages long, the SEA Restriction Guidance is strikingly vague in 
places. One might argue that such is appropriate, given that guidance should not 
usurp the role of the text of REACH. However, the SEA Restriction Guidance is a 
good illustration of where ECHA attempts to channel the behavior of those subject 
to REACH without sufficient specificity to make the guidance meaningful in any 
real way. Take, for example, the advice in relation to the identification and 
assessment of “social impacts” in a SEA: 
“Social impacts: These are all relevant impacts which may affect: 
workers, consumers, and the general public and which are not covered 
under health, environmental or economic impacts [which are 
themselves vague and lacking in detail] (e.g. employment, working 
                                                        
122
 ECHA (n 8) 32 
123
 ECHA (n 8) 44 
124
 With 100 participants from, among others, the RAC, SEAC, Member State Competent 
Authorities, European Commission, ECHA and the US Environmental Protection Agency. 
125
 ECHA (n 121) iv 
  
206 
 
conditions, job satisfaction, education of workers and social security). 
Impacts on certain social groups may need to be considered.”126 
 
While this inherent vagueness may be deliberate, and an attempt to give Member 
States flexibility in creating a SEA, it may lead to practical issues in the creation 
of the Annex XV restriction dossier. At other times, the guidance is strikingly 
detailed (for example, as regards the monetisation of human health impacts via 
“willingness to pay” values.)127 What is clear is that the SEA Restriction Guidance 
implicitly favours quantitative over qualitative assessment of impacts and is much 
more detailed when the assessment of impacts can be reduced to mathematical 
formulae.
128
 Interestingly, one of the “main conclusions” of the SEA Workshop 
goes completely against the tenor of the guidance in this regard: “In many 
occasions, well-prepared qualitative assessments may be the end result. A full-
blown quantitative assessment is unlikely to be prepared due to lack of 
information and data.”129 The tenor of the SEA Restriction Guidance in this regard 
provides a good example of ECHA’s advice determining a significant plank of the 
operational framework of REACH: in this instance, a seeming preference for 
quantitative over qualitative data.  
 
As well as having differing precision in the delineation of impacts, the SEA 
Restriction Guidance also creates a hierarchy as regards the materiality of different 
impacts: 
“The human health, environmental and economic impacts are often the 
most significant and therefore should be assessed first. Analysis of 
social and wider economic impacts should follow on…”130 
 
Nowhere is this hierarchy of significance to be found in the text of REACH. In 
particular, Annex XVI of the Regulation (“Socio Economic Analysis”) simply 
lists, without preference or rank, the types of impacts which might be included in a 
SEA. While the lack of ranking of impacts in the text of REACH may be a matter 
worthy of future reform (in that it would be useful to know which impacts should 
take preference over others), it is questionable whether ECHA has the right to be 
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so categorical in its SEA Restriction Guidance. This is another example of ECHA 
translating the text of REACH as it sees best. 
 
Restrictions to Date 
 
As of 18 September 2013, 20 substances have been put forward for consideration 
for restriction: two nominated by France (both in April 2010), five by Norway (in 
June 2010), five by Denmark (in April 2011 and January); two by ECHA (in June 
2010 and April 2012); five by Sweden (in August 2012, January 2013 and July 
2013); and one by the Netherlands (in August 2013).
131
 The nominee substances 
appear somewhat uncontroversial (in that they seem to be ‘known’ harmful 
chemicals) and include: dimethylfumarate (for which there is already a temporary 
ban in place);
132
 lead used in jewellery (due to children being poisoned via 
ingestion);
133
 phenylmercury compounds (which degrade and are highly toxic to 
humans, ecosystems and wildlife);
134
 and mercury used in measuring devices.
135
  
In terms of the quality of the restriction dossiers put forward for consideration, 
ECHA has commented that “The focus and details of restriction reports vary from 
case-to-case and it remains a challenge to prepare a high quality dossier which is 
proportionate to the case in question.”136  
 
Conclusions 
 
This Chapter has done two things. First, it has provided a critical review and 
comparison of the Authorisation and Restriction processes under REACH. Second, 
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it has considered how guidance produced by ECHA shapes the operation of these 
two processes.  
 
Authorisation and Restriction are highly technical and highly structured processes. 
They are, at the same time, both built on a number of assumptions and on the data 
which has been, and will be, generated via Registration. This is despite the fact 
that both Authorisation and Restriction are supposed to operate independently and 
irrespective of Registration. The two processes share the same regulatory goal: the 
inability to manufacture or place on the market a particular substance (either in full 
or in part). However, Authorisation is somewhat narrower than Restriction, as the 
former only applies to substances that are SVHCs. In addition, a number of uses 
(e.g. medicinal products, food) are specifically excluded from the Authorisation 
process, but which could be regulated under Restriction if the need arose.  
 
One key difference between the two processes is that applications can be made for 
specific, permitted uses of the regulated substance under Authorisation, which is 
not permitted under Restriction. However, with Restriction, it is possible for a 
Member State (or ECHA) to wrap a form of authorisation into the restriction by 
only restricting certain uses of the substance in certain contexts (and thereby 
implicitly authorising the use of the substance in all other contexts). The second 
key difference is that Restriction is, in theory, quicker and for substances of most 
concern. That being said, regulatory action to date under both Authorisation and 
Restriction has been slow. In their review of REACH, ECHA commented that 
restrictions are “relatively heavy to introduce” and there seems to be little appetite 
for wide scale activity by either the Agency or Member States.
137
 
 
This Chapter has highlighted a number of practical issues with the day-to-day 
workings of Authorisation and Restriction, including: the lack of clarity on the 
overlap between the two processes; the lack of obligations on registrants to 
actively highlight potential SVHCs to ECHA; the limited time which the RAC and 
SEAC have to make their decisions; and the limited resources which Member 
States have thus far brought to bear on targeting chemicals of concern.  
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The guidance produced by ECHA for Authorisation and Restriction is long, dense 
and highly technical, more so for Restriction than for Authorisation. Compared to 
the other aspects of REACH previously explored in this thesis, with ECHA’s 
guidance on Authorisation and Restriction we see many more clear examples of 
the Agency shaping the operation of the Regulation either: (a) in ways not 
foreseen or set out in REACH (the extrapolation function); or (b) in ways that are 
contrary to the legislation (the translation function). As regards the former, this 
Chapter has highlighted the following examples: 
 
(i) The advice that Member States engage in public consultation during 
the preparation of an SVHC dossier (where REACH is silent on 
consultation at this stage of the process); 
 
(ii) The creation of a hierarchy of human health, environmental and socio-
economic impacts as part of Socio Economic Analysis (where REACH 
has no such hierarchy); 
 
(iii) The favouring of quantitative over qualitative data for socio economic 
analysis (which is not set out in the Regulation); 
 
(iv) The detailing of triggers for Member State action to restrict substances 
(where REACH is silent on what may prompt regulatory action in this 
area); and 
 
(v) The (strong) suggestion that applicants for authorisation include a socio 
economic analysis even where they are seeking authorisation on the 
basis of ‘adequate control’ (and where REACH does not say that SEA 
is required). 
 
Such shaping and channeling by ECHA means that the Agency is itself creating 
significant planks in the practical operation and implementation framework of 
REACH. As regards direct contestation (the ‘translation’ function of ECHA’s 
guidance), the text of REACH is very clear that there should be a six month period 
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of public consultation on restriction dossiers.
138
 Despite this, ECHA is equally 
clear in its advice to the public that they should, “Provide [their] comments within 
the first three months of the consultation period to ensure that [their] comments are 
taken into account.”139 Looking back, this thesis has thus far explored the main 
processes under REACH: Registration; Evaluation; Authorisation; and Restriction. 
The Chapter which follows looks at the enforcement of the Regulation.  
                                                        
138
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CHAPTER 8 
 
THE ENFORCEMENT OF REACH 
 
 
As a Regulation, REACH is directly applicable in every Member State without the 
need for transposition into national law.
1
 However, the enforcement of REACH is 
a matter for individual Member States, who are required to “maintain a system of 
official controls and other activities as appropriate to the circumstances.”2 What 
this means, in practice, is that it is for individual Member States to set out 
provisions on the sanctions associated with the infringement of REACH (in their 
respective jurisdictions) in their national laws. Such penalties must be “effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive” and notification to the Commission of the national 
REACH enforcement regimes was required by 1 December 2008.
3
  
 
28 separate regimes for the enforcement of REACH across the EU could easily 
lead to claims of disproportionate or discriminatory impact. Given this, REACH 
does provide for some attempts at co-ordination (if not harmonisation) in this area 
at the EU level. This Chapter is concerned with the mechanics of REACH 
enforcement in the UK and with the inter-relationships between the REACH 
regulatory agencies in the UK inter se and with ECHA, in both cases as set out in 
the text of the Regulation as well as in associated guidance (here, by ECHA’s 
Enforcement Forum and by the UK’s Health and Safety Executive). As was noted 
in Chapter 3, the REACH enforcement regime in the UK has been chosen as the 
most appropriate focus for obvious reasons. This Chapter does not discuss the 
overlap of REACH enforcement issues with EU Regulation 765/08 on 
Accreditation and Market Surveillance, a matter of some concern for the Dutch 
Government.
4
 Instead, this Chapter begins with an overview of the attempts at EU 
                                                        
1
 Article 288 TFEU 
2
 Article 125, REACH. As in other Chapters, save as expressly stated otherwise, references in this 
Chapter to “Articles” and “Recitals” are references to Articles and Recitals of REACH.  
3
 Article 126. As at 1 December 2008, only 14 out of 27 Member States had notified the 
Commission of the national provisions for breach of REACH. By September 2009, it was reported 
that 4 Member States (Austria, Belgium, Italy and Portugal) had still not notified the Commission – 
see: <http://chemicalwatch.com/2659> accessed 10 August 2014 
4
 See: <http://chemicalwatch.com/2433> accessed 10 August 2014  
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REACH enforcement co-ordination before turning, in some detail, to the UK 
regime contained in the REACH Enforcement Regulations 2008.  
 
REACH Enforcement Co-Ordination at the EU Level 
 
At the EU level, a Forum for Exchange of Information on Enforcement 
(hereinafter, “the Forum") was established as part of ECHA, with the aim of 
coordinating a network of the Member States’ authorities responsible for REACH 
enforcement.
5
 The Forum has no enforcement powers itself and is not a regulatory 
body. Rather, it has a series of given tasks (as set out in Article 77(4) of REACH) 
of a more general nature, including spreading good practice, highlighting 
enforcement problems at Community level and proposing, coordinating and 
evaluating harmonised enforcement projects and joint inspections.
6
 It is worth 
noting that the language used in Article 77(4) refers to “good practice”, “working 
methods” and “coordination” but does not explicitly refer to ‘guidance’ (as 
happens elsewhere in the text of REACH). The need for such a Forum is put fairly 
clearly in Recital 105:  
“In the light of the increased responsibility of natural or legal persons 
for ensuring safe use of chemicals, enforcement needs to be 
strengthened. The Agency should therefore provide a Forum for 
Member States to exchange information on and to coordinate their 
activities related to the enforcement of chemicals legislation. The 
currently informal cooperation between Member States in this respect 
would benefit from a more formal framework.” 
 
What is not said in the text of REACH, but which is equally obvious, is that there 
must be fair and consistent enforcement of REACH across the 28 Member States. 
Without this, certain companies in certain Member States could be put at a 
significant competitive disadvantage.
7
 
 
Membership of the Forum is comprised of one representative per Member State 
(chosen “for their role and experience in enforcement of chemicals legislation”), 
                                                        
5
 Article 76(1). The Forum also has responsibility for co-ordinating the enforcement of the CLP 
Regulation. However, and as stated in Chapter 1, the CLP Regulation is outside the scope of this 
thesis.  
6
 Article 77(4)(a) and (b) 
7
 DEFRA, ‘Summary of responses to the consultation on REACH enforcement between 13 March 
to 4 June 2007’ (Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, August 2007) 
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with an additional 5 co-optees, who are invited to join the Forum to enable it to 
have a “broad range of relevant expertise among its members.”8 Forum members 
are appointed for a three year term. The current UK representative on the Forum is 
Mike Potts, Senior Scientific Officer within the REACH section of the UK Health 
and Safety Executive.
9
 Member State representatives in the Forum are required to 
ensure that there is “appropriate coordination” between the Forum and the 
REACH competent authorities in their respective States.
10
 Exactly what would 
count as “appropriate” co-ordination and what would fall outside this term is not 
given and is unclear. While it is intended that the Forum is to be supported, on a 
technical and scientific level, by resources in individual Member States,
11
 the 
Forum is allowed to seek external advice “on important questions of a general 
scientific or ethical nature.”12  Given the differences among Member States as 
regards their technical and scientific resources (and their appetite for REACH 
enforcement), it may be that certain States shoulder more responsibility for 
supporting the Forum than others.
13
  
 
In February 2009, the Forum adopted Rules of Procedure,
14
 which deal with 
internal mechanical matters including, but not limited to, the election of a Chair of 
the Forum, the allocation and casting of votes and the recording of meeting 
minutes. Of more importance is the Forum’s Work Programme, required under 
Article 2(4) of the Rules of Procedure. In creating a specific Work Programme 
(which is updated annually), the aim is to, “cover the tasks as described 
in…[REACH and the Forum’s Rules of Procedure]… structured into suitable 
work packages to be handled by working groups or otherwise, [while] also trying 
                                                        
8
 Article 86(1) 
9
 The role of the HSE in relation to REACH enforcement is discussed in more depth later on in this 
Chapter. A full CV of Mr Potts can be found here: 
<http://echa.europa.eu/documents/10162/13577/forum_mini_cv_potts_en.pdf> accessed 10 August 
2014  
10
 Article 86(2) 
11
 Here, the exact level of support is not specified in the text of the Regulation. Article 86(3) details 
that “Each Member State competent authority shall facilitate the activities of the Forum and its 
working groups” but the lack of specificity gives rise to the potential for disparate support across 
the EU.  
12
 Article 76(3) 
13
 The author is aware, from contacts in the chemicals sector, that the UK strongly pushed for the 
Forum and is taking the lead on many of the Forum’s initiatives.  
14
 See: <http://echa.europa.eu/documents/10162/13577/forum_procedures_rules_en.pdf> accessed 
10 August 2014  
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to avoid unnecessary overlap of work”.15 Interestingly, the first matter in the Work 
Programme for 2008–2010 is not, as might be have been thought, a common 
strategy for the enforcement of REACH, but rather the task of agreeing on a 
common format for the report that each Member State is required to submit every 
five years to the Commission (under Article 117) on the enforcement of 
REACH.
16
 Article 77(4) of REACH sets out 8 tasks for the Forum. These are not 
ranked and no guidance is given in the Regulation on whether one is more 
important than any other. Despite this, the Work Programme has priority settings, 
such that certain tasks (e.g. developing an electronic information exchange system) 
are less urgent than others (e.g. enforcement co-ordination projects).
17
 This is a 
clear example of ECHA (through its Enforcement Forum) translating the text of 
REACH into something not seen in the Regulation (here, take a list of non-
hierarchal tasks and putting them into priority ordering). Unlike other examples of 
‘translation’ seen in previous Chapters, however, in this instance the guidance 
comes not really from agents of the Agency but from Member States (via their 
nominees sitting on the Forum).  
 
The Work Programme also foresees the issuing of guidance by the Forum where 
this will allow it to, “document good practice.”18  When this guidance will be 
issued is another matter. In May 2008 the Forum decided that, “REACH 
enforcement guidance should be elaborated once enforcement experience is gained 
on specific areas, as a result of performing coordinated projects.”19 One piece of 
guidance has now been issued, on complaints handling under Article 33(2).
20
 This 
is a good example of the amplification of the text of REACH, in that it provides 
advice to registrants and Member State competent authorities but specifically 
states that there is no need for a “specific route” of complaints handling to be set 
out. The current Work Programme (2011-2013) details that other guidance is also 
                                                        
15
 ECHA, ‘Revised Work Programme 2011– 2013’ (2011) 4. See: 
<http://echa.europa.eu/documents/10162/13577/forum_work_programme_2011-2013_en.pdf> 
accessed 10 August 2014  
16
 This Work Programme was housed on ECHA’s website but is no longer publicly available in 
that space. Copies can, however, be requested from the Agency. 
17
 ECHA (n 15) 6-11 
18
 ECHA (n 15) 18 
19
 ECHA, ‘Forum Work Programme 2008 – 2010’ (2008) Section B.5  
20
 See: 
<http://echa.europa.eu/documents/10162/13577/guidance_for_handling_complaints_under_article3
3-2_en.pdf> accessed 10 August 2014  
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in preparation. However, while the Forum’s strategy to issue guidance following 
the results of enforcement coordination projects (discussed below) makes good 
common sense, for those who are subject to REACH in a number of EU 
jurisdictions ex post facto guidance (which could be useful for industry in 
producing a harmonised EU wide REACH compliance policy) is of more limited 
utility. 
 
From the point of view of the regulated, perhaps the most important aspect of an 
EU network on REACH enforcement would be some attempt at harmonisation of 
enforcement policies and approaches across the Member States. However, the 
Forum admits a certain amount of defeat on this point. In their paper on the 
“Strategies for Enforcement” of REACH, they comment that, 
“Since there is a big difference between Member States in the 
administrative systems, the type and scale of the industry concerned, 
the division of competencies and responsibilities of the enforcing 
authorities, etc., the elaboration of a single, detailed EU wide 
enforcement strategy….would not be practical.”21  
 
Instead, the Forum proposes that the “most efficient approach is to elaborate 
general minimum criteria on the policy, implementation, monitoring and review of 
the REACH enforcement strategies of the Member States.”22 The idea is that the 
Forum will create a general approach, with detailed strategy the purview of the 
relevant regulators in the Member States.  
 
The general approach advocated by the Forum in their “Strategies for 
Enforcement” paper details that the specific enforcement frameworks of each 
Member State should have five elements: (a) a definition of clear policy objectives 
and priorities; (b) the right organisational structure for the enforcement of 
REACH; (c) performing actual enforcement measures; (d) the auditing of progress 
via monitoring and measurement of the enforcement procedures; (e) the reviewing 
and updating of the enforcement strategy. One might question the utility of 
publishing (originally in March 2009) minimum criteria for REACH enforcement 
                                                        
21
 Forum, ‘Strategies for Enforcement’ (Adopted at the 9 meeting of the Forum on 1-3 March 2011 
and updated from March 2009) 4. See: 
<http://echa.europa.eu/documents/10162/13577/strategies_enforcement_reach_2011_en.pdf> 
accessed 10 August 2014  
22
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three months after the deadline by which Member States were required to notify 
the Commission of their national systems for REACH enforcement (December 
2008).
23
 One might also question the value (excluding any aspirational value) of a 
Forum which has no formal powers and no ability to compel a Member State to do 
any given thing. Any value in such an organisation will only be apparent where 
active steps are taken, in a timely fashion, to ensure harmonisation. Only time will 
tell, as enforcement of REACH is itself in its infancy. Despite these critiques, the 
“Strategies for Enforcement” paper, while not labelled ‘guidance’, does seem to be 
attempting to standardise the actions of Member State enforcement practices 
(albeit at a very high level).  
 
REACH-EN-FORCE-1, or REF-1, was the first coordinated REACH enforcement 
project initiated by the Forum. National REACH inspectors were to check whether 
companies had, where so required, submitted pre-registration and/or registration 
dossiers for phase-in substances. The final report on REF-1 was published in 
December 2011.
24
 REF-1 ran from May 2009 to April 2011 and comprised 
inspections of almost 2,400 companies in 26 Member States.
25
 REF-1 found 
higher than expected non-compliance with REACH and noted the need for 
particular help with SMEs.
26
 The final report also recommended the need for 
greater cooperation between Member State competent authorities, particularly 
when dealing with companies active in several Member States.
27
 It is not entirely 
clear what happens next, following the publication of the REF-1 final report. For 
example, the Forum’s ‘Strategies for Enforcement’ document has not been 
updated in light of the report, nor has the Forum produced guidance which builds 
on the recommendations set out in the report. The final report on a second Forum 
enforcement project, on downstream users (REACH-EN-FORCE-2, or REF-2), 
                                                        
23
 This issue of timeliness appears elsewhere in the work of the Forum. So, for example, a 
programme to “train the trainers” (i.e. to create a common understanding of REACH enforcement 
to be fed into the training of REACH inspectors in individual Member States, who would then go 
on to train others) did not commence until the start of 2010.  
24
 Forum, ‘Final Report on the First Coordinated REACH Enforcement Project on Registration, 
Pre-Registration and Safety Data Sheets’ (Helsinki, 31 December 2011). See: 
<http://echa.europa.eu/documents/10162/13577/forum_ref-1_consolidated_report.pdf> accessed 10 
August 2014  
25
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26
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was published in September 2013.
28
 Inspections of 1,181 downstream user 
companies were undertaken, amounting to checks on approximately 6,900 
substances, 4,500 mixtures and the evaluation of 4,500 SDSs.
29
 67% of those 
inspected were found to be non-compliant in some way with REACH.
30
 Despite 
this, some improvements since REF-1 were noted as regards the format and 
availability of SDSs.
31
  
 
Before turning to consider the role of ECHA in the context of REACH 
enforcement, it is perhaps worth noting that the Forum is not the sole enforcement 
network at the EU level with responsibility for chemicals legislation. While none 
of the following networks have any specific remit in relation to REACH, their 
work may impact on the work of the Forum and they are likely to be regulating (or 
acting in relation to the regulation of) the same businesses: 
 
 The CLEEN network (Chemical Legislation European Enforcement 
Network), which deals with other legislation on chemicals, such as 
classification and labeling or biocides;
32
  
 The SLIC–CHEMEX working group: the SLIC (Senior Labour Inspectors 
Committee), which deals with labour inspection in the field of health and 
safety at work and the CHEMEX Working Group, which has been 
established by SLIC to investigate the impact of REACH on labour 
inspectors; 
 The RoHS enforcement network deals with enforcement of the RoHS-
directive;
33
 
 The IMPEL (European Union Network for the Implementation and 
Enforcement of Environmental Law) Network, which deals with 
environmental legislation;
34
 and 
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 Forum, ‘Obligation of Downstream Users – Formulation of Mixtures’ (ECHA-13-R-08-EN, 
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 PEMSAC (Platform of European Market Surveillance Authorities for 
Cosmetics), which deals with cosmetic products.
35
 
 
ECHA and Enforcement 
 
Exactly what role ECHA has to play in the context of REACH enforcement is not 
clear. On its website, the Agency comments that,  
“ECHA has no enforcement responsibilities, since it is a Community-
level institution. However, ECHA does host the Forum for Exchange 
for Information on Enforcement (Forum).”36  
 
This perhaps belies the lack of clear lines in this area. While ECHA cannot levy 
sanctions on those subject to REACH, it does have some quasi enforcement-like 
powers: for example, it may call for more information in relation to a registration 
dossier or it may reject such a dossier because it does not comply with the relevant 
requirements under REACH. In their 2008-2010 Work Programme, the Forum 
commented that,  
“Under Article 126 of the REACH Regulation the responsibility for 
enforcement lies with the Member States. However, the boundaries and 
interactions between ECHA, [Competent Authority] and [Member 
State] enforcing authorities need to be clarified. Actions by different 
institutions in cases of, for example, violations of registration 
requirements need to be specified.”  
 
The wording of this section has changed in the current (2011-2013) Work 
Programme, which details that, 
“Under Article 126 of the REACH Regulation and Article 46 of the 
CLP Regulation the responsibility for enforcement lies with the 
Member States. However, the interlinks and interactions between 
ECHA, Member State competent authorities (MSCA) and Member 
State national enforcing authorities (NEAs) need to be clarified. This 
work is conducted liaising with CARACAL.”37 
 
The two key changes are: (a) a removal of the use of “boundaries”; and (b) the 
removal of specific reference to registrant violations. A guidance paper by the 
Forum on the areas of enforcement overlap between ECHA and bodies in the 
                                                        
35
 See: <http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/sectors/cosmetics/marketsurveillance/index_en.htm> 
accessed 10 August 2014   
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Member States was expected during the course of 2009. The 2011-2013 Work 
Programme promised the publication of “an inventory of communication cases 
and needs in enforcement of different obligations” before the end of 2012.38 This 
has not yet been published.  
 
Before turning to REACH enforcement in the UK, it is also worth stating the 
obvious: that the Commission has a limited role in REACH enforcement. It plays 
no role in the enforcement of REACH itself, but does have a role in enforcing 
compliance by the Member States with their obligations under REACH.
39
 As 
noted above, a number of States were late in creating national legislation covering 
the enforcement of REACH in their respective jurisdictions. It does not appear as 
if any subsequent enforcement action was taken by the Commission. On the 
Commission’s website, the only matter of any substance linked to the enforcement 
of REACH is a report prepared for the Commission on the penalties applicable, in 
the various Member States, for violations of REACH.
40
 The report detailed 
striking variations between Member States in the type (criminal, administrative 
etc) and extent of penalties (from EUR 50,000 to an unlimited fine).
41
 
 
The REACH Enforcement Regulations 2008 
 
There is little novelty in the national law introduced by the UK to provide for a 
system of penalties for the breach of certain of the provisions of REACH. The 
REACH Enforcement Regulations 2008 (hereafter, the “Enforcement 
Regulations”) came into force on 1 December 2008, following consultations in the 
Spring of 2007,
42
 and in the Summer of 2008.
43
 The following sections discuss the 
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39
 As the Guardian of the Treaties, the Commission has the option of commencing infringement 
proceedings under Article 258 TFEU whenever it considers that a Member State has breached 
Community law. 
40
 See: <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/chemicals/reach/enforcement_en.htm> accessed 10 
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 Milieu, ‘Report on penalties applicable for infringement of the provisions of the REACH 
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various regulators with obligations under the Enforcement Regulations, the 
structure of the Enforcement Regulations, enforcement activity to date followed by 
a few words on comparisons of the Enforcement Regulations with other REACH 
enforcement regulatory schemes across the EU. It is worth stating at the outset that 
there is no associated guidance to accompany the Enforcement Regulations, either 
by the Government (and on the DEFRA website) or by the HSE. This is striking, 
particularly when compared to the wealth of guidance produced by ECHA on 
REACH.  
 
The Regulators 
 
The Enforcement Regulations provide for a multi-agency approach to REACH 
enforcement, with certain overlapping areas of remit between the various 
regulators and a compulsory mandate of inter-agency co-operation and 
information sharing. It is not surprising that a multi-agency approach has been 
taken given the breadth of areas on which chemicals legislation touches. Here, the 
Strategies for Enforcement document produced by the Forum (discussed above) 
comments that,  
“Since [REACH] requires actions to control and manage different 
requirements in the area of environmental protection, occupational 
health and safety, consumer protection, customs and the protection of 
the public from environmental or work related hazards a number of 
different enforcing authorities are likely to be appointed.”44  
 
It is also worth noting that no new REACH enforcement body has been created. 
Rather, DEFRA was of the view, following their 2007 REACH enforcement 
consultation, that extending the ambit of regulatory responsibility of existing 
regulators was the preferred option. For them, such a new body was, “not 
necessary if the existing regulators can enforce REACH within the range of their 
current functions.”45 This may turn out to be a big ‘if’.  
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 See: 
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Under the Enforcement Regulations, there are 440 separate regulators, as follows: 
 the Health and Safety Executive (HSE);  
 the Health and Safety Executive for Northern Ireland (HSENI);  
 the Environment Agency (EA);  
 the Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA);  
 the Northern Ireland Environment Agency (NIEA)  
 the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC); and  
 434 local authorities (commonly known as ‘trading standards’). 46 
  
While, in itself, it is not particularly uncommon for the enforcement burden of 
environmental law in the UK to be shared between different authorities,
47
 this may 
cause certain issues. Two of the most obvious were put succinctly by the Forum in 
that, “Each authority is… likely to have different priorities and resources.”48 In 
addition, (and while not explicitly referred to in the Enforcement Regulations), 
two further regulatory bodies have roles to play in the enforcement of REACH, 
namely: HM Revenue and Customs (“HMRC”); and the Home Office, as regards 
the grant and terms of licences for scientific experiments using animals under the 
Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986. As for HMRC’s role, the HSE 
comments as follows: 
“HMRC will provide assistance to the named enforcing authorities by 
detaining goods at import, either when requested to do so or in the event that 
HMRC suspect that goods may be being imported which are in breach of 
REACH. HMRC can also share intelligence with, and assist criminal 
investigations by, the named enforcing authorities.”49 
 
Exactly what role customs bodies should have in relation to REACH is not clear 
(indeed, HMRC’s own website barely even mentions REACH, never mind any 
discussion on their role in REACH enforcement). In February 2009, it was 
reported that a shipment of chemicals from a company in the US was blocked 
from entering a port in Belgium as customs officials demanded evidence of 
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 For current lists, see: <http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/Dl1/Directories/Localcouncils/index.htm> 
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REACH pre-registration before entry.
50
 While the chemicals contained in the ship 
may (or may not) have been subject to pre-registration or registration, nowhere in 
REACH is there an obligation on a manufacturer, importer or Only Representative 
(or anyone else) to provide evidence of such. This notwithstanding, Regulation 
9(2) of the Enforcement Regulations grants the power to an officer of HMRC to, 
“detain, for not more than two working days, an article or substance which has 
been imported”. The grounds on which such detention may occur (for example, 
reasonable suspicion of non-compliance with a provision of REACH) are not set 
out in Regulation 9 and, thus, this may become an area of contention in the future 
between HMRC and importers. This ability to detain goods sits somewhat 
disjointedly with the comment by the Government, in the first REACH 
enforcement consultation paper, that, “It is not proposed to give HMRC a day to 
day inspection role for chemicals.”51 Exactly how and when goods have been, or 
will be, detained by HMRC under Regulation 9(2) is not known.   
 
The above describes what we may call the ‘formal’ REACH enforcement 
regulators. In addition, the Government sees a number of more ‘informal’ 
individuals and bodies having a role to play: 
“Enforcement will be risk based but will have a significant intelligence 
led component… A significant amount is likely to come from ‘whistle 
blowing’…Other groups such as environmental NGOs may also be 
monitoring the behaviour of companies they suspect of not complying 
with REACH.”52 
 
While the US has greater experience of NGOs as whistle blowers, watchdogs and 
private attorneys general, this is much more limited in the UK.
53
  
 
The Enforcement Regulations in Detail 
 
Under the Enforcement Regulations, the primary obligation is on enforcing 
authorities to enforce the “listed REACH provisions” for which they are 
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responsible.
54
 Schedule 1 to the Enforcement Regulations contains the “listed 
REACH provisions”. What these do is reference a provision of REACH and the 
corresponding regulator with responsibility for enforcement in four areas of the 
UK: England & Wales; Scotland; Northern Ireland; and in respect of Offshore 
Installations. So, for example, the enforcement of Article 5 of REACH (which, as 
the reader will recall from Chapter 3, prohibits placing chemicals on the market 
which are subject to REACH without prior registration) is undertaken in England 
& Wales by the HSE, in Scotland by the HSE, in Northern Ireland by HSENI and 
for offshore installations by the HSE and HSENI. For the majority of “listed 
REACH provisions”, the HSE is the sole regulator. However, certain matters in 
the same jurisdiction are the potential remit of two or three or four separate 
regulators. So, for example, someone manufacturing a substance subject to a 
REACH Restriction (as discussed in Chapters 3 and 7) in one of the unoccupied 
seminar rooms at Cardiff University (a breach of Article 67(1) of REACH) may 
well find themselves subject to investigation by the HSE, the EA and Cardiff 
Council (the latter acting in two capacities as responsible regulator for: (i) 
consumer safety; and (ii) health and safety).
55
 
 
It is worth noting that the “listed REACH provisions” are not exhaustive in the 
sense that they do not correspond to every obligation or requirement contained 
within the text of REACH. Only those provisions of REACH which the 
Government consider “appropriate to enforce in the UK to make REACH work” 
have been included.
 56
  For example, certain of those matters set out in REACH 
which concern interaction with ECHA have been left out. In this context, the 
Government gave the following example: 
“[ECHA] will be responsible for issuing registrations…and if an 
applicant fails to comply with the requirements of applications for 
registration, the Agency may simply reject the application.” 
 
Although (as noted above), it is in no way clear exactly what responsibility ECHA 
has for REACH enforcement, this is not particularly contentious. However, certain 
                                                        
54
 Regulation 3(1) Hereafter, references to “Regulations”, “Parts” and “Schedules” are, save where 
explicitly stated otherwise, references to “Regulations”, “Parts” and “Schedules” contained within 
the Enforcement Regulations.  
55
 Schedule 1 
56
 DEFRA (n 43) 16 
  
224 
 
other REACH obligations have also not flowed down to become “listed REACH 
provisions”. Obligations in REACH to form a SIEF and to “make every effort” to 
reach agreement on matters relating to data generation cost sharing are not 
included as “listed REACH provisions”. 57 The reason given for this by DEFRA 
was that, “it would be impractical and inappropriate to resolve [such provisions] 
using criminal sanctions as they are matters for the civil law to resolve as and 
when appropriate.”58 This may be somewhat disappointing for those subject to 
REACH who may have neither the inclination, time or other resources to turn to 
the civil law for the resolution of REACH related disputes. The time factor is 
especially important as the text of REACH does not allow for late registration due 
to a delay caused by civil law proceedings in a Member Stated (or indeed, for any 
other reason). The other block of matters contained within REACH but not a 
“listed REACH provision” under the Enforcement Regulations relate to the use of 
animals in the generation of chemical testing data. As was set out in Chapter 3, 
REACH aims to reduce the number of animals used for testing purposes.
59
 
However, the Enforcement Regulations make no reference to the animal testing 
provisions of REACH as the Government is of the view that existing legislation 
and associated licensing regime (contained, as referenced above, in the Animals 
(Scientific Procedures) Act 1986) are sufficient.  
 
Enforcing authorities are mandated, under Regulation 4, to co-operate with each 
other, with ECHA and with REACH competent authorities in their own Member 
States and elsewhere “where [such co-operation] will facilitate compliance with, 
or the effective enforcement of, REACH in the European Union.” Exactly what 
would happen to an enforcing authority where such co-operation did not occur is 
not clear. At the same time, that whole notion of ‘co-operation’ is not defined. 
Regulation 4(2) does place an obligation on an enforcing authority to disclose 
information (to other national enforcers, ECHA and competent authorities) in 
certain circumstances, but, apart from this, no other explicit tasks of co-operation 
are enumerated.  
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Given the large number of regulators enforcing REACH in the UK and the 
potential for overlap in their remit and function (both, as noted above), the 
Enforcement Regulations provide for so-called “enforcement agreements.” 60 
While such are not obligatory, one enforcing authority may make an agreement 
with another enforcing authority to divide or allocate certain duties between them 
which they have in relation to the “listed REACH provisions.”61 This, in theory, 
should lead to an element of clarity as between regulators with overlapping 
functions and administrative convenience in the allocation of REACH 
enforcement obligations. The HSE comments that with these agreements, “…there 
is flexibility for the most appropriate enforcing authority to carry out enforcement 
in any particular case.”62 However, the fact that the “enforcement agreements” are 
not compulsory means that there could well be disparities across the UK (with 
some regulators entering into agreements and others choosing not to, for whatever 
reason). It is understood that, by the second half of 2013, no enforcement 
agreements had been entered into. In private correspondence with the author, the 
HSE commented that, 
“This is because in the vast majority of our cases there has been only a 
single enforcing body responsible for the enforcement of the specific 
duty under consideration. Occasionally, for example where a number 
of points of a supply chain have been out of compliance, (where HSE 
would be responsible for trade to trade supply and Local Authorities 
responsible for retail sale)  it has been agreed informally that a single 
body, normally HSE, will take the necessary action at the top of the 
chain.”63   
 
Parts 2 and 3 of Schedule 3 to the Enforcement Regulations could be considered a 
form of statutory enforcement agreement, in the sense that they set out whether the 
HSE or the health and safety team of a local authority has the obligation to enforce 
where there is a joint enforcement obligation. Such allocation of responsibility is 
said to flow from existing responsibilities on those bodies under pre-REACH 
health and safety law in the UK. If, for example, the HSE had prior responsibility 
for health and safety inspections at a given business, they tend to gain 
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responsibility for REACH enforcement for that business under Parts 2 and 3 of 
Schedule 3, even where a local authority may, under Schedule 1, have co-
responsibility. As with other areas of the Enforcement Regulations, Parts 2 and 3 
of Schedule 3 attempt to retain the status quo.  
 
In the context of inter-agency co-ordination, there is also a Memorandum of 
Understanding which, it is understood, sets out agreement between the various 
REACH enforcement bodies in the UK on matters such as co-operation, 
information exchange and business compliance. However, this Memorandum has 
not been made public.  The document was drawn up by the UK REACH 
Enforcement Liaison Group which, as the name suggests, contains members from 
the various REACH regulators and meets twice a year to discuss, among other 
matters, “grey areas” of emerging enforcement issues. 64  The minutes of the 
meetings of this group are publicly available online via the HSE website.
65
  
 
Interestingly, in the first consultation on REACH enforcement in the UK, the 
Government was keen to stress the lack of any substantial increase in regulatory 
burden for UK business flowing from the introduction of the Enforcement 
Regulations. They commented: 
“[The REACH enforcement regulators] already enforce similar matters 
with existing legislation and in so doing visit premises and request 
information. So far as possible, the enforcement of REACH will be 
carried out in conjunction with these other matters and therefore it is not 
intended that businesses will see any more site visits than they currently 
experience nor visits from different regulators than those they deal with 
now.”66 
 
As is evident in the detail of the Enforcement Regulations, discussed below, there 
appeared to be a strong desire on the part of the Government to retain the status 
quo. 
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Enforcement Powers 
 
The powers of the various REACH regulatory agencies are set out in Schedule 6 
of the Enforcement Regulations. The stated intention in the drafting of Schedule 6 
was to give the regulators powers which were as close as possible to their existing 
enforcement powers in other areas.
67
 Broadly, the powers relate to the entry of 
premises, the seizure of assets, the collection of information and samples and the 
service of various forms of notice. Schedule 6 is in four parts: Part 1 contains the 
powers for the environmental regulators (the EA, the SEA etc); Part 2 the 
enforcement powers for the health and safety regulators (HSE and local 
authorities); Part 3 the powers for trading standards (local authority consumer 
safety); and Part 4 for the Secretary of State. In setting out the enforcement powers 
for the four groups set out above, Schedule 6 highlights certain generic differences 
given to different regulators as regards the specific breadth and depth of their suite 
of enforcement powers. So, for example, while the Environment Agency is 
permitted to use force, where necessary in an emergency, to enter premises, the 
HSE is not.
68
 The EA must give seven days’ notice where entering residential 
premises.
69
 No such obligation rests on the HSE.  
 
Where and how the enforcement powers set out above would or could be exercised 
is not clear. For example, while the HSE has a dedicated REACH enforcement 
team, it is not known how local authorities are responding to their increased 
enforcement workload, how they are training their existing health and safety and 
consumer safety inspection teams, whether they have been given increased 
funding which corresponds to their increased enforcement role etc. While the 
enforcing authorities are placed under a duty to enforce,
70
 how this duty is 
exercised remains a matter for their own discretion. As the Government put it, the 
Enforcement Regulations, “…do not specify any particular level of activity for the 
enforcing authorities and this will depend on their enforcement programmes and 
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resources.”71 In this content, several concerns relating to the ability of the REACH 
enforcement regulators to exercise their enforcement powers (including regulator 
resources) were set out in the responses to the Government’s first consultation on 
REACH enforcement.
72
 Detailed empirical research would be needed to 
understand whether these concerns have, as a matter of fact, materialised. There is 
no associated guidance to accompany the Enforcement Regulations, either by the 
Government (and on the DEFRA website) or by the HSE. 
 
Penalties For Non-Compliance 
 
While there are a variety of possible offences under the Enforcement Regulations, 
the penalties for non-compliance are the same. Any person found guilty of an 
offence is liable: (a) on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding the statutory 
maximum (currently £5,000) or to imprisonment not exceeding three months, or 
both; or (b) on conviction on indictment, to an unlimited fine or to imprisonment 
not exceeding two years, or both.  In the UK the breach of REACH, via the 
Enforcement Regulations, is a criminal offence. While this is common for many 
breaches of environmental law in the UK, the same cannot be said for the majority 
of other Member States in the EU.  The nature of the penalties for breach of 
REACH under the Enforcement Regulations are similar to those for breaches of 
other areas of environmental law in the UK. This continues the theme with 
REACH enforcement in the UK of mapping the Enforcement Regulations onto an 
existing enforcement structure (i.e. no new regulator; no new penalties; and no 
new powers of enforcement). The reader will recall that the introduction to this 
Chapter set out that Article 126 of REACH required Member States to introduce 
national enforcement regimes which contained penalties for breach that are 
“effective, proportionate and dissuasive”. Interestingly, in the responses to the 
Government’s first consultation on REACH enforcement in the UK, half of those 
who responded thought that the above penalties were “effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive”; the other half did not.73  
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The primary offence under the Enforcement Regulations is for a person “to 
contravene a listed REACH provision or cause or permit another person to do 
so.”74 There are, in addition, other offences set out in Regulation 13, including 
obstructing the enforcing authorities and providing false or misleading 
information. The idea that permitting a breach of a listed REACH provision 
amounts to an offence under the Enforcement Regulations is worthy of some 
reflection. The offence of permitting another to breach a provision of law is seen 
elsewhere in UK environmental legislation,
75
 and usually connotes some power on 
the part of the ‘permitter’ to prevent or remedy the breach.76 Exactly how this 
would play out in relation to breaches of “listed REACH provisions” under the 
Enforcement Regulations is not clear. Could, for example, the parent company of a 
wholly owned subsidiary be liable for failure by that subsidiary to comply with its 
obligations under REACH?  
 
The only widespread defence under the Enforcement Regulations is to provide a 
“defence exemption certificate” made by the Secretary of State. 77  It is likely 
(although such is not stated) that this provision flows from the power contained in 
REACH for Member States to nominate certain substances as being exempt from 
the Regulation where it is necessary to exempt such substances in the interests of 
defence.
78
 The exemption under REACH is an exemption for a given substance. 
The “defence exemption certificate” under the Enforcement Regulations, however, 
occurs where the Secretary of State decides that “it is necessary in the interests of 
defence for a person to be exempt from compliance with a listed REACH 
provision”.79  Quite how an exemption for a given person from compliance with a 
listed REACH provision may be derived from the text of REACH is unclear. 
While it makes much greater practical sense for exemptions to be given to persons 
subject to REACH (who may manufacture or import substances which are used for 
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defence purposes) especially where such substances may be used, in addition, in a 
variety of non-defence related applications, this is not what the text of REACH 
says. This then raises an interesting question about transposition.  
 
In addition to the defence of having a “defence exemption certificate”, a person 
may plead “reasonable excuse” where charged with an offence of failure to 
comply, in various forms, with a regulator.
80
 There is also a defence of lawful 
disclosure in relation to the provision of certain information received from 
HMRC.
81
 However, aside from these three, there are no other statutory defences in 
relation to the Enforcement Regulation offences. This being said, the HSE 
comments that, “…enforcing authorities will usually take into account the efforts 
made by companies to comply when deciding what kind of enforcement action to 
take.”82  
 
As is common with modern environmental legislation, directors of companies (and 
certain other company ‘officers) may be liable as well as the body corporate where 
an offence is committed with their consent or connivance or can be attributed to 
their neglect.
83
 In addition, Regulation 20 provides that if an enforcing authority is 
of the opinion that proceedings against a person (natural or legal) for an offence 
would afford an ineffectual remedy against that person, the enforcing authority 
may take civil proceedings against that person for the purpose of seeking such 
remedy as the enforcing authority believes is appropriate in the circumstances. To 
date, no civil proceedings have been instituted.
84
 
 
Enforcement Activity to Date 
 
While the above has described the range of formal powers open to the REACH 
enforcement regulators in the UK and the associated penalties for breaches of any 
“listed REACH provision”, it was expected that a less formal approach would 
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initially be taken. In their first consultation paper on REACH enforcement in the 
UK, the Government commented that,  
“Initial enforcement action may be to advise businesses of their 
obligations and encourage compliance, followed if necessary by the 
use of enforcement notices. Prosecution would only be used as a last 
resort.”85  
 
To date, 57 improvement notices have been served by the HSE in respect of 
breaches of the Enforcement Regulations but there have, as yet, been no 
prosecutions.
86
 This is despite the hundreds of REACH related inspections 
conducted by the HSE as part of the REACH-EN-FORCE projects discussed 
above. As regards enforcement by the other REACH regulators, the HSE have 
commented that they, “are aware of two separate local authority prosecutions 
brought by their trading standards departments, concerning restricted substances 
being supplied to consumers.”87 
 
Conclusions 
 
What we see with the enforcement of REACH in the UK is layer upon layer of EU 
and national regulatory agencies and other bodies (such as the Forum) with 
varying (and at times overlapping) degrees of responsibility for the enforcement of 
REACH and mandates to co-operate and co-ordinate. At the EU level, the 
Commission, ECHA and the Forum each have roles to play. In the UK, over four 
hundred separate environmental, health & safety and consumer safety bodies at 
national and local levels make up the corpus of REACH enforcers. The reality, 
however, may well be that the only ‘real’ regulator in the UK is the HSE. 
Evidence to date suggests little enforcement activity in particular on the part of 
local authorities. The degrees of overlap (between the UK regulators inter se and 
between those regulators, ECHA and the Forum) and the allocation of 
enforcement responsibility for certain matters are, at times, less than clear. It is 
also in no way certain that any effective harmonisation of REACH enforcement 
across the EU will be achieved.  
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What is striking in this area is the lack of guidance. ECHA says almost nothing 
about enforcement, the Forum promises guidance but little has appeared to date 
and while the HSE provides ‘Bitesize Advice’ and highlights case studies, such go 
to compliance with REACH and there is no guidance whatsoever on the 
Enforcement Regulations. Even where the HSE does offer advice on REACH 
compliance, it primarily directs those with responsibilities under REACH back to 
ECHA and the ECHA guidance.
88
 As regards guidance on enforcement produced 
by ECHA’s Enforcement Forum, this Chapter has highlighted single instances of 
each of the amplification, standardisation and translation functions reviewed in 
earlier Chapters. In terms of amplification, the guidance by the Enforcement 
Forum on complaints handling under Article 33(2) is striking in that it offers 
advice, but specifically states that there is no need for a “specific route” of 
complaints handling to be set out. While registrants operating in multiple EU 
jurisdictions might have hoped for greater standardisation of enforcement 
legislation and enforcement practices, such does not exist. The sole exception is 
seen in the “Strategies for Enforcement” paper by the Enforcement Forum which 
sets out to achieve harmonisation of enforcement frameworks (but at only a very 
superficial level). In terms of translation, the text of REACH is clear that there is 
no hierarchy among the tasks for which ECHA’s Enforcement Forum is 
responsible. However, the Work Programme of the Forum is clear in prioritising 
various tasks over others.  
 
This Chapter and the three preceding Chapters of this thesis have set out, in some 
considerable depth, the key elements of REACH: the creation of data; the 
registration of that data with ECHA; data evaluation; chemical bans; and the 
enforcement of the Regulation. For each element, the accompanying guidance has 
also been reviewed and critique offered up on what function(s) such guidance 
serves. The following Chapter explores how thesis contributes to, and challenges, 
new governance scholarship. It also sets out, in detail, the differentiation that can 
be seen in soft law, highlighted through the documentary analyses in Chapters 5-8.  
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CHAPTER 9 
PLAYING HARD AND SOFT WITH LAW:  
REACH, NEW GOVERNANCE AND HYBRIDITY 
 
This thesis provides an exploratory, explanatory and normative account of modern 
EU chemicals regulation. It contributes to scholarship on new governance, 
particularly the subset of literature concerned with hard and soft law, in two key 
ways: (a) it provides detailed, thick, granular empirical data on hard and soft EU 
chemicals regulation, at a level previously unseen; and (b) it offers a rich case 
study on hybridity (for these purposes, the yoking of soft norms onto hard). As 
such, it gives a nuanced, robust, differentiated account of EU governance and 
amounts to the “careful delineation of variables and substantial empirical work” 
called for by Trubek and Trubek in this area.
1
 This thesis is the first account of 
REACH to fully explore relationships between the Regulation and its post 
legislative guidance, and how the latter interacts with the former. Guidance is not 
mentioned in the index to Drohmann and Townsend’s edited collection on 
REACH.
2
 It is discussed in under two pages in Bergkamp’s practitioner text,3 and, 
by her own admission, Korkea-aho opens only a “small window” into this area.4  
The remainder of this Chapter unfolds as follows. It beings by exploring in detail 
how this thesis contributes to new governance scholarship. It discusses how the 
work in this thesis challenges a number of assumptions in the new governance 
literature and how REACH is peculiar in a number of ways when compared with 
other new governance regimes. The Chapter then turns to consideration of how we 
can, using the data in this thesis, explore differentiation within soft law along a 
number of axes: authorship; formats; addresses; acceptance; functions; genesis; 
review; impact; and coverage. 
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Contributions of and to New Governance Scholarship 
New governance approaches, in the EU and elsewhere, have emerged as policy 
makers respond to changes in society, the economy (financial and political) and to 
innovations in public administration. De Burca has suggested that the rise of new 
governance systems can be seen as a response to two background conditions: the 
first is “the need to address complex policy problems which have not shown 
themselves readily amenable to resolution”; the second is the need to manage 
interdependence where divergent national regulatory regimes affect one another.
5
 
REACH is a strong example of the former; and less so of the latter (given the 
existence, pre-REACH, of EU chemicals control schemes, albeit not very effective 
ones).  
Scholarship on ‘new governance’ seeks to explore, understand and critique 
changes in EU governance as they move away from traditional, top-down, 
command and control modes of regulation (associated with the Community 
Method) and towards deliberative, diverse, flexible, decentralised, experimental, 
multi-level, reflexive and participatory forms of ordering.
6
 Or, as Armstrong 
frames it, this scholarship seeks to provide a legal response to the proliferation of 
modes of governance and to explain how these changes signal, “the decline of a 
traditional world of hierarchical governance.”7 As regards the latter, this thesis 
shows (discussed in detail below) how newer modes of governing, via post 
legislative soft norms, may simply be replicating that traditional world of 
hierarchy. Much of the work on new governance to date has consisted of mapping 
exercises using specific case studies, or (less empirically grounded) work charting 
the normative aspects of the new and emerging governance patterns.
8
 This thesis is 
another case study mapping project, but serves as justification for this approach 
and a challenge to those who avoid thick, granular work: it is the detailed mapping 
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of the contours of the operationalization of REACH that have highlighted nuances 
in, and challenges to, current understandings of EU governance. As de Burca has 
noted, “if we are to understand [new governance] change, there is no substitute for 
careful and thorough research.”9 
There has been a notable increase in the use of guidance in the EU, both generally 
and specifically in the context of EU environmental law. This, Scott observes, is a 
product of increasing legislative complexity and a marked reliance on broad and 
imprecisely defined framework norms.
10
 Post legislative guidance in the EU is a 
form of soft law (discussed in detail in Chapter 2), in that it is a governance 
arrangement that operates alongside or is blended with EU ‘hard law’ that comes 
from the treaties, regulations and directives and the Community Method.
11
 The 
work in this area splits primarily between those who observe this shift as an 
indicative development in the maturing EU legal landscape,
12
 and those who raise 
objections (as regards transparency, accountability and competence creep) to its 
use.
13
 This thesis, as set out in Chapter 10, aligns more with the former view than 
with the latter.  
There are two ironies at play here: first, new governance forms were said to 
emerge because of legitimacy concerns with the classic Community method, but 
these newer forms of governance themselves pose legitimacy challenges (which 
often replicate those seen before: participation; accountability; transparency etc);
14
 
and second, the EU has striven over time to become a valid legal order and, in 
many ways, to mirror the legal orders of its Member States – in using soft 
instruments (as have been previously, and still are, used in the Member States) the 
EU both matures as a legal order and makes the claim that that order is legitimate 
more fragile (due to the issues of legitimacy just discussed). Much of the early 
work in the new governance field is on contrasts: on setting out and exploring the 
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dichotomies between old and new governance, between hard and soft law. As 
such, new governance scholarship has been criticised for its ‘definition-by 
contrast’ approach and for idealising the ‘new’ over the ‘old’.15 This is in spite of 
the origins of this body of scholarship in offering up a critical review of the 
“normative qualities of different ‘old’ and ‘new’ forms of governance in the EU, 
and their compatibility with the principles of the rule of law and democracy.”16  
More recent scholarship, however, suggests that such a binary distinction does not 
account for variations in policy development, implementation, assessment and 
justiciability of various instruments.
17
 While dichotomies provide clear bright 
lines, and as such are attractive, there is a risk that these binary understandings 
“undersell and under-explain” changes that are occurring in the functions and 
definitions of law and governance.
18
 The exploration of REACH in this thesis 
suggests that a harder look at soft norms will help to show that the bright lines are 
not so bright. As Armstrong argues, and I would agree, differentiation in EU law is 
much more important as a site of study than scholarship that simply charts a shift 
from traditional towards newer forms of governance.
19
 He writes that the EU is a 
“striking illustration” of a phenomenon which sees,  
“pluralisation and differentiation in the techniques, tools and methods 
deployed by public and private actors in the search for more legitimate 
and/or more effective means of securing economic and social 
governance.”20  
This thesis has focused therefore upon the plural, differentiated hybrid of new 
governance and the Community Method. Here, we have an EU Regulation that 
contains both framework norms and detailed commands alongside a wealth of post 
legislative framing documents, in the shape of guidance. This is discussed in more 
depth below. This thesis moves the debate beyond the existing, somewhat blunt 
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typologies of soft norms that have compared ‘preparatory and informative 
instruments’ and ‘interpretative and decisional instruments’;21 or “soft regulatory 
rule-making” (involving para-law policy-steering instruments) with “soft 
administrative rule-making” (involving post-legislative guidance instruments).22 
The functions, formats and blends of post legislative norms offered up by this 
thesis are set out in detail below. 
 
The potential relationships between traditional and more experimental forms of 
governance are myriad: they may co-exist in parallel, run counter to each other, 
overlap or fuse, each to lesser or greater degrees and potentially also in 
combination.
23
  Trubek and Trubek argue that when new governance approaches 
are “yoked together in a hybrid form” with conventional forms of regulation, we 
see a “real transformation in the law”.24 These hybrids, they argue, represent a 
new form of law in which hard and soft norms are fused together and, as such, are 
“of special interest”.25 While these notions of ‘yoking’ and ‘fusing’ are interesting, 
and intellectually neat, what we see in REACH (as discussed below) is actually far 
more nuanced and far more complex than a simple join: without wishing to 
belabour to metaphor, what REACH shows are multiple yokes, with interesting 
variations and gaps in the seams, drawn together by a variety of threads. In the 
context of EU race discrimination law, de Burca writes of “different approaches 
yoked together in a single and increasingly integrated framework.” 26  With 
REACH, and as set out below, what we have is perhaps not just an hybrid hard 
law/soft law approach, but an hybrid regime (hard and soft, public and private, 
foreseen and not foreseen, multiple, and imperfect) for chemicals control. It is 
worth noting here that earlier notions of ‘hybridity’, including those by Trubek and 
Trubek and also de Burca and Scott, use a wider sense of the term ‘hybridity’ to 
refer to all situations in which hard and soft law complement each other, existing 
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in the same field to promote the same goals (without necessarily being fused, or 
“yoked”, together).27 This thesis is concerned with the situation when soft norms 
are yoked with hard legislation. Existing new governance literature focuses largely 
on researching and understanding soft law as something pre-legislative or extra-
legislative, with little attention to the role and functioning of yoked soft law as 
post-legislative.
28
 This is a significant gap in the field, given the increasing use of 
guidance in this way; a gap which this thesis seeks to part fill.  
Trubek and Trubek set out a “functional typology” for hybrid (or ‘transformed’) 
law.
29
 In some cases, laws aim at problem solving or conflict resolution through 
the creation of new governance procedures.
30
 In other areas, law provides recourse 
to rights when new governance processes fail.
31
 Thirdly, new governance may 
allow actors to exceed minimum standards set down in law, which de Burca and 
Scott call “default hybridity”.32 Finally, Trubek and Trubek suggest there are cases 
in which “law may provide general norms while new governance is used to help 
make concrete…to give specific meaning to the general norms.”33 This approach, 
they argue, is seen in the Water Framework Directive, EU employment 
discrimination regulation and EU health and safety regulation.
34
 REACH shows 
that this functional typology of hybridity may benefit from further work. To give 
one example (the others are set out in depth below), the hybrid of REACH has 
emerged both ex ante and ex post: the Regulation, and its drafters, foresaw the 
need for elaboration of the Regulation, via guidance, and incorporated both 
specific and general references to that guidance in the legislation; while, at the 
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same time, other actors (public and private), in ways not foreseen in the 
Regulation, have also contributed to the hybrid nature of REACH (industry, DCG, 
NGOs, MSCAs etc). The hybrids of REACH, plural and plastic, were both 
planned and not planned, conscious and unconscious, framed and not set. Trubek 
and Trubek, however, see that the co-existence of new governance and legal 
regulation “may come about accidentally or by design”.35 This dichotomy does not 
allow for situations, as seen in REACH, where there is both ex ante planned and 
ex post ad hoc integration of the legislation with soft law. The integration of EU 
chemicals governance, from the initial drafting of the Regulation and the RIPs to 
the current multiple modes and forms of norm shaping, is complex. 
Whereas, as noted above, much of the work on new governance is about 
differentiation between different forms of law (hard and soft), it is also suggested 
that much of the work on hybridity takes post legislative norms as a phenomenon, 
rather than, as is seen in this thesis (and set out in detail below) differentiated, 
hierarchical, plural and worthy of close scrutiny. This thesis is as much about 
differentiation within soft law as it is about hybridity itself. In so doing, it 
challenges an assumption that guidance simply adds technical content to 
legislation; see, for example, ECHA’s risk communication guidance addressed to 
Member States;
36
 or the SIEF guidance addressed to registrants (which is far more 
about collaboration and dispute prevention than it is about the techniques of data 
sharing).
37
 The thesis shows how guidance is more than “a useful interpretive 
tool”;38  in the context of REACH, the guidance effectively operationalises (to 
greater or lesser degrees in different contexts) the entirety of the Regulation. This 
thesis, however, also reinforces some of the core ideas of new governance 
approaches as flexible, deliberative, diverse and experimental, each to lesser or 
greater degrees as regards different aspects of REACH (and discussed more fully 
below).  
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For EU scholars, this thesis also advances understandings about the role of law in 
the process of EU integration, particularly important in a situation in which, “the 
catalogue of sources and hierarchy of norms in Articles 288 – 291 TFEU are of 
misleading simplicity”.39 Much like Lange’s work on EU pollution control, this 
thesis pushes our understanding of EU law in context.
40
 Law is said to be both “the 
object and the agent” of European integration.41 Soft norms could, therefore, be 
seen as a challenge to the legitimacy that the EU has gained over time. A number 
of new governance scholars are anxious that (while at the same time wholly 
cognisant of the limits of traditional forms of EU law) the shift towards new 
governance approaches might mean that EU law “no longer serves as an 
integrating force in Europe”.42 Dawson, however, takes a different view: 
“If Europe is no longer being “integrated through law”, soft law instead 
suggests its integration through functional objectives and outputs – the 
‘completion’ of the internal market…- the achievement of which are 
sufficient conditions in and of themselves.”43 
Concerns as to the EU’s legitimacy as a legal order may have some validity in 
situations where soft law supplants hard law, or operates in its shadow. However, 
one might argue that hybrid new governance (where soft law is yoked onto hard 
law) poses less of a legitimacy challenge to the EU project, and is simply 
reflective of a maturing legal order. As a consequence, the destabilising and 
disintegrative effects of new governance in the EU are arguably less significant 
with hybrids. This is discussed more in Chapter 10.  
Having set the scene on new governance scholarship, and on how this thesis 
contributes to aspects of that field, the following section looks at how REACH is 
somewhat different to other EU regulatory regimes, and discusses what this means 
as regards certain assumptions about new governance forms and functions. The 
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Chapter then sets out the complex differentiation within soft law that this thesis 
has highlighted.   
The Peculiarities of REACH 
REACH is a Regulation. It is long. It is complex. It has a central, overseer EU 
agency, ECHA. It was born because of frustration with previous EU chemicals 
regulation. The guidance produced under REACH is, in many (if not all) places, 
highly specific and highly detailed. Each of these facts pushes at different 
assumptions in the new governance scholarship,
44
 and at other new governance 
examples. Soft law is often seen as supplanting or supplementing traditional forms 
of regulation; however, REACH is not one of the ‘Model Directives’ in which the 
task of drawing up technical specifications is left to EU standardisation bodies.
45
 
Similarly, REACH looks quite different to the Water Framework Directive, where 
most of the existing work on post legislative norm elaboration exists.
46
 Others 
have argued that REACH is an example of framework legislation,
47
 which has 
been described as “laws in progress, providing little explicit guidance about the 
conduct of those they govern.” 48  This is both accurate and very misleading. 
REACH has many framework provisions (e.g. the bare command to form a SIEF); 
but the Regulation is also very prescriptive and detailed in other areas (e.g. in the 
technical content advice on registration dossiers). Contrast this with Scott, who 
argues that, 
“post legislative guidance is deployed to elaborate upon the meaning 
and implications of framework norms; that is to say in precisely those 
circumstances in which the relevant EU norm may lack the degree of 
clarity and precision to confer direct effect.”49  
Scholars interested in the EU’s scheme for integrated pollution prevention and 
control have suggested there are “serious theoretical and empirical concerns 
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regarding the applicability of soft regulation in heterogeneous regulatory regimes 
such as the EU.”50 This, they argue, is because of the relative ‘softness’ of the soft 
regulation being deployed (i.e. lacking precision). The same simply cannot be said 
of REACH, where norms are formed through top down (as well as bottom up) 
processes (i.e. via mandate in the Regulation and through the orchestration of 
ECHA), and where many of the norms seen in ECHA’s guidance are precise, 
prescriptive and highly detailed. 
Critics have attacked new governance approaches for the lack of clear hierarchical 
rules; there is some suggestion that command and control regulation may be 
needed to minimize the incentives for private gain.
51
 REACH, however, contains a 
number of very clear command and control provisions: for example, the ability for 
ECHA to refuse a registration dossier (which effectively removes a substance from 
the market); the power of the Commission to ban, in full or in part, any chemical. 
The vast majority of REACH guidance comes from ECHA. Contrast this with the 
Water Framework Directive (where post legislative guidance is the product of 
informal working groups); or the Emissions Trading Scheme (where guidance 
nominally comes from the Commission).
52
 At the same time, most of the case law 
in this area (discussed in Chapter 4) concerns soft norms issued by the 
Commission (and not an EU agency). REACH, therefore, might be more easily 
compared with modern EU food or financial regulation, which have strong, 
centralising EU agencies.
53
 However, and unlike these two spheres,
54
 REACH was 
not a new governance approach born of a widespread crisis or series of crises. The 
role of ECHA means that comparing REACH and its guidance to other EU 
environmental spheres is only partly instructive. For example, guidance produced 
in the form of BREFS under IPPC has been questioned due to a lack of capacity in 
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various EU member states to enforce the regime.
55
 While the enforcement of 
REACH is a matter for individual Member States, ECHA, as the core regulator, is 
the single point of decision making in a number of core areas (such as the 
acceptance or rejection of registration dossiers).  
What, then, does the above mean? Is the control of chemicals special in that it 
requires both a very large, very complex, often detailed Regulation with a new EU 
agency, together with a wealth of even more detailed/complex/specific/lengthy 
guidance? Chemicals are a private, more than a public good (though there is 
obviously a public interest in chemicals, chemical risks and the chemicals market); 
they are a source of primarily private and not public exploitation; they are complex 
and an area which is heavily reliant on various forms of expertise; they are also an 
area in which there is rapid, continual and widespread innovation in application 
and development. There is no real direct public consumption of chemicals. The 
EU chemicals market is vast and previous regulatory regimes for chemicals 
control have failed. However, none of these factors really tell us why REACH is a 
Regulation and why it has been elaborated, and operationalised, via post legislative 
guidance in the way that it has. As a consequence, REACH is a fascinating site of 
study: it is both very ‘new governance’ (multiple modes of regulation; multiple 
forms of norm; multiple actors); and a challenge to a number of new governance 
assumptions. In many ways, it is the size of REACH and its guidance that allows 
for a fuller account than has been previously seen of the very different and 
complex interactions between hard and soft law. It is not so much that conclusions 
drawn about hybridity in other work are wrong, but that the nature of their case 
studies (i.e. their data) have not perhaps allowed sufficient space for the nuanced 
meanings seen in this thesis. These nuances, and the fuller account of post 
legislative normative shaping, are set out further in the section that follows. 
Differentiation Within Soft Law 
The term ‘hybrid’ is used in a number of contexts in the two schools of regulation 
and governance. For regulation scholars, a hybrid is seen where regulation is 
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multi-modal and/or where public and private forms of regulation co-exist;
56
 for 
governance scholars, a hybrid occurs where hard and soft law complement each 
other, occupying the same field to promote the same goals. REACH is hybrid in 
both of these senses. However, the detailed review of the Regulation offered up in 
this thesis suggests that ‘hybrid’ is an umbrella term for what is seen in practice as 
regards the governance of the EU’s flagship chemicals regime. As Borzel has 
argued, “The EU’s governance architecture is too multifaceted to be captured by 
one particular mode.”57 With REACH, and the guidance that shapes its operation, 
this thesis has highlighted a differentiation within soft law along a number of axes: 
authorship; formats; addresses; acceptance; functions; genesis; review; impact; 
and coverage. As such, this thesis offers up a rich and nuanced vision of hybridity 
in modern EU governance and drives towards the “functional theory of hybrids” 
that Trubek and Trubek called for almost a decade ago (and which has not been 
much advanced in that period).
58
 Chart 9.1 at the end of this chapter sets out this 
differentiation in pictorial form, and the following sections look in depth at each of 
the ways in which the post legislative guidance that frames the operation of 
REACH can be differentiated.  
 
1. Authorship  
The guidance that shapes the operation of REACH comes not only from 
the regulator created to oversee the Regulation, ECHA, but also from a 
variety of other sources, public and non-public. At the same time, while 
ECHA is the official author of its own guidance, this obscures the actors 
who may have contributed to the policy or drafting of the text.
59
 Thus, 
REACH is both a governance hybrid in the yoking of hard and soft law, 
but also in the welding of public and private spheres of influence in the 
context of guidance development and authorship. This provides an 
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example of multi-level governance within the tier of post legislative norm 
elaboration.
60
 As such, this thesis confirms the “horizontal spread of EU 
governance to new institutional structures like agencies or committees or 
networks.”61 The use of private norms in public settings, what Schepel 
calls ‘private regulators in law’, is seen in other contexts. 62  But, with 
REACH, the role of the private actors is something more than just standard 
setting; these actors, and their norms, are a significant part of the 
operationalization of the Regulation. As such, REACH is a good example 
of a form of experimentalist governance which, “builds on our capacity for 
learning from other’s experience and for multi-layered problem-solving in 
and across various formal and informal networks and ‘publics’.”63 
As is shown in Chart 9.1, and discussed in Chapter 4 in more depth, 
ECHA, Member States, industry groups, NGOs and the somewhat obscure 
Directors Contact Group (‘DCG’) all issue guidance shaping the operation 
of REACH. In their review of EU multilevel regulation, Chowdhury and 
Wessel comment that,  
“The regulatory space may or may not be reflected in the formal 
legal/regulatory framework that governs the sector. In other 
words, the regulatory space may be populated with actors that do 
not have formal legal roles but play a critical role in the 
regulatory process.”64  
This is certainly true in the context of REACH. As noted earlier, the 
guidance produced under REACH was both planned and not planned; 
certainly, there is nothing in the Regulation to suggest that such a wealth of 
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actors, private and public, would be involved in REACH’s post legislative 
norm setting. As such, the authorship of guidance that elaborates REACH, 
and helps to operationalise the regulation, may be an example of the 
“polyarchic distribution of power” described by Sabel and Zeitlin.65 What 
we see with REACH is that the deliberative, epistemic communities 
involved in the creation and promulgation of ECHA guidance are public 
and private, national and supranational.  
Armstrong writes that what is seen over time in the EU is a, “relocation of 
norm production and norm elaboration to a range of institutional locations 
outside of, but not unconnected to, the inter-institutional decision making 
processes associated with the Community Method.”66 The involvement of 
private actors is a recurring theme in new governance work.
67
 However, it 
is not entirely clear whether the notion of hybridity put forward by Trubek 
and Trubek allows for yoked soft norms originating from beyond the state. 
One might argue that this type of yoking is simply not possible, in that 
such private sector guidance/shaping is simply not ‘law’. While this may 
be true, there is nothing to suggest that the guidance issued by the DCG, 
and other private actors (including, in particular, Cefic), does not have 
practical effects and/or does not shape the behaviours of those subject to 
the Regulation. On a functional level, the actions and behaviours of those 
subject to REACH are shaped by norms public and private, hard and soft. 
Here, then, we may see yoking between two very different forms of soft 
instrument; guidance issued by public actors; and guidance issued by 
private actors, both yoked to the same underlying hard law norm.
68
 This 
thesis thus shows other ways of how notions of regulatory capitalism,
69
 and 
public/private regulatory hybrids, can and should contribute to 
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understandings of new governance. There is no “neat and tidy regulatory 
space” with REACH.70 Instead, the space is filled with multiple actors on 
multiple levels; forming multiple hybrids in the same regulatory space. 
This is another example of how, “social steering is becoming more and 
more of a property of the interaction of organisations, networks and 
associations involving both public and private actors.”71  
There is no clear line, with the post legislative shaping of REACH, as to 
when the guidance will be authored by private parties and when it will be 
issued by ECHA, MSCAs or other public bodies. It is not as if the highly 
technical, highly expert guidance is produced solely by the private sector 
(who are often said to be the holders of such expertise); indeed, this thesis 
has shown that much of ECHA’s own guidance is dense and technical. In 
this regard, this thesis presents a challenge to Schepel’s argument, in the 
context of EU approaches to standardisation, that expertise and social 
complexity force regulators, “to draw on private actors, to bargain with 
organised private actors, and even to rely completely on private parties’ 
judgments.”72 What we see are areas in which REACH guidance issued by 
public actors overlaps with that produced by private actors (e.g. SIEF 
formation and organisation); areas in which guidance issued by public 
actors goes to some aspect of REACH, but is not also within the sphere of 
guidance by private actors (e.g. risk communication by Member States); 
and areas in which guidance produced by private actors has no mirror in 
that produced by public actors (e.g. DCG advice on registration obligations 
when groups of companies are sold, or sub-divided). This is represented by 
Diagram 9.1 below.   
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The preceding discussion has centred on guidance produced other than by 
ECHA. As for ECHA’s own guidance, the 2011 Consultation Procedure on 
Guidance details that the Secretariat decides who to consult and on the 
time frames given for consultation.
73
 There is then no set body of 
contributors to, or authors of, ECHA’s own guidance. Much of the 
consultation is ‘closed’ in that it involves experts “whose nominations have 
been received by a specified deadline”74 and who are then formed into 
Partner Expert Groups (‘PEGs’).75 The ECHA website does not detail lists 
of experts within PEGs formed as part of previous consultations on 
guidance. This is a striking omission in transparency and the reason for the 
lack of disclosure is not clear. Only in limited situations (for example, for 
entirely new guidance) will ECHA engage in full public consultation. Even 
where full public consultation does take place, the Agency works 
particularly closely with what it terms “Accredited Stakeholder 
Organisations” (‘ASOs’), who represent differing fields of competence at 
the EU level. It will be recalled, from Chapter 4, that the vast majority of 
ASOs are industry representative bodies: only 7 out of the 69 accrediated 
ASOs represent civil society.
76
 Others have suggested that the success of 
new governance approaches is, “significantly affected by the extent to 
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which certain stakeholder groups are marginalised or absent.”77 It is clear 
that the discretion granted to ECHA as regards consultation, both in terms 
of when to consult and who to consult, creates the potential for a new 
governance failure. What this means for EU jurisprudence on soft norms is 
discussed in Chapter 10.  
In her work on one of ECHA’s guidance documents, Korkea-aho talks of 
the transformation of framework norms through networked activities and 
practices of guidance drafting.
78
 What is clear is that while the guidance 
documents on ECHA’s website bear ECHA’s name, they are often the 
product of input from multiple sources and there is, in fact, a “blurring of 
authorship”.79 When one looks at the references in Korkea-aho’s case study 
on ECHA’s Guidance on Requirements for Substances in Articles, what is 
interesting is that her insights into who actually participated in the 
generation of that guidance document come not from public sources, but 
from personal communications with ECHA.
80
 As Korkea-aho notes, this 
lack of public information on contributions during the writing of ECHA 
guidance stands in stark contrast to what happens with other EU 
environmental regimes, for example under the Water Framework 
Directive.
81
 This lack of full transparency is a potential concern both for 
REACH and more widely for soft, post-legislative instruments.
82
 What is 
also striking as regards the creation ECHA’s guidance is the lack of input 
from the third sector: of 20 stakeholders who formed part of the PEG for 
that guidance document, only one was a NGO.
83
 However, and on an 
instrumental level, as discussed further in Chapter 10, the outputs of this 
lack of transparency and participation (i.e. the guidance documents) are 
themselves largely legitimate and so the lack of transparency, while not 
ideal, can be accepted. 
                                                        
77
 de Burca (n 5) 235. See also the contributions by Lisa Alexander, Wendy Bach and Mark 
Dawson in the same special issue of the Wisconsin Law Review. 
78
 Korkea-aho (n 4) 365 
79
 Armstrong (n 7) 257 
80
 Korkea-aho (n 4) footnotes 28 and 29 
81
 Korkea-aho (n 4) 372 
82
 Senden (n 21) 65; Scott (n 10) 336 
83
 Korkea-aho (n 4) 372 
  
250 
 
2. Formats and Size 
As was noted earlier in this chapter, guidance is not monolithic and, 
instead, comes in a variety of forms. Just as (hard) law is pluralised and 
differentiated, so too are post legislative norms. ECHA produces Guidance, 
‘Guidance in a Nutshell’, ‘Guidance Factsheets’, ‘Practical Guides’ and 
‘Formats’,84 together with almost 1,000 separate FAQs.85 The breadth of 
the ‘guidance’ produced by ECHA and the variety of forms that ECHA’s 
guidance takes is striking. What is revealing is the explicit 
acknowledgment by the Agency of a hierarchy of soft law norms within 
the differing types of guidance that it produces. ECHA labels everything 
bar the core guidance documents as “quasi-guidance”, with the intent that 
the latter are “in simple terms” and particularly intended for SMEs.86 Such 
differentiation is not unique to ECHA, though the breadth of the 
differentiation is unusual. In her work on EU agencies (in general) Vos 
writes of their “informal law making” and comments that,  
“in terms of output informality, agencies adopt a variety of 
informal documents, such as recommendations, opinions, 
standards, guidelines, guidance documents, scientific reports, 
codes of conduct, an annual report, a work plan and a strategic 
plan.”87  
Armstrong has questioned whether new governance lives up to its 
allegedly non-hierarchical character.
88
 The thesis certainly shows that there 
is a hierarchy of norms in different soft post legislative formats. The 
different formats of ECHA’s guidance raise an interesting jurisprudential 
question as to hierarchy: exactly what is the legal effect of ECHA calling 
something ‘quasi guidance’? The answer is not clear. Certainly, there is no 
EU jurisprudence directly on point. Indeed, the review of the relevant case 
law in Chapter 4 showed that the label ‘quasi guidance’ has the potential to 
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be meaningless, on a case-by-case basis, as the courts are more interested 
in substance over form (and so what will matter will be what that guidance 
does, rather than what it is called). What is also interesting is that some of 
ECHA’s guidance documents seek to govern by design (rather than 
through pure advice), in offering up structures and templates for 
registrants:
89
 thus, ECHA’s so-called ‘Formats’ are blank templates of 
certain of the reports to be submitted to the Agency (e.g. the Chemical 
Safety Report or the Annex XV dossier on Restriction); and there are also 
‘Practical Examples’ published by ECHA, which give illustrative examples 
of how completed chemical safety assessments and exposure scenarios 
should look.
90
 
Much has been made in this thesis not just about the different formats of 
ECHA’s guidance, but also its size. Notwithstanding the length of REACH 
itself, the core guidance documents are almost 10 times as long as the 
Regulation. Adding in the ‘quasi guidance’ pushes this multiplier even 
further. Sizeable guidance documents are not the sole purview of REACH. 
For example, two of the guidance docs produced under the Water 
Framework Directive are more than 200 pages long.
91
 There are now 29 
WFD guidance docs, plus 7 overview “policy summaries” of those 
guidance documents.
92
 However, while these are voluminous, they pale in 
comparison with REACH and there is not the same breadth of formats. The 
differing formats of ECHA’s guidance and their size pose a normative 
challenge to most conventional understandings of new governance. Joerges 
and Weimer comment that, 
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“The main thrust of the new governance paradigm of 
European integration was to point to the limits of traditional 
EU law to achieve common regulatory objectives.”93  
If, as shown by REACH, we have a hybrid new governance approach in 
which the new elements are both voluminous and hierarchical (mirroring 
EU hard law), does this then mean the approach has failed? Modes of new 
governance are seen as being more effective than traditional modes of 
control, as being better at problem solving. What does this then mean 
when, in a hybrid like REACH, the ‘new’ part (i.e. the multiple and myriad 
modes of guidance) in many ways reflect the ‘old’ part? That is, where the 
guidance is just as detailed and dense, if not more so, than the legislation, 
have we just created more and more complex forms of ordering and 
fewer/less effective forms of problem solving? I would suggest not. 
Though the extent of REACH’s post legislative normative ordering is 
striking, we should perhaps not be surprised. Legislative time is limited, 
and some matters will necessarily be left for further debate. At the same 
time, legislative knowledge at the point of law-making is incomplete and 
imperfect,
94
 requiring elaboration in the post legislative phase. Finally, 
there will always be discretion in how legislative norms are interpreted, 
expanded on and operationalised. The very size of REACH, and the 
complexity of chemicals risk assessment, may be the reasons for the size 
and complexity of the post legislative norm elaboration. The hierarchy, 
density, spread and lack of flexibility in REACH’s post legislative norms 
may be atypical of a new governance approach but, at the same time, this 
thesis acts as a challenge to a number of other conventional understandings 
of new governance.   
3. Addressees 
The guidance produced by ECHA is intended for different addressees, 
explicit and implicit, and it matters to whom ECHA’s guidance is officially 
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addressed. In PTC, a Polish regulator was held by the ECJ to be unable to 
apply Commission guidelines on market power in electronic 
communications markets because those guidelines were addressed to 
Member State regulatory authorities and not to individuals.
95
 On an explicit 
level, most of ECHA’s guidance is addressed to registrants, aiming at 
assisting industry with the execution of its obligations under REACH. But 
there are core guidance documents aimed at Member States,
96
 and at the 
Agency itself.
97
 However, it would be foolish to ignore the fact that 
ECHA’s guidance is also addressed (implicitly) to a wider variety of actors 
not named in the documents: lawyers (advising their clients on compliance 
and other matters); would-be entrants to the EU chemicals; Only 
Representatives; Third Party Registrants; NGOs/third sector actors; 
Member State competent authorities; and the Commission.  
The language that ECHA uses in its guidance differs depending on to 
whom the guidance is addressed. Two comparisons are instructive. The 
Guidance on Information Requirements and Chemical Safety Assessment 
is the most dense and most technical of all that published by ECHA. It is in 
fact 28 separate guidance documents, amounting to more than 200,000 
words of text across 2,232 pages.
98
 These 28 are (implicitly) addressed to 
chemists and regulatory scientists and detail processes for chemicals data 
collection and assessment, the identification of data gaps and the 
subsequent generation of additional data to fill those gaps. The more 
accessible Guidance on Registration, however, is written for those ‘with or 
without expert knowledge in the field of chemicals’ and acts as an 
umbrella overview of the implementation of REACH.
99
 This guidance 
document details helpful examples and the language used is markedly 
different (namely, more layperson friendly) than that used in the Guidance 
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on Information Requirements. The Guidance on Registration takes the text 
of REACH and puts it into more accessible language. In striking contrast to 
the Guidance on Information Requirements, ECHA’s Guidance on the 
Communication of Information on the Risks and Safe Uses of 
Chemicals,
100
 addressed to Member States, is both basic and generic. Much 
of what is written is also suggestive: MSCAs are advised to “consider” 
doing X or Y on 59 separate occasions in the guidance. This suggests a 
reflexivity and awareness on the part of the Agency as to the impact of its 
guidance, and a degree of political manoeuvring. The differences in 
language (permissive; suggestive; technical; explanatory; reassuring etc) 
may also be relevant to how the different guidance documents would be 
adjudicated (discussed in Chapter 4). 
4. Functions 
This thesis offers up four, different functions of the guidance produced by 
ECHA: amplification; standardisation; translation; and extrapolation – 
examples of each were set out in Chapters 5-8. These functions form part 
of my original contribution to the existing body of scholarship on post 
legislative norms. Amplification occurs where guidance produced by 
ECHA goes beyond, but is not in direct contradiction with, the text of the 
Regulation. Standardisation is depicted as a subset of the amplification 
function. Here, the goal of ECHA is to channel registrants (and others) 
down given avenues of action (not set out specifically in the text of 
REACH) in order to make the tasks for which ECHA is responsible more 
manageable. This thesis has argued that translation occurs when, despite 
the text of REACH being clear, the Agency, in its guidance, implicitly 
contests the drafting of the Regulation and ‘translates’ the relevant 
provisions into something else. Finally, extrapolation was said to occur 
where REACH was silent on a particular matter that the Agency felt was 
important for the operation of REACH and so guidance was issued to fill in 
the gap. Amplification and standardisation may be seen as legitimate aims 
of guidance produced by an EU agency; extrapolation may be seen as 
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necessary for the efficient working of REACH. Translation, however, is 
more troubling.  
In terms of how these four functions differ from one another, it may be 
useful to think that: (a) amplification is ECHA setting out what REACH 
says, but in more depth; (b) standardisation is ECHA setting out what 
REACH requires to be done (even though the Regulation is not specific 
about what course of action should be taken to achieve the thing to be 
done); (c) translation is ECHA putting forth what REACH meant to say 
(but said incorrectly); and (d) extrapolation is ECHA detailing what 
REACH should have said (but did not). ECHA is well aware of the power 
it holds, in issuing guidance, to shape the operationalization of the 
Regulation and to set out understandings of REACH. In its revised 
Consultation Procedure on Guidance, ECHA states that the production of 
guidance, “require[s] interpretation of the underlying regulation.”101 In so 
doing, the Agency acknowledges the discretion and policy choices inherent 
in this process.
102
 
5. Acceptance 
Save for one example (discussed below), ECHA’s guidance is presented on 
the Agency’s website as a suite of norms accepted by all of those involved 
in its creation or updating. This may, however, be misleading. A Guidance 
Consultation Procedure was first adopted by ECHA’s Management Board 
in 2008, with full implementation of the procedures and workflows for 
developing and updating guidance occurring in 2009.
103
 ECHA’s aim with 
the development and review of guidance is to build consensus between 
various actors. This, however, is not always possible. The 2008 Guidance 
Consultation Procedure was said to have led to, “protracted discussions on 
scientific, technical or policy issues which caused delays.”104 As a result, 
ECHA implemented a new Consultation Procedure on Guidance in 2011, 
which allows the Agency to, “finalise guidance on the basis of majority 
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views if full consensus cannot be achieved.”105 What this means then is 
that, even if on the face of the guidance document it seems accepted, there 
could have been strong, minority views against its norm shaping. In many 
ways, the same is true of EU legislation. However, the difference (and it is 
an important difference) is that, with EU legislation, the legislative history, 
the differing drafts, the various debates etc are publicly available. With 
ECHA’s guidance, while there are some minutes published on the 
Agency’s website, it is very difficult to have an in-depth sense of 
contestation, participation and deliberation in guidance making.  
ECHA’s Guidance on Requirements for Substances in Articles comes with 
a front page health warning that it “did not find full support by consulted 
national authorities.”106 As such, the Agency has put out guidance which is 
explicitly contested. The story of this contestation is illuminating.  A 
Swedish NGO performed a study on plastic shoes, which showed that they 
contained phthalates (DEHP and DBP) in very different concentrations, 
depending on which method of calculation one used.
107
 Once published, 
and then picked up, different Member States took sides on which method 
of calculation was more appropriate. This story is instructive as it raises the 
question of how many other guidance documents might, in the future, 
become similarly contested through intervention/data creation by private 
bodies which in turn leads to disagreements in interpretation between 
Member States. This issue, and the disputed ECHA guidance document, is 
also interesting as it poses another challenge to conventional notions of 
hybridity, which implicitly assumes complementary and does not 
(explicitly) allow for contestations between yoked norms. In their work, 
Trubek and Trubek distinguish complementarity, rivalry and hybridity; 
their analysis suggesting that new approaches to governance can co-exist 
with more traditional forms of regulation sometimes on a complementary 
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basis, sometimes on a rival basis and sometimes on a transformative, or 
hybrid basis.
108
 Cottrell and Trubek comment that,  
“The [hybrid] systems complement one another: without the 
standard regulatory framework entities might lack incentives to 
self-regulate, while without the more flexible new governance 
processes they would not be able to carry out innovative 
strategies”109 
In a similar vein, Armstrong writes that, “The essence of hybridity is the 
idea of a mutual interaction between instruments.”110 I would suggest that 
his ‘mutual interaction’ and the other conceptions are implicitly positive. 
Here, and with the example of the Guidance on Requirements for 
Substances in Articles, we see a yoked soft norm that imperfectly aligns 
with its backstopped hard law; there is an element of subversion going on.  
There is, among the Member States, and with the resultant guidance 
document, a rivalry of interpretations. Similarly, where ECHA’s guidance 
translates the text of REACH (discussed above), this is also not 
complementary. While others have commented on the “multiple 
complementary or contradictory governance modes” within the EU’s new 
governance approaches,
111
 this thesis is the first to show, on one level, the 
multiple complementary and contradictory post legislative norm shaping 
within the same hybrid, yoked space. This subversion is important when it 
comes to consideration of the justiciability of soft norms, discussed in 
Chapters 4 and 10. 
6. Genesis and Competence 
The guidance that underpins REACH was born at different times, derives 
its authority from different provisions in the Regulation and is updated in 
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differing ways. Not all of the guidance that underpins REACH was 
produced after the entry into force of the Regulation. Much of it (or, at 
least, many of the first iterations) was compiled in tandem with the 
negotiation of the text of the Regulation.
112
 This is important as the notions 
of hybridity assume that the soft norms that are yoked onto the hard are 
post-legislative; other new governance work looks at soft norms that are 
pre legislative or extra legislative. With the REACH Implementation 
Projects (‘RIPs’), and the development of guidance in tandem with the 
draft of the Regulation, what we see are co-legislative soft norms that have 
post legislative effect. Indeed, Recital 35 of REACH exhorts that, 
“Member States, the Agency and all interested parties should take full 
account of the results of the RIPs.” This matters because all of the 
information related to RIPs 3 and 4 (which produced the 15 initial REACH 
guidance documents for industry and Member State regulators) is no 
longer accessible, due to the closure of the European Chemicals Bureau 
and its associated website.
113
 The guidance itself remains (housed on 
ECHA’s website) but there is no public information on the development of 
the RIPs, the stakeholders engaged, the challenges encountered etc. There 
is an important practical learning point here, as regards transparency, in the 
co-legislative development of soft norms.
114
   
In terms of legislative mandate for guidance, Article 77(2) details that one 
of the tasks of ECHA’s Secretariat is to, 
“… (g) provide technical and scientific guidance and tools 
where appropriate for the operation of this Regulation…; 
h) provide technical and scientific guidance on the operation of 
this Regulation for Member State competent authorities and 
providing support to the helpdesks established by Member 
States…; [and] 
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(i) provide guidance to stakeholders including Member State 
competent authorities on communication to the public of 
information on the risks and safe use of substances…” 
This mandate is wide and non-specific. However, the Regulation then also 
details a small number of specific instances where the Agency is obliged to 
produce guidance: for example, cost sharing guidance for SIEFs;
115
 and 
applications for authorisation which require socio economic analysis.
116
 The 
creation and promulgation of guidance under REACH is both specific and 
generic. Earlier in this chapter, the striking breadth and volume of ECHA’s 
guidance was discussed. Given this breadth, and given this volume, one 
might question whether there is an element of competence creep in ECHA’s 
approach to guidance production and whether the Agency has overstepped 
its generic mandate to provide, “technical and scientific guidance and tools.”  
7. Impact and Coverage 
A discussion earlier in this chapter concerned the amount of guidance 
produced by ECHA. However, it should not be thought that the Agency’s 
guidance has equality of impact or coverage. In some areas (for example, 
on enforcement) there is little guidance. In others, it is suggested that 
without ECHA’s guidance REACH would simply fail. In their work on 
hybridity, Trubek and Trubek suggest that we see a “real transformation” 
where, “one system [of governance] seems to be needed for the other to 
become fully effective.”117 Of all the elements of REACH, the creation and 
running of SIEFs is the area in which guidance produced by ECHA shapes 
the effective day- to-day operation of the legislation, and where we may 
see this ‘real transformation’. However, the same is not equally true as 
regards other areas of REACH. Thus, the extent to which an hybrid system 
of new governance results in a ‘real transformation’ is variable.  
In its guidance, the Agency is far more comfortable in telling registrants 
what to do than in giving advice on how third parties can enforce their 
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entitlements under REACH. Take, for example, ECHA’s Guidance on 
Requirements for Substances in Articles, which relates to obligations under 
Article 7, and Article 33 of REACH. This guidance is detailed as regards 
what is (and is not) an article and when (and when not) substances are 
intended to be released from articles. However, less than 2 of the 87 pages 
of the Guidance are devoted to the communication obligations in Article 33 
(which give consumers rights to know about the chemical content of the 
products they purchase).
118
 There are also gaps in the guidance coverage 
offered up by the Agency; for example, ECHA has not produced guidance 
to assist third parties in understanding complex chemical data. While 
guidance produced by ECHA is detailed when it comes to business-to-
business communication or compliance matters, there is little which speaks 
to risk communication by registrants and suppliers to employees or the 
general public. On the face of it, the Agency is better at, and more 
comfortable with, obligation based hybrids than with rights based hybrids.  
Further Work 
The above account of differentiation within post legislative soft norms suggests 
that there is further work to be done in this area by new governance scholars. 
Much of the existing literature on new governance is awash with dichotomies, 
with contrasts, with conceptual pairings: this thesis challenges new governance 
scholars to become more granular, more nuanced and to take a harder, closer look 
at exactly what is going on, particularly in modern hybrid regulatory systems. 
Using this thesis as a departure point for potential further work, two main avenues 
of inquiry are suggested; the first is socio-legal empirical work on the 
development and impact of guidance; the second is on other areas of law which 
deserve a close (or closer) look, using the differentiated, hybrid new governance 
lens offered up in this thesis.  
Writing of her experience of ECHA’s 2012 Stakeholders’ Day, Korkea-aho noted 
the lack of reference by delegates to the text of REACH and the multiple 
references, instead, to ECHA’s guidance.119 Socio-legal empirical work is needed 
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to explore exactly how those to whom guidance is addressed experience it. At the 
same time, the role of lawyers in new governance is worth exploring further: not 
just, as has been suggested elsewhere, in how their roles have changed as a result 
of shifts in governance (for example, away from litigation as a problem solving 
strategy);
120
 but also in how lawyers contribute to new governance (for example, 
as “norm intermediaries” in shaping policy choices and drafting soft 
instruments).
121
  
The documentary richness of this thesis, and the differentiation of soft law it offers 
up, could act as a template for further work in other areas of EU law, both within 
and without the environmental sphere. An easy starting point would be the 
similarities and differences in post legislative norm elaboration between the 
various regulatory regimes for which ECHA is now responsible. Even a cursory 
review shows that while the CLP regime appears similar to REACH as regards the 
legislative mandate for guidance production,
122
 how the biocidal products regime 
and how the Prior Informed Consent Regulation detail that guidance is to be 
produced are very different.
123
 Away from environmental law, the European 
Aviation Safety Agency does not merely assist the Commission in exercising rule-
making powers, but also directly adopts technical guidelines.
124
 The European 
Medicines Agency is an example of an agency that has de facto engaged in issuing 
technical, scientific and procedural guidance concerning the implementation of the 
EU pharmaceutical legislative framework.
125
 As discussed earlier in this chapter, 
the EU regulatory regimes for foods and finance also bear similarities to REACH, 
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in having a strong central EU agency that issues post legislative norms. It would 
be interesting to apply the differentiated, pluralised account of soft law offered up 
in this thesis to each of those four regulators and regimes. Having set out how this 
thesis contributes to, and challenges, existing work on new governance the 
following, final Chapter brings together some overarching themes by way of 
conclusion.
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CHAPTER 10 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
We live in a world of toxic ignorance. A world in which we are affected, on a 
daily basis, by chemicals. A world in which those effects are poorly understood. 
Over five decades, the EU has sought to better control, via regulation, the extent 
and nature of these impacts. Prior to 2007, the regulatory landscape within the EU 
for chemicals control was said, by the Royal Commission on Environmental 
Pollution, to be, “fragmented and differentiated.”1 As from 2007, REACH has 
been the EU’s flagship chemicals’ regulation. Chemicals pervade almost every 
aspect of our lives and yet our knowledge of their impacts on human health and 
the environment is limited. REACH aims to address this data gap by transferring 
the regulatory burden for substance testing to the private sector and making 
compulsory the registration of such testing data overseen by a central EU body, 
ECHA. This public to private shift in responsibility for evaluating the intrinsic 
nature of substances is significant and reflects an (implicitly acknowledged) 
asymmetry of resources of financial and capital, expertise and information. 
 
The text of REACH stands at more than 130,000 words. The most recent 
consolidated version of the Regulation is 516 pages long. The Regulation is 
complex, dense and lengthy. It is one of the longest legislative instruments in the 
history of the EU; almost a third longer than the consolidated version of the 
TFEU. 2  For the uninitiated, REACH is a daunting and intimidating piece of 
legislation, requiring an ability to speak the language of toxicology. There is little 
by way of rigorous, significant writing on this Regulation, quite possibly because 
of its sheer size and, for those not so engrossed by science or the minutiae of risk 
assessment, chemicals regulation may appear dull and impenetrable. An effective 
understanding of REACH, however, stretches far beyond knowledge of the 
Regulation. Accompanying the text of the legislation are a further 5,000 pages 
(more than 1,000,000 words) of guidance produced by the European Chemicals 
Agency, to say nothing of the other normative framing and shaping documents 
                                                        
1
 RCEP, ‘Chemicals in the Environment’ (Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, 24th 
Report, 2003) 162 
2
 See: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=EN> accessed 10 August 2014 
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(some labelled ‘guidance’; some not) issued by other public bodies (e.g. the EU 
Commission and Member State competent authorities such as the Health and 
Safety Executive in the UK) and private actors (industry associations, NGOs, law 
firms, consultancies etc). The use of guidance to accompany legislation is hardly a 
new phenomenon, but the breadth, formats and depth of guidance that 
accompanies REACH, and the functions that guidance serves, are striking.  
 
This thesis has provided a careful, close and detailed analysis of REACH and its 
guidance. It has offered up a working, four fold typology of post legislative soft 
norm functions (amplification; standardisation; translation; and extrapolation) and 
moves beyond the existing, rather blunt labels used to describe what soft norms do 
or can do. This thesis also challenges a number of assumptions built into work on 
new governance. It argues that soft law can be just as detailed and as thick as hard 
law, and that hierarchy and differentiation can be seen in soft norms just as they 
can in hard. This thesis challenges the assumption that yoked, hybrid (hard and 
soft) norms come only from public actors and the assumption that yoked soft 
norms are always complementary to their backstopped hard law. The careful 
documentary analysis offered up in this thesis is argued to be justification for 
greater granularity in new governance scholarship and a call to avoid bright line 
dichotomies. What is seen with REACH is more complex, more nuanced and 
messier than can be accounted for in simple dyads. Nuance and detail in this 
context are helpful because they help us to understand exactly what is going on 
with changes to EU norms, and the development of the EU legal order over time, 
and such an approach avoids scholarship based on superficial observations of 
governance regimes. Indeed, the use of dichotomies is highly reductive as a means 
of accommodating and exploring differentiation and pluralization within 
governance forms.
3
 
 
Though the extent of REACH’s post legislative normative ordering is striking, we 
should perhaps not be surprised. Legislative time is limited, and some matters will 
necessarily be left for further debate. Equally, legislative knowledge at the point of 
                                                        
3
 Kenneth A Armstrong, ‘The Character of EU Law and Governance: From “Community Method” 
to New Modes of Governance’ (2011) 64 Current Legal Problems 179, 206 
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law-making is incomplete and imperfect, 4  requiring elaboration in the post 
legislative phase. In this way, post legislative guidance has the potential to act as a 
correcting mechanism to flaws, gaps and/or missed opportunities. Finally, there 
will always be discretion in how legislative norms are interpreted, expanded on 
and operationalised. The legislative endeavour has not necessarily failed if it is 
accompanied by rigorous and robust post legislative supporting norms, though 
such may require us to rethink soft law as a necessarily flexible panacea for hard 
norm deficiencies.  
 
The work in the preceding Chapters has presented a detailed, complex, nuanced 
and differentiated account of hybrid new governance grounded in thick 
documentary analysis. This thesis has shown that the vast majority of ECHA’s 
guidance seeks simply to amplify the text of the Regulation, or to standardise the 
actions of registrants (and others). Only in a handful of situations has the work in 
this thesis shown the Agency to have over-stepped its (admittedly wide and vague) 
mandate in the context of guidance production to translate the text of REACH into 
something very different. Similarly, only in a handful of cases has the Agency 
created new obligations in situations in which the Regulation is silent, (the 
‘extrapolation’ function). We see a system of normative ordering which is both 
deeply hierarchical (a Regulation with a million words of guidance, plus other, 
less formal of shaping documents: quasi guidance, FAQs etc) and deeply 
heterarchical (a multitude of public and private actors all trying, in different ways, 
to control the operationalization of REACH). The normative landscape for 
chemicals regulation is played out in part in the pages of REACH, in part in the 
official ECHA guidance and in part in the private norms put out by Cefic and 
others. The yoking of post legislative norms to REACH has seen a complex 
transformation; one which was only partially foreseen in the Regulation (and 
likely also only partly foreseen in the minds of the legislature). As such, REACH 
is a good example of an evolving system of EU governance that is both associated 
with the Community Method and is also differentiated, new, complex and 
nuanced.  
 
                                                        
4
 Michael Wilkinson, Three Conceptions of Law: Towards a Jurisprudence of Democratic 
Experimentalism, (2010) Wisconsin Law Review 673, 682 
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Much of the existing literature on new governance is awash with dichotomies, 
with contrasts, with conceptual pairings: this thesis challenges new governance 
scholars to become more granular, more nuanced and to take a harder, closer look 
at exactly what is going on in modern regulatory systems. New governance 
scholarship largely splits into those favouring the ‘transformation thesis’ (which 
argues that new approaches to governance see not only government transformed 
but also the nature of law itself); and those favouring the ‘gap thesis’ (which 
asserts that what we see with new governance is not the transformation of law but 
its eventual disappearance).5 Yoked, hybrid forms of governance (and REACH in 
particular) challenge both of these views to some degree. For ‘gap’ theorists, 
REACH as a modern, large and complex Regulation (supported by post legislative 
guidance) suggests not that law and new governance run in parallels but that they 
are often fused, though this thesis has also shown that the yoking is imperfect in a 
number of areas and so gaps may appear, not between the aligned-but-never-
touching tracks of governance, but between the joined seams of the hybrid. With 
REACH, formal law is not “largely blind” to new governance, but is inextricably 
wound up with it, in ways foreseen (in the legislation) and unforeseen. 6  For 
‘transformation’ theorists, REACH does not necessarily demonstrate a 
transformation of law: instead, hybridity is (and has been shown to be) the idea of 
hard and soft law yoked together, not so that one automatically transforms (or has 
the potential to transform) the other, but so that the two work in tandem.  
 
Armstrong has criticised scholarship on new governance for being more 
comfortable in “elaborating what is changing in governance compared to its 
conceptualisation of what is happening to law.”7 This thesis, and its author, do not 
hold indifferences towards law or legal institutions. Indeed, what is so very 
interesting about REACH, and its operationalization, are the constellations of 
norms in various hybrid forms yoked on a very long, very detailed, and very 
                                                        
5
 For a more detailed review of these approaches, see: Wilkinson (ibid). The work on the ‘hybrid 
thesis’ is much less developed. See, by way of starting point, the contributions in: Grainne de 
Burca and Joanne Scott (eds) Law and New Governance in the EU and US (Hart 2006) 
6
 Grainne de Burca and Joanne Scott, ‘Introduction’ in Grainne de Burca and Joanne Scott (eds) 
Law and New Governance in the EU and US (Hart 2006) 4 
7
 Kenneth A Armstrong, ‘New Governance and the European Union: An Empirical and Conceptual 
Critique’ in Grainne de Burca, Claire Kilpatrick and Joanne Scott (eds) Critical Legal Perspective 
on Global Governance: Liber Amicorum David M Trubek (Hart 2014) 249 
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complex piece of legislation. In some ways, the yoking of hard and soft norms 
makes it easier for our understandings of legality to accommodate these changes, 
in that questions as to the legitimacy and legality of the latter can be referred back, 
and set against, the former.8 The formal frameworks of EU law, the Treaties, do 
not reflect modern EU governance – as Busuioc observes, “agencification has 
arisen, grown and progressed in the shadow of the law, without an explicit basis in 
the treaties”9 - and there is no reference to soft law in the categories of EU Treaty 
norms.10 With REACH, what we see is (hard) law being elaborated on, interpreted 
by, pushed at, challenged and developed, to lesser and greater degrees in different 
situations, by norms from a number of public and private actors. What is not yet 
clear, given the Regulation is still largely in its infancy, is the effectiveness of 
those changes.  
 
The work in this thesis also has relevance for EU jurisprudence on soft law. Five 
points are worth making. First, this thesis shows how soft law takes different 
forms and functions and that it is necessary for the judiciary to be alive to this – 
existing case law is rather blunt in the lenses used to conceptualise what soft law is 
and what functions it serves. The careful, methodical review of differentiated post 
legislative soft norms in this thesis may help EU judges to confront a priori 
assumptions about law and governance, to move them beyond “cognitive 
dissonance.” 11  In particular, the notion that post legislative soft norms only 
supplement or interpret hard law needs revisiting. Second, this thesis also 
highlights questions of vires – especially as regards the translation and 
extrapolation functions of ECHA’s guidance – with which EU judges may need to 
grapple. Third, even where post legislative norms are within the powers of their 
makers, there are key issues of reliance which give rise to legitimate expectation. 
This is particularly important where, as with REACH, the post legislative norms 
greatly outweigh the underlying hard law. The ECJ has thus far been reluctant to 
review post legislative norms where they are said to only “flesh out” the 
                                                        
8
 That is, if we want to know whether the soft norms are legitimate, we can go back to look at the 
hard provisions and the underlying principles that created those provisions.  
9
 Madalina Busuioc, European Agencies: Law and Practices of Accountability (OUP 2013) 5 
10
 Linda Senden, ‘Soft Post Legislative Rulemaking: A Time for More Stringent Control’ (2013) 
19(1) European Law Journal 57 
11
 Joanne Scott and David M. Trubek, ‘Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches to Governance in 
the EU’ (2002) 8 European Law Journal 1, 18 
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underlying hard law.12 This must be wrong, particularly in situations where, like 
REACH, the fleshing out is orders of magnitude greater than the underlying hard 
law. Fourth, there could be a need for procedural review to ensure that actors did 
that which they promised to do. There is little explicit in REACH about how 
guidance should come into existence. Given this, the EU courts would need to 
refer back to general EU principles (e.g. transparency, participation). Finally, there 
may be overarching rights (to information, of participation etc) which could 
provide the basis for challenge in line with the previous point on procedural 
review. ECHA’s Procedure on Guidance does not allow for full and fair 
participation by all interested groups for all guidance changes. As discussed in 
Chapters 4 and 9, there is a distinct lack of third sector groups as ‘Accredited 
Stakeholder Organisations’ who may participate in the production and redrafting 
of ECHA’s guidance. Following existing ECJ jurisprudence, this raises the 
question of whether the stakeholders who do contribute to ECHA’s guidance 
“taken together are sufficiently representative.” 13  The lack of transparency on 
Partner Expert Groups is also a potential area of challenge.  
 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the debate as to the legitimacy of soft law is 
largely academic, albeit an intellectually interesting exercise. There is nothing to 
suggest that use of soft law in general, and post legislative guidance in particular, 
will stop. At the same time, little of real substance has so far been said by the EU 
courts as to the uses of post legislative norms. The idea that one can rely on law 
and legal institutions, in particular the EU courts, to act as a check on the 
executive seems an instance of magical thinking, not least because of the very 
particular and limited way in which matters come before the courts. It would seem 
highly unlikely that the EU courts will move towards the “radical version” of 
Scott’s argument for enhanced judicial review of post legislative guidance.14 At 
the same time, it is unlikely that the other EU institutions will act as a check on the 
proliferation of post legislative norm making. One only has to look to the almost 
                                                        
12
 Case C-325/91 France v Commission [1993] ECR I-3283, para 14 
13
 Case T-135/96 UEAPME [1998] ECR II-02335 para 90 
14
 Joanne Scott, 'In Legal Limbo: Post-Legislative Guidance as a Challenge for European 
Administrative Law' (2011) 48 Common Market Law Review 329, 349ff 
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complete lack of public interest of the Commission in ECHA’s guidance, shown 
by the lack of coverage in the  2012 review of REACH.15  
 
As set out above, on an empirical level this thesis shows that while there are some 
concerns about consultation and transparency in the production of REACH 
guidance, the vast majority of that guidance performs a legitimate amplification 
and/or standardisation function. Only a fraction of the voluminous guidance 
translates the underlying text into something different, or extrapolates to create 
obligations where none previously existed. In a world where ECHA’s guidance 
did not exist, the effective functioning of REACH would almost certainly 
diminish. The lack of legal certainty would result in increased administrative 
burdens for ECHA and in increased costs and delays for industry. That a very 
small proportion of ECHA’s guidance is ‘bad’/illegitimate is a price worth paying. 
There is no real evidence of a crisis in EU law on the basis of REACH and its 
guidance. This work is not indifferent to issues of accountability, but does perhaps 
show a legal realist’s preference for output legitimacy.16 Chemicals abound; so too 
are the norms, hard and soft, public and private, that operationalise the EU’s 
flagship regime for chemicals control. The reach of REACH is in many ways as 
striking and as interesting as its legal method.  
 
 
                                                        
15
 Commission, ‘Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions in accordance with 
Article 117(4) of REACH and Article 46(2) of CLP, and a review of certain elements of REACH 
in line with Articles 75(2), 138(2), 138(3) and 138(6) of REACH: Staff Working Document (SWD 
(2013) 25 final) 4 
16
 Vivien A Schmidt, ‘Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union Revisited: Input, Output 
and ‘Throughput’(2013) 61(1) Political Studies 2 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
THE ROAD TO REACH – TIMELINE 
 
1972 United Nations Environment Programme formed  
Chemical pollution declared a global concern 
1976 
Dangerous Substances Directive 
1992 Intergovernmental Forum on Chemical Safety, Rio  
1996 Communication on the Competitiveness of the Chemicals 
Industry (COM (1996) 187) 
April 1998 EU Informal Environmental Council, Chester  
Discussion of future EU chemicals policy 
18 November 1998 EU Commission report on implementation of four main EC 
chemicals legal instruments (SEC (1998) 1986) 
20 December 1998 EU Council conclusions affirming need to work on future EU 
chemicals policy 
22 February 1999 Brainstorming of Stakeholders (WRC Report RET EU 47/9) 
8/9 May EU Informal Environmental Council, Weimar  
To discuss future EU chemicals policy 
26 June 1999 Environment Council conclusions (Council Document 
11265/99) Invited Commission to come forward with proposals 
by end of 2000 
2000 Communication on the Precautionary Principle 
2001 European Environment Agency Report, Late lessons from 
early warnings: the precautionary principle 1896-2000 
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13 February 2001 EU Commission White Paper, “Strategy for a Future Chemicals 
Policy” COM (2001) 88 final 
2 April 2001 Stakeholders Conference on White Paper 
October 2001 - 
February 2002 
Expert technical groups convened to assist in development of  
legislation following the White Paper 
21 May 2002 Stakeholders Conference to discuss Business Impacts of the 
new policy 
4 September 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg  
Agreed that by 2020 chemicals will be produced and used in 
ways that “lead to the minimisation of significant adverse 
effects on human health and the environment” 
6 February 2006 Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management, 
Dubai 
7 May 2003 -  
10 July 2003 
Internet Consultation on workability of draft legislation 
June 2003 Final Report – Impact of the New Chemicals Policy on Health 
and the Environment prepared by RPA and BRE Environment 
September 2003 Assessment of Additional Testing Needs under REACH 
prepared by JRC (Institute for Health and Consumer Protection) 
29 October 2003 EU Commission Proposal for REACH – COM (2003) 644 final 
29 October 2003 EU Commission Staff Working Paper: REACH Extended 
Impact Assessment – SEC (2003) 1171/3 
November 2003 A Microeconomic Model to Assess the Economic Impacts of 
the EU’s New Chemicals Policy (prepared by DG Enterprise) 
21 November 2003 Stakeholder Workshop on the EIA of REACH 
September 2004 - REACH Trial Run #1: SPORT 
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June 2005 Strategic Partnership on REACH Testing 
June 2005- 
December 2005 
REACH Trial Run #2: PRODUCE Piloting REACH for 
Downstream Use and Communication in Europe 
July 2005 REACH – Further Work on Impact Assessment: report prepared 
by KPMG Business Advisory Services 
July 2005 JRC (IPTS) Study of the impact of REACH on new Member 
States 
5 July 2005 SPORT Report 
September 2005 Report on the “Environmental benefits of REACH”, prepared 
by DHI 
16 December 2005 Final report on the analysis of the potential impacts of REACH 
on European textile supply chains 
January 2006 PRODUCE Final Report 
2006 Early in 2006, EU Commission Initiated the SHERPER project 
(SME Helpdesks – Experts Roundtable Planning their 
Establishment for REACH)  
Aimed at identifying the best strategy for setting up a national 
helpdesk based on the needs of SMEs 
25 September 2006 Workshop on progress of REACH Implementation Projects for 
industry stakeholders  
Also open to NGOs and Trade Unions 
 
December 2006 REACH adopted 
January 2007 Report on the “"Announcement effect" in the market related 
to the candidate list of substances subject to authorisation” 
prepared by the German Institute for Environmental 
Strategies, Ökopol 
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14 February 2007 SHERPER Final Report, Berlin 
February 2007 Analysis of studies discussing benefits of REACH, prepared 
by the German Institute for Environmental Strategies, 
Ökopol 
June 2007  
REACH enters into force 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
ECHA GUIDANCE ON REACH 
 
Name Content Length Functions
1
 
Guidance on 
Information 
Requirements and 
Chemical Safety 
Assessment
2
 
The Guidance consists of two major parts: 
Concise guidance (Part A to G) and 
supporting reference guidance (Chapters R.2 
to R.20). In total, 28 separate guidance 
documents.  
 
Parts A – G = 
356 pages; 
119,859 
words.  
Total for this 
guidance: 
more than 700 
pages; more 
than 200,000 
words. 
 Amplification 
 Standardsation 
(e.g. composition 
and content of 
registration 
dossier) 
Guidance for 
Annex V 
This document describes the exemptions 
from the obligation to register in accordance 
with Article 2(7)(b) of the REACH 
Regulation. 
55 pages; 
17,508 words 
 Amplification 
Guidance on 
Registration 
“This document describes when and how to 
register a substance under REACH.” 
126 pages; 
53,501 words 
 Amplification 
(e.g. definition of 
a ‘Lead 
Registrant’) 
Guidance on 
Monomers and 
Polymers 
“This document describes the specific 
provisions for polymers and monomers 
under REACH.” 
 
26 pages; 
9,268 words 
 Amplification 
Guidance on Data 
Sharing 
“This document describes data sharing 
mechanisms for phase-in and non phase-in 
substances under REACH. It includes the 
communication within the SIEF and the cost 
sharing guidance. The document also 
describes the Confidential Business 
Information and Competition Law issues in 
the context of data sharing.” 
148 pages;  
66,286 words 
 Amplification 
(e.g. assessment 
of data quality; 
role and 
functioning of 
data holders) 
 Standardisation 
(.e.g. advice on 
consortia; use of 
ITPs) 
 Translation (e.g. 
point at which a 
SIEF is formed; 
how data in a 
SIEF should be 
shared) 
 
                                                        
1
 This thesis has highlighted four functions of ECHA’s guidance: amplification; standardisation; 
extrapolation; and translation. This column details which functions are seen with each guidance 
document and highlights a number of particularly noteworthy examples. 
2
 <http://echa.europa.eu/web/guest/guidance-documents/guidance-on-information-requirements-
and-chemical-safety-assessment> accessed 10 August 2014 
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Guidance for 
Identification of 
Substances 
“This document describes how to name and 
identify a substance under REACH and 
CLP.” 
118 pages; 
35,423 words 
 Amplification 
 Standardisation 
(e.g. how to 
determine 
chemical 
‘sameness’) 
 Extrapolation 
(e.g. notion of 
UVCB 
substances) 
Guidance on the 
compilation of 
Safety Data 
Sheets 
This guidance provides information on 
issues to consider when compiling a Safety 
Data Sheet (an SDS), details of the 
requirements for information to be included 
within each Section of an SDS - in particular 
detailing the changes arising from the 
different revisions of Annex II of REACH 
and transition periods for implementation of 
these changes. It also gives general 
information on for which substances and 
mixtures SDSs needs to be provided and by 
whom.    
125 pages; 
49,872 words 
 Amplification 
(e.g. definition of 
‘competent 
person’) 
 Extrapolation 
(e.g. required 
language of 
SDS’) 
Guidance on 
requirements for 
substances in 
articles 
This document assists producers and 
importers of articles in identifying whether 
they have obligations under REACH; in 
particular in relation to registration and 
notification according to Article 7, and in 
relation to article supply chain 
communication according to Article 33. 
87 pages;  
30,188 words 
 Amplification 
(e.g. how Article 
33(2) works) 
Guidance on 
preparation of an 
application for 
authorization 
This document describes how to prepare an 
application for authorisation and provides 
guidance on analysis of the alternatives and 
substitution plan. It also describes how third 
parties may prepare and submit information 
on alternatives. 
141 pages; 
61,706 words 
 Amplification 
 Standardisation 
Guidance on 
Socio-Economic 
Analysis – 
Authorisation 
This document assists applicants making an 
application for an authorisation to prepare a 
socio-economic analysis. 
260 pages; 
98,380 words 
 Amplification 
 Extrapolation 
(e.g. requirement 
for SEA when 
adequate control 
demonstrated) 
 Translation (e.g. 
requirement for 
formal SEA when 
not using 
adequate control 
route/misreading 
of Article 
65(2)(a)) 
Guidance on 
Intermediates 
This document describes when and how the 
specific provisions for the registration of 
intermediates under REACH can be used. 
49 pages; 
17,696 words 
 Amplification 
Guidance on the 
Communication 
This guidance document is intended to be 
used mainly by Member State Competent 
68 pages; 
23,924 words 
 Amplification 
 Standardisation 
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of Information on 
the Risks and 
Safe Uses of 
Chemicals 
Authorities (MSCAs) in communicating 
about the risks of chemicals, specifically in 
the context of the REACH Regulation. 
(but weak, due to 
use of qualified 
language by 
ECHA) 
Guidance on 
Waste and 
Recovered 
Substances 
This document describes under which 
conditions legal entities recovering 
substances from waste can benefit from the 
exemption laid down in article 2(7)(d) of 
REACH and elaborates the obligation to 
share information in the supply chain as put 
forward in title IV of REACH. 
 
36 pages; 
17,775 words 
 Amplification 
Guidance on 
Priority Setting 
for Evaluation 
This document describes the different 
priority setting methods developed to 
prioritise dossiers, testing proposals or 
substances for evaluation and gives guidance 
for the Agency and the Member States 
Competent Authorities on the application of 
these methods. 
 
53 pages; 
19,488 words 
 Standardisation 
 Amplification 
 Translation (e.g. 
misreading of 
Article 
41(1)/criteria for 
testing proposals) 
Guidance on 
Socio-Economic 
Analysis – 
Restrictions 
This document assists Member State 
Competent Authorities and the Agency (on a 
request from the Commission) in preparing 
and using a socio-economic analysis when 
developing an Annex XV dossier for 
Restriction. Further, it assists interested 
parties in preparing a socio-economic 
analysis or providing information in order to 
contribute to one. 
211 pages; 
79,345 words 
 Amplification 
 Extrapolation 
(e.g. hierarchy of 
SEA impacts; 
triggers for 
restriction; 
requirement for 
SEA when 
adequate control 
demonstrated;  
Guidance on 
SR&D and 
PPORD 
This document describes specific provisions 
under REACH for substances manufactured, 
imported or used in scientific Research and 
Development (SR&D) and Product and 
Process Oriented Research and 
Development (PPORD). 
 
18 pages; 
5,914 words 
 Amplification 
Guidance for 
Downstream 
Users 
This document describes the roles and 
obligations of downstream users, and 
advises them on how to prepare for the 
implementation for REACH.    
160 pages; 
66,066 words 
 Amplification 
Guidance on 
Dossier and 
Substance 
Evaluation 
This document describes the evaluation 
tasks to be performed by the Authorities: 
evaluation of testing proposals and 
compliance check by the Agency and 
substance evaluation by the Member States 
Competent Authorities. 
139 pages; 
45,983 words 
 Amplification 
 Standardisation 
(e.g. steps to be 
taken by ECHA 
during the 
compliance 
check) 
Guidance for 
Preparation of an 
Annex XV 
dossier on 
This document describes how the authorities 
(Member States Competent Authorities or 
the Agency) can prepare an Annex XV 
dossier to identify a substance of very high 
58 pages; 
22,393 words 
 Amplification 
 Standardisation 
 Extrapolation 
(e.g. consultation 
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Identification of 
SVHCs 
concern. requirement on 
Member States) 
Guidance for 
Preparation of an 
Annex XV 
dossier for 
Restrictions 
This document describes how the authorities 
(Member States Competent Authorities or 
the Agency on request from the 
Commission) can prepare an Annex XV 
dossier to propose a restriction under 
REACH. 
130 pages; 
44,141 words 
 Amplification 
 Standardisation 
Guidance on 
Inclusion of 
Substances in 
Annex XIV 
This guidance document was withdrawn, but 
a copy of the original version is on file with 
the author.  
12 pages; 
6,048 words   
 
 
 Not Relevant (as 
document 
withdrawn) 
 
